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Title: Licensing American Physicians: 1870-1907
In 1870, physicians in United States were not licensed by the state or federal 
governments, but by 1900 almost every state and territory passed some form of medical 
licensing.  Regular physicians originally promoted licensing laws as way to marginalize 
competing Homeopathic and Eclectic physicians, but eventually, elite Regular physicians 
worked with organized, educated Homeopathic and Eclectic physicians to lobby for 
medical licensing laws.  Physicians knew that medical licensing was not particularly 
appealing to state legislatures.  Therefore, physicians successfully packaged licensing 
laws with broader public health reforms to convince state legislatures that they were 
necessary.  By tying medical licensing laws with public health measures, physicians also 
provided a strong legal basis for courts to find these laws constitutional.  While courts 
were somewhat skeptical of licensing, judges ultimately found that licensing laws were a 
constitutional use of state police powers.  
The quasi-governmental organizations created by licensing laws used their legal 
authority to expand the scope of the practice of medicine and slowly sought to force all 
medical specialists to obtain medical licenses.  By expanding the scope of the practice of 
medicine, physicians successfully seized control of most aspects of healthcare.  These 
iv
organizations also sought to eliminate any unlicensed medical competition by requiring 
all medical specialists to attend medical schools approved by state licensing boards.  
Ultimately, licensing laws and a growing understanding of medical science gradually 
merged the three largest competing medical sects and unified the practice of medicine 
under physicians.        
This dissertation includes previously published materials.
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This dissertation examines the passage and enforcement of medical licensing laws 
in the United States between 1870 and 1907.1  During this time, every state and territory 
except Alaska enacted medical licensing laws that regulated their physicians.  This legal 
transformation occurred at a time when there was a split in American medical practice 
among three major medical sects: Regulars, Homeopaths, and Eclectics.  Each of these 
medical sects was hampered by a limited understanding of health and disease, and none 
of them could prove that their approach to healing was superior to any other.  Despite this 
division, physicians persuaded state legislatures to enact laws that established 
government or quasi-governmental agencies run by physicians to license doctors.  Instead 
of relying on the free market, physicians convinced state legislatures that medicine 
needed to be regulated to protect their citizens.  In doing so, states helped create the 
beginnings of the twentieth-century administrative state. 
What is licensing?  Historian William Rothstein defined licensing “as [a] 
certification by the state of a member of a profession who meets certain criteria 
pertaining to practice of that profession.”  Rothstein noted that typically “members of 
almost all professions” actively lobbied for licensing “as a means of regulating the supply 
1
1 Approximately 8 pages of Chapters VII and X were originally was published as “Enforcing 
Medical Licensing in Illinois: 1877-1890” Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine 82 (June 2009).
of labor in a profession.”2  During the colonial and early republic era, some states did 
have a few medical regulations.  Typically, these laws were not true licensing laws, but 
they allowed physicians to collect payment from patients.  Most of these early medical 
regulations were repealed during the Jacksonian era, and by 1850, state legislatures ended 
medical licensing.  It was not until the 1870s that physicians began to pass true licensing 
laws in the United States.         
Despite the importance of medical licensing, only a few scholars have ever 
focused exclusively on this legislative revolution.  In 1967, Richard Harrison Shryock 
published Medical Licensing in America, 1650-1965.  Shryock’s book focused on the 
“dual themes of education and licensure – using each of those terms in a broad sense.”  
While Shryock’s work was groundbreaking, it was not meant to be comprehensive.  
Shryock sought to describe the gradual professionalization of the medical profession, but 
his study did not adequately address the messy reality of medical licensing at the turn of 
the nineteenth century.  Shryock’s primary goal was to combat the belief that physicians 
secured medical licensing because their stature grew during the nineteenth century.  
Shryrock effectively dismantled this notion, but he did not do nearly enough to explain 
how doctors finally persuaded legislatures to adopt medical licensing.3  
In 1979, Ronald Harmowy argued that organized physicians (especially those in 
the American Medical Association) dramatically damaged health care in the United States 
by restricting the number of people who could become doctors from going to medical 
2
2 William Rothstein, American Physicians in the Nineteenth Century: From Sects to Science 
(Baltimore and London, John Hopkins University Press, 1972), 20. 
3 Richard Harrison Shryock, Medical Licensing in America, 1650-1965 (Baltimore, Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1967), viii.
school.  He deprecated the idea that the adoption of medical licensing was an attempt by 
physicians to improve medical care and argued instead that doctors were primarily 
interested in improving their economic interests. Unfortunately, Harmowy undermined 
his argument by speculating that licensing resulted in lower quality care and higher costs.  
While he made several interesting arguments, he hypothesizes that most of the costs 
associated with health care could be dramatically reduced if licensing was avoided.  
Harmowy failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his broader claim regarding the 
ultimate effect of licensing on the cost of health care.4
In a 1984 article, Samuel Baker focused on tracking the type of medical licensing 
laws that were passed between 1870 and 1910.  At times, the distinction he made between 
registration and licensing laws was somewhat confusing, but he did an outstanding job 
showing when states passed specific laws.  He also attempted to explain whether the 
“appearance” was caused by advancements in germ theory or efforts by physicians to 
limit competition.  Baker argued that because elite physicians were most likely to support 
licensing, they were not motivated by financial gain.  He proposed that they were already 
secure in their profession and would have little financial benefit from the expansion of 
medical licensing.  Therefore, they arguably had nobler reasons for their views.  
While that was an intriguing idea, Regulars, Homeopaths, and Eclectics possessed 
different reasons for supporting or opposing these laws based on their status in the 
profession, their sect, their financial condition, their educational attainment, and the 
nature of their practice. Still, Baker’s contention that organized, elite physicians wanted 
3
4 Ronald Harmowy, “The Early Development of Medical Licensing Laws in the United States, 
1875-1900,” The Journal of Libertarian Studies, 1979. 
to compromise with each other to enact licensing was accurate.  Whether their support for 
licensing laws was motivated by lofty aspirations for the medical profession is 
debatable.5  
Medical Licensing and Discipline in America by David A. Johnson and Humayun 
J. Chaudhry, examined the role of the Federation of Medical Examiners on licensing and 
enforcing discipline.  While the book provides a solid synthesis of existing material on 
the nineteenth century, their work focuses on licensing reforms after 1921, when these 
laws were already substantially in place.  Their book focuses on the key role played by 
the Federation of State Medical Boards during the twentieth century.  They did not add 
any new information to our understanding of how licensing was originally enacted during 
the Gilded Age and Progressive era.6
The most recent book on medical licensing, James C. Mohr’s, Licensed to 
Practice: The Supreme Court Defines the American Medical Profession, takes an in depth 
look into the history of the United States Supreme Court case, Dent v. West Virginia, that 
found medical licensing to be constitutional.  Mohr examined the drama that followed the 
state’s licensing law and explored the case that led to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Dent v. West Virginia.7  Mohr’s book is the definitive case study of this important 
Supreme Court decision that dramatically expanded the role of government in the 
nineteenth century.   
4
5 Samuel Baker, “Physician Licensure Laws in the United States, 1865-1915,” Journal of the 
History of Medicine and Allied Sciences (Volume 39, Issue 2, April 1984), 173-197.  
6 David A. Johnson and Humayun J. Chaudry, Medical Licensing and Discipline in America:  A 
History of the Federation of the State Medical Boards, (Lexington Books, Plymouth UK, 2012).
7 James C. Mohr, Licensed to Practice: The Supreme Court Defines the American Medical 
Profession, (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013).
Aside from a few small journal articles that examine the history of medical 
licensing in Illinois, these are the only published works that focus exclusively on medical 
licensing.8  A few more general medical histories such as William Rothstein’s American 
Physicians in the Nineteenth Century, Paul Starr’s The Social Transformation of 
American Medicine, and William Novak’s The People’s Welfare also have briefly 
examined medical licensing, but each of these works addressed medical licensing in a 
tangential fashion.  Historians of Homeopaths, Eclectics, Osteopaths, and Christian 
Science also have examined medical licensing, but they almost exclusively focused on 
the impact of licensing on the specific medical sect in their study.9  Nobody has written a 
broad-based history of licensing that shows how it expanded throughout the United States 
or how these laws were enforced.  
Licensing was critical because it disrupted the key feature of nineteenth-century 
medicinal marketplace – unfettered competition.  Eminent historian George Rosen, 
among others, contended that “competition” between physicians for clients was “an 
accepted fact of professional life” for American physicians.10  The lack of significant 
medical licensing contributed to this unfettered competition.  American newspapers and 
5
8 Clinton Sandvick, “Enforcing Medical Licensing in Illinois:  1877-1890” Yale Journal of 
Biology and Medicine 82 (June 2009); Kenneth Schnepp, “Medical Licensure in Illinois: An 
Historical Review” Federation of Bulletin 64 (1977).  
9 Martin Kaufman, Homeopathy in America: The Rise and Fall of a Medical Heresy (Baltimore 
and London, The Johns Hopkins Press,  1971); John S. Haller, Medical Protestants:  The 
Eclectics in American Medicine, 1825-1939 (Carbondale and Edwardsville, Southern Illinois 
University, 1994); John S. Haller, The History of Homeopathy:  The Academic Years, 1820-1935 
(New Brunswick, New Jersey, and London, Rutgers University Press,  2005);  Norman Gevitz,  
The DOs:  Osteopathic Medicine in America, 2nd edition, (Baltimore, John Hopkins University 
Press,  1982, 2004);, Rennnie Schoepflin, B., Christian Science on Trial:  Religious Healing in 
America, (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).
10 George Rosen, The Structure of American Medical Practice:  1875 - 1941 (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1983), 19.
magazines of this era were littered with advertisements for physicians, healers, and 
miracle cures.  Additionally, the number of medical schools in the United States exploded 
during the nineteenth century.  Not only were the medical schools churning out large 
numbers of physicians, but tenacious Irregular physicians challenged the physicians from 
the dominant Regular medical sect.  Historian Paul Starr argued that the position of 
physicians in the nineteenth century was “somewhat precarious.”  Physicians did not 
have a fixed path to success and prosperity.  If anything, physicians struggled to develop 
medical practices that could support them and their families.  Not surprisingly, Starr  
described a profession that was increasingly divided between well-connected, organized 
elites and ordinary practitioners.  Entrance into top ranks of medicine often depended on 
the proper surname or the correct ethnic background.11   
This is the medical marketplace described by Rosen.  Regulars, Homeopaths, and 
Eclectics competed with each other across the country.  While it is undeniable that this 
was a fiercely competitive marketplace, Rosen went one step further and argued that 
physicians generally believed that medical practitioners should be free from 
“governmental interference.”  He stated that most physicians celebrated their 
“egalitarianism” and generally believed in the wisdom of a competitive marketplace.12  
Rosen’s conclusion is suspect.  While a few doctors praised competition and the 
free market, physicians were not committed champions of the free market.  Between 
1850 and 1900, medical societies throughout the country were obsessed with regulating 
6
11 Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign 
Profession and the Making of a Vast Industry, (Basic Books, Inc., 1982), 85, 89.
12 Rosen, The Structure of the American Medical Practice, 19-20.  
the practice of medicine and curbing the free market.  The continuous and relentless 
efforts by physicians to pass state medical licensing laws demonstrated that they did not 
trust the free market.  If physicians truly had accepted the free market, then they never 
would have attempted to impose licensing.  Educated and experienced physicians 
desperately sought to short-circuit the chaotic medical marketplace and establish a less 
competitive, more orderly and regulated one.  Physicians essentially sought to create 
government-mandated guilds that not only limited the total number of practicing 
physicians, but would eventually require all physicians to complete extensive education 
and practicable experience including graduating from a medical school, taking a specific 
set of courses, passing a licensing exam, and following a strict code of ethics to keep their 
licenses.  While Rosen is correct that doctors did, to some extent, publicly laud the free 
market, their efforts to pass medical regulation clearly undermined the operation of the 
free market.13
Physicians favored licensing because they believed it could improve their 
standing in the community.  Paul Starr wrote that “the rise of the medical profession 
depended on the growth of its own authority.”14  Physicians undermined their own 
authority because they were ineffective healers, but they hoped that they could elevate 
their status and increase their authority by imposing licensing.  During the nineteenth 
century, physicians had been hampered by a fundamental lack of understanding of 
science, and the human body and its ailments.  Physicians simply did not have the tools 
7
13 Rosen, The Structure of the American Medical Practice, 13-37.  
14 Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign 
Profession and the Making of a Vast Industry, (Basic Books, Inc., 1982).
or scientific understanding to effectively treat their patients.  These failures were not their 
fault, but doctors at the time lacked the knowledge to improve the practice of medicine.  
Medical licensing gave physicians another route to legitimacy.  By passing medical 
licensing laws, doctors hoped for the imprimatur of state authority and sought to control 
who could become a physician.  The key question then becomes: How did physicians 
convince every state and territorial legislature to pass medical licensing in the United 
States over an approximately thirty year period despite the failure of any medical sect to 
successfully show that they were demonstrably superior in the healing arts?  Physicians 
never demonstrated during the Gilded Age that they knew what constituted minimum 
standards for physicians because they fundamentally did not understand how the illness 
and disease operated.  Despite a rudimentary understanding of medicine, physicians 
successfully persuaded state legislatures to create licensing laws.      
 This study attempts to answer this question.  The primary goal of this dissertation 
is to highlight trends that were present across the country.  To accomplish this task, 
several states have been examined thoroughly including Alabama, California, Illinois, 
Indiana, Missouri, New York, Oregon, and Texas.  Each of these states is used to 
highlight different aspects of the development of licensing in the United States.  Because 
of the uneven nature of medical regulation, definitive timelines of medical legislation are 
difficult to detail, but it is possible to discern three phases of medical licensing:  
1865-1885, 1885-1900, and 1900-1910.   
During the first phase of medical licensing between 1865 and 1885, medical 
organizations lobbied state legislatures for medical licensing.  During this timeframe, 
8
doctors typically proposed two different types of regulatory schemes: medical registration 
and medical licensing.  Medical registration usually required physicians only to register 
with the county clerk.  Registration laws were not designed to regulate medicine, but 
were seen as a gateway to medical licensing.  Other states, including Illinois and 
California, created medical licensing systems where physicians were required to pass 
medical exams or graduate from a medical school in good standing to secure a license.  
During the second phase of licensing, most states began to repeal registration acts 
and move slowly toward medical licenses issued by newly created examining or state 
boards of health.  Medical registration laws had proven to be ineffective because they 
failed to eliminate medical practitioners that elite physicians had hoped to eliminate.  
After 1885, only two states passed medical registration laws.  Increasingly, medical 
school boards began to evaluate the quality of various medical schools.  Initially, medical 
boards sought to eliminate diploma mills, but their requirements for medical schools soon 
expanded.  Medical boards became increasingly interested in dictating the length and 
type of education that medical schools offered.  
In third phase starting around 1900, medical boards were faced with determining 
which of the new medical specialists were practicing medicine.  Medical boards 
prosecuted anyone whose medical speciality could be seen as even tangentially related to 
the practice of medicine.  Osteopaths and Christian Scientists were new challengers who 
threatened the hegemony of the three major medical sects.  These new specialists often 
were forced to lobby state legislatures for either special privileges or exemptions to 
physician licensing laws. Additionally, states began to unify medical licensing boards and 
9
increasingly required physicians to pass medical exams.  States also began to create 
unified boards where Eclectics, Homeopaths, and Regulars served together.  These 
unified boards gradually helped to erode the walls among the three major sects and unify 
medicine. 
Ultimately, this study is focused on the passage of medical licensing laws and the 
early efforts to enforce them.  Regulars originally intended to use licensing to eliminate 
their Irregular brethren, but it became obvious almost immediately that this was not going 
to work.  Regulars relied on Irregular support to pass these laws, and licensing also 
legitimized Irregular practitioners.  While Regulars and Irregulars continued to disparage 
each other publicly, medical licensing and boards of health prosecuted more marginal and 
less legitimate medical practitioners.  Additionally, licensing laws were used to eliminate 
opposition to licensing by prosecuting physicians who refused licensing on legal grounds.
   
10
CHAPTER II
REGULARS, HOMEOPATHS, AND ECLECTICS
Nineteenth-century medicine was characterized by constant competition among 
three major medical sects: Regulars, Eclectics, and Homeopaths.  These three medical 
sects meaningfully disagreed on how to treat illnesses and diseases.  Arguably none of the 
three sects was superior to the others, but their adherents concluded that their sectarian 
beliefs were better than their competitors.  Regulars were the inheritors of Galenic 
tradition and were the largest and most established of the three sects.  Homeopaths 
represented a new approach to medicine with a new unified medical system developed in 
the eighteenth century.  Homeopaths were quite successful in the United States and 
represented the biggest threat to the Regulars’ dominance of medicine.  The Eclectics 
were true to their name.  They were a diverse sect composed of dissident Regulars, 
herbalists, and medical reformers.             
Before 1800, western medical therapeutics changed remarkably little over the last 
2,000 years.15  Traditional Regular physicians (also known as Allopaths) might have 
viewed themselves as learned professionals, but Galen’s 2,000-year-old “four humoral 
theory” was the basis for their therapeutic methods.  “The body was seen, metaphorically, 
as a system of dynamic interactions with its environment,” and physicians believed that 
11
15 Charles E. Rosenburg, “The Therapeutic Revolution:  Medicine, Meaning and Social Change in 
Nineteenth-Century America,” in The Therapeutic Revolution: Essays in the Social History of 
American Medicine, ed. Moris J. Vogel and Charles E. Rosenburg, (Philadephia, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1979), 3.
specific diseases played an insignificant role in the system.16  During the nineteenth 
century, this understanding of the human body came under assault because it was not 
effective in treating human illnesses.  
Many formally educated physicians (Regulars) were the followers of Galen’s 
therapeutic legacy, but during the nineteenth century they became increasingly devoted to 
the principles of scientific medicine.  They began to believe in the “long-term efficacy of 
such principles as rational research and cooperative intercommunication.”  The Regulars 
created medical societies and journals and attempted to combat the abysmal standards of 
American medical schools.17  Their approach to medicine was essentially scientific, but 
their alleged reliance on science produced few results until the late nineteenth century 
because they lacked the tools to truly understand viruses, bacteria, and human 
physiology.18  As a result, the Regulars’ dominance of American medical practice eroded 
dramatically between 1820 and 1850, and competing medical sects and systems evolved 
to fill the vacuum.19
During colonial period, some colonies had passed rudimentary licensing laws, but 
these licensing laws were ineffectual and were mostly eliminated by the Jacksonian era.  
Some historians have argued that the public’s perception of the Regulars declined after 
1830.  According to Kenneth De Ville, physicians in the mid-1800s “saw an intimate 
12
16 Rosenburg, The Therapeutic Revolution, 5, 6.
17 James Mohr, Abortion in America: The Origins and Evolution of National Policy, 1800-1900 
(New York, Oxford University Press, 1978), 33.
18 Joseph F. Kett, The Formation of the American Medical Profession: The Role of Institutions, 
1780-1860 (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1968), 162.
19 Rosen, The Structure of American Medical Practice, 20.  
connection between Jacksonian rhetoric, their decline in status, the abolition of licensure, 
and the increase in malpractice suits.”20   Richard Harrison Shryock argued that 
Americans always distrusted their doctors and that they had only become more vocal in 
their opinions by 1840.21  
A number of the Regulars’ problems were self-inflicted.  The medical profession’s 
inability to maintain those early colonial laws was “hampered by disorganization and 
slackened requirements.”22  Many Regular physicians were seen as incompetent and 
ineffective.  During the mid-nineteenth century, Regulars were hobbled by a 
fundamentally flawed understanding of medicine.  Woefully inadequate Regular medical 
schools also sprouted throughout the country.  These schools were staffed by poorly 
trained practitioners and driven by profits, not educational excellence.  Admission 
standards for most American medical schools could be best described as non-existent.  
Ronald Numbers quoted a physician who wrote, “[i]t is well understood among college 
boys that after a man has failed in scholarship, failed in writing, failed in speaking, failed 
in every purpose for which he entered college; after he has dropped down from class to 
class; after he has been kicked out of college, there is one unfailing city of refuge – the 
profession of medicine.”23
As the Regulars’ monopoly over medicine waned during the nineteenth century, 
numerous medical sects quickly developed.  In time, these dissenters became known as 
13
20 Kenneth Allen De Ville, Medical Malpractice in Nineteenth-Century America:  Origins and 
Legacy (New York and London, New York University Press, 1990), 87.
21 Shryock, Medical Licensing in America, 106.
22 Kett, American Medical Profession, 31.
23 Numbers, Sickness, 226.
Irregulars. In some ways, these medical sects were pushed and pulled by the same fervor 
that led to the creation of many new and unique Christian faiths during the Second Great 
Awakening.  Like those assorted faiths, some of these sects were little more than fads and 
disappeared quickly after their birth.  However, two Irregular medical sects, the Eclectics 
and the Homeopaths, became formidable competitors to the traditional Regulars during 
the nineteenth century.  Several unorthodox medical sects arose because they believed 
that heroic medical practice of the Regulars was extremely dangerous.24    
Homeopaths in many ways resembled Regulars.  Like Regulars, they were 
initially trained by experienced physicians as apprentices, but eventually they developed 
their own medical schools.  They created local, state, and national medical societies. 
Homeopathy replaced the earlier herbalist sect known as Thomsonianism to become the 
most prominent unorthodox medical practice in America.  Samuel Christian Hahnemann, 
a German physician and theorist, developed the underlying theories and medical practices 
of Homeopathy in 1790s.  Hahnemann established a medical system based on the 
principle of similia and the law of infinitesimals.25  The principle of similia held that 
physicians should treat patients with drugs that created the same symptoms in a healthy 
person that were being exhibited by an illness.  Hahnemann created the law of the 
infinitesimal and he argued that the smaller and more agitated the dose of medicine, the 
more potent it became.  While Hahnemann’s therapeutic theories were not particularly 
sound, Homeopathic patients benefited from their doctors’ willingness to allow the body 
14
24 Martin Kaufman, Homeopathy in America:  The Rise and Fall of a Medical Heresy (Baltimore 
and London, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 23.
25 Kaufman, Homeopathy in America, 23-24.
to combat illness without much interference.  Additionally, the drugs advocated by 
Homeopathic physicians were extremely diluted and did not actively harm their patients 
unlike Regulars.  In essence, Homeopaths allowed their patients’ bodies to heal 
themselves and they did not further endanger their patients with bleedings and purgings 
as the Regulars did. 
Eclectic physicians differed from both Homeopaths and Regulars.  Eclectic 
physicians were the indirect descendants of the preexisting botanic movement known as 
Thomsonians.  Unlike the Thomsonians, however they did not just provide herbal 
remedies.  They incorporated herbal remedies into their practice, but they also worked as 
surgeons and utilized some Regular medical practices.  As Thomsonianism was displaced 
by Homeopathy as the second largest medical sect, the remaining professional 
Thomsonsian practitioners allied with disgruntled Regulars and other medical reformers 
to form Eclectic medicine in 1830s and 1840s.  Eclectics were a discordant group.  They 
were extremely independent and predisposed to oppose any type governmental 
regulation.  Unlike Homeopathy, Eclectics did not have a rigid medical orthodoxy.  
Eclecticism was true to its name; it was a mishmash of different types of physicians who 
practiced medicine as they saw fit.  Unlike traditional Thomsonians, Eclectics encouraged 
medical education, and they took a far more pragmatic approach to medical treatment.26  
Eclectics saw themselves as reformers and dissidents from traditional European medical 
tradition.  Eclectics rejected the four humoral theory and sought to end “the vast amount 
of human suffering, the anguish of soul, the premature decay, and death, resulting from 
15
26 Kaufman, Homeopathy in America, fn. 114.
this Paganism [Galenism] in medicine.”27  Their objections to Regular medicine were 
well-founded.  Many Eclectics were originally trained in Regular medical schools or by 
Regular physicians, but became disenchanted with heroic medicine and shifted towards a 
more pragmatic approach to health care.       
Like Regulars, both Homeopaths and Eclectics were interested in organization 
and formal education.  Homeopathic and Eclectic physicians created medical societies 
and began publishing medical journals throughout the country.  The Homeopaths and 
Eclectics created medical schools that taught their medical systems, and these schools 
competed for students with Regular schools.  
Each of the three sects created local, state, and national organizations.  
Homeopaths formed their national organization, the National Institute of Homeopathy in 
1843. The Regulars formed the American Medical Association, three years after the 
formation of the National Institute of Homeopathy.  Eclectics also attempted to form a 
national organization, but it was scuttled after few years.  The Eclectics would not 
reestablish a national voice until the 1870s.      
While Numbers argued that the development of the Irregular sects undermined the 
status of the Regulars, it is just as likely that the ineffectiveness of traditional Regular 
medicine and the ambiguous benefits of early Regular medical science spurred the 
expansion of these new sects.28  If Regulars had demonstrated to the public that their 
therapies were successful, patients might not have searched for alternatives.  John B. 
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Beck wrote a series of articles in 1847 and 1848 in the New York Journal of Medicine, 
which argued that heroic treatments such as blistering, mercury, and bloodletting were 
dangerous and potentially lethal, especially when employed by reckless physicians.29  
Beck challenged the basic tenets and undermined Regular medicine in general.  The 
gradual shift away from heroic treatments could have also undermined public trust in 
Regular medicine.  While heroic methods were dangerous, the public would not 
necessarily have known that.  All they would see was a major shift in how they were 
treated by their doctors.   Homeopathy, Eclecticism, and later Osteopathy and Christian 
Science, gained adherents because of the growing public skepticism of the efficacy of 
Regular medicine.  Homeopaths presented the greatest threat to Regulars because they 
persuasively argued that their therapeutic methods were potentially more scientific than 
those of the Regulars and they obtained credibility comparable to Regular physicians.  
In 1912, Frederick R. Green, at the behest of the American Medical Association, 
wrote that medicine began to fundamentally change after the Civil War because “the old 
order of things had been practically wiped out.”  Green’s assessment was accurate.  
Educated Regular physicians were forced to rethink the historical tenants of Regular 
medicine.  Additionally, Regulars faced legitimate challenges from Eclectic and 
Homeopathic physicians who argued that Regular medicine was ineffective and 
unscientific.30
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Concerned physicians from the Medical Society of the State of New York sought 
to create a national movement to raise the standards in American medical schools.  These 
Regulars called for a national convention of medical societies and schools to be held in 
1846.  In 1846, delegates decided to create a national medical society, the American 
Medical Association (AMA).  The delegates hoped the AMA would enable the medical 
profession to regain some of its former luster. 31  The newly formed AMA immediately 
identified three aspects of American medical practice that needed to be reformed.  First, 
the association conjectured that most students were inadequately prepared for the rigors 
of a medical education.  The AMA argued that medical schools needed to demonstrate the 
“firmness to reject all importunity not sustained by real and appreciable qualification.”32  
At the time, medical schools rarely refused admission to any candidates regardless of 
their qualifications or abilities.  Second, the AMA wanted to ensure “competent and 
complete instruction” for the nation’s medical students.33  Finally, the AMA wanted to 
have a “severer test of qualification for admission into the profession.”34  The AMA 
would gradually see licensing as the best way to accomplish this final goal.
While the AMA’s efforts to reform medical education were largely ineffectual in 
the nineteenth century, the group successfully established itself as the national hub for 
local and state medical societies.  In this role, the AMA was a strong proponent of 
medical licensing and encouraged state and local societies to lobby their state legislatures 
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to eliminate Irregulars.  The AMA advocated for medical regulation that would limit 
competition between Regulars and Irregulars, reduce the total number of practicing 
physicians, stop the growth of malpractice actions, and improve the quality of medical 
care.  Regardless of the positions taken by the AMA, the general public did not appear to 
support medical licensing.  Public support for registration or licensing laws was tepid at 
best.  When physicians lobbied for medical licensing in state legislatures, they often did it  
on their own.    
While the AMA was a strong advocate for licensing, its Code of Ethics and its 
general hostility towards Irregular practitioners were generally counterproductive in its 
fight for medical licensing.  To become members of the AMA, the AMA required local 
and state societies to adopt its Code of Ethics.  The code barred Regular physicians from 
consulting with any Irregular practitioners and fostered an antagonistic relationship 
between Regular and Irregular doctors.    
The code further complicated efforts to pass medical licensing because Regular 
physicians were often initially both unwilling to cooperate and were openly hostile to the 
Irregulars.35  The AMA code not only prevented Regular physicians from consulting with 
Irregulars, but encouraged local and state medical societies to expel Regular physicians 
who utilized Irregular treatments.  If medical societies failed to purge those colleagues, 
they were not permitted to send delegates to the national AMA convention.  
 A prominent example of the problem arose in 1870, when the Massachusetts 
Regular chapter of medicine was given an ultimatum by the AMA to expel questionable 
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members or else lose its privileges at the national convention.  After a wrenching internal 
debate and the unpopular removal of several prominent physicians, the Massachusetts 
Medical Society ruined its reputation when the public supported Homeopaths in this 
dispute.36  Instead of eliminating the influence of Homeopaths in Massachusetts, the 
“persecution [of the physicians] strengthened the will” of the martyred Homeopaths and 
reinvigorated Irregular practice.  By antagonizing the state’s Homeopathic physicians, 
Massachusetts’s Regulars also undermined their attempts to passing medical licensing 
laws for the next twenty-four years.  It also should not be surprising that Regular state 
medical societies vigorously renewed their push for licensing at the same time as the last 
Homeopaths were being purged from Regular state medical societies.37      
After the American Medical Association had expunged Irregulars from local 
medical societies, Eclectics realized that they needed to reestablish a national association 
to protect themselves from the AMA.  The original national organization was founded 
after a group of physicians from the “Eclectic Reform School” met in Cincinnati, Ohio, at 
the Eclectic Medical Institute for the National Convention of Eclectic Physicians in 1850.  
This first National Convention morphed into a new organization, the National Eclectic 
Medical Association (NEMA).  Unlike the AMA, the first NEMA did not survive.  In 
1856, the chairman of the Committee on the State and Progress of Medical Reform 
complained that an insufficient number of Eclectic physicians were attending NEMA’s 
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decried the “apathy manifested by Eclectics in not sustaining their organizations.”  The 
diverse nature of Eclectic medicine undoubtedly undermined attempts to create a 
cohesive membership organization.39
In June 1869, in response to the growing threat of the AMA and Regulars pushing 
for new licensing laws, the Eclectic Medical Society of the State of New York and the 
Reformed Medical Association of the United States organized a committee to explore 
holding a nationwide convention for “Physicians belonging to the New School of 
Medicine.”  These physicians were deeply concerned about the Regular threat to their 
medical practice.  Additionally, Eclectics did not have an effective national voice to 
advocate on their behalf.  The early version of the Eclectic’s national organization folded 
six years after it was founded in 1850.  
In 1870, the New York Eclectic society contacted various state medical societies 
and Eclectic medical colleges and proposed holding a national convention in Chicago, 
Illinois.  In fall 1870, Eclectic physicians from around the country descended on Chicago 
and created a new national Eclectic organization.  A prominent New York physician, 
Robert S. Newton, welcomed the Eclectics to Chicago and informed them that “persons 
connected with the different branches of the profession” hoped their meeting would fail, 
but he asked the attending doctors to let “nothing but harmony and peace prevail.”  While 
Newton’s congregation was quite small, he sought to create an organization that could 
represent the interests of an estimated ten-thousand American Eclectic physicians.  These 
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physicians voted to create a new national organization, the National Eclectic Medical 
Association (NEMA).40
By 1870, these three national medical organizations along with their local and 
state affiliates began the thirty-year battle over licensing in America.  All of these 
organizations played a critical role in shaping and passing the new licensing laws.  While 
the differences among the three sects over medical licensing played out in legislatures, all 
of these organizations faced internal dissent and strife that complicated licensing efforts 
and fractured previously unified sects.     
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CHAPTER III 
THE EMERGENCE OF MEDICAL REGULATION IN THE 1870s
By 1870, Regular medical societies across the United States began pushing for 
medical licensing laws.  These efforts previously had been disjointed and unsuccessful.  
Because state legislatures were leery of wading into sectarian medical disputes, Regulars 
were making little progress in advancing any type of medical licensing.  While the 
medical marketplace was confusing, the public was not demanding governmental 
oversight of doctors.  State medical societies around the country began to realize that if 
they wanted to pass new legislation, they were going to have to tie the necessity of 
medical licensing to broader medical reform efforts.  The public’s discomfort with the 
shady practices of abortion and the emerging science of sanitation presented physicians 
with two opportunities to enact medical licensing for an uninterested public.  
One of the best early opportunities for passing medical regulation occurred in 
New York City during the summer of 1871.  In late August, a young pregnant woman 
named Alice Augusta Bowlsby read an advertisement in the newspaper for Dr. Ascher.  
The advertisement stated that Dr. Ascher could help “[l]adies in trouble, guaranteed 
immediate relief, sure and safe; no fee required until perfectly satisfied; elegant rooms 
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and nursing provided.”41  Bowlsby went to Ascher’s office where he performed an 
abortion.  Bowlsby died from Ascher’s botched abortion, and her tragic death provided an 
opportunity for New York’s organized Regulars to open the debate for medical licensing.   
Bowlsby’s death captured the attention of the New York Times and the New York 
Herald because the details of her death were incredibly salacious.  After Bowlsby died, 
Ascher attempted to hide the woman’s death by shipping her body in a ramshackle trunk 
to Chicago by train.  After an alert railroad employee searched the trunk, police 
authorities were quickly contacted and conducted an autopsy on the body.  The coroner 
determined that the young woman died from several “severe lacerations” that “had been 
sustained in the attempt to affect an abortion.”  The police quickly ascertained the identity  
of the young women and tracked down Jacob Rosenzweig, a 39-year-old Polish 
physician.  The police learned that Rosenzweig practiced in New York City under the 
name Dr. Ascher.42  
The Times relentlessly reported on the Bowlsby case because it was not only a 
headline-grabber, but it gave the newspaper an opportunity to batter one of its chief 
rivals, the New York Herald.  The Times had a golden opportunity to accuse the Herald of 
enabling abortionists and hypocrisy.  Soon after Bowlsby’s death, the Herald ran an 
editorial condemning abortionists, but the Herald’s editorial staff failed to notice that 
Rosenweig’s alias, Dr. Ascher, still advertised in the Herald's classified section.  
Naturually, the Times was overjoyed at the chance to castigate the Herald.  While the 
Times may have had difficulty containing its glee, a quick scan of the New York Times 
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classified section reveals that it, too, ran numerous advertisements for dubious doctors 
and patent medicine pushers.    
The Bowlsby case was not the first abortion case to get publicity in 1871 in New 
York City.  The New York City police had previously arrested two other physicians, Dr. 
Michael Wolff and Dr. Thomas Lookup Evans, for performing abortions that year.  Both 
cases garnered media interest in New York City.  Dr. Michael Wolff was convicted of 
second-degree manslaughter after the death one of his patients.  The presiding judge in 
that case, Gunning Bedford, sentenced Wolff to seven years in prison and began a 
campaign in New York City to stamp out abortion.  Bedford also presided over the trial of 
the other abortionist, Lookup Evans.  Evans was charged with performing an abortion 
that killed twins.  The Times refused to describe Evans’ alleged crime in the newspaper 
because it was of such a “revolting character” that it was completely “unfit for 
publication.”43  
Judge Bedford spoke to the members of the New York Academy of Medicine on 
September 30th at the start of the Bowlsby case.  These prominent abortion cases 
convinced Bedford that New York City was “living in an atmosphere of abortion.”  He 
stated that the authorities would “strain every nerve until these traffickers in human life 
be exterminated and driven from existence.”  Aside from prosecuting abortionists under 
the law, Bedford argued that the legislature should change the penalty for abortion or 
abortion-related deaths from second-degree manslaughter to first-degree murder.  If 
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convicted of first-degree murder, doctors could be executed for botched abortions.44  At 
the same meeting, members of the New York Academy of Medicine passed a resolution 
promising to “promote public health and public morals” and pledged to support “any 
legislative or other measures” advocated by law enforcement officials to “remove the 
pestilence of criminal abortion.”45  
Bowlsby’s “Trunk Murder” and Bedford’s campaign merged and convinced 
members within the medical community that it was time they eliminated abortionists 
from their ranks.  Abortionists undermined the already questionable reputations of 
doctors and lowered the profession's standing in the public’s eyes.  In step with Bedford’s 
proposal ratcheting up the abortion laws, members of the New York medical community 
argued that doctors had to be regulated by the state to stem the tide of tragic abortion 
cases in the city.  Prominent Regular physicians wanted to stigmatize physicians who 
preformed abortions with medical licensing.  Regular physicians began to argue that 
medical licensing was the only effective way to stop abortionists from plying their trade.
“Medical and legal members” of the New York Medico-Legal Society had drafted 
“An Act to Protect the People against Quackery and Crime” two years earlier, but it 
received little or legislative support.46  Soon after the Bowlsby case, Stephen Rogers, 
M.D., a member of the Medical Society of the State of New York and the President of the 
New York Medico-Legal Society, believed that it was critical for the New York medical 
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community to stamp out abortion and focused the Medico-Legal Society on that mission.  
Not surprisingly, he believed that a medical licensing law was the best way to do it.  
Rogers’ primary goals as the society's president was to pass medical licensing and a new 
severe abortion law.  The Times reported on January 12 the Medico-Society proposed a 
“bill against quacks” which had authorized the creation of county medical societies.  
These county societies would each appoint five censors who would examine “resident 
practitioners.”  The proposed bill permitted prosecuting any unlicensed physicians “for 
obtaining money under false pretenses.”  After the Medico-Legal Society approved the 
draft bill, it agreed to print copies of the bill for distribution around the state.47  
 One of Rogers’ primary arguments was that legitimate medicine was being 
“supplanted by superficial and criminal quackery” in New York City.  Education also had 
failed to stem the rise of the most “absurd, preposterous and even dangerous systems of 
therapeutics.”  While Rogers did not say it explicitly, his jab against "dangerous systems 
of therapeutics" was a condemnation of competing Irregular medical sects.  He argued 
that patients lacked sufficient information to protect themselves from the most dangerous 
practitioners, therefore the state had an obligation to intervene and protect its citizens 
from “becoming a victim to false pretenses.”48  
Rogers, along with other members of the Regular sect, accepted that the state’s 
failure to regulate physicians permitted abortionists to prosper.  An East River Medical 
Association of New York report discussing abortion argued that “the unrestricted practice 
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of medicine was the main case for the existence of professional abortionists.”  The report 
contended that only medical licensing could eliminate abortion.49  While Rogers 
concluded that strengthening the penalties for criminal abortion were important, he 
argued that only medical licensing had the power to stop abortions.  Rogers, along with 
most Regular physicians, believed that most abortionists could not meet even minimum 
medical licensing requirements.  Even if a licensing board did give an abortionist a 
license, the state’s Regulars contended that strong licensing board should be granted the 
power to revoke licenses for unprofessional behavior, such as performing abortions.  
After the proposed law was drafted by the Society in 1872, Rogers took an active 
role lobbying New York physicians for both the abortion and licensing laws.  Despite his 
efforts, physicians were not thrilled by the proposed licensing bill.  Many physicians, 
both Regular and Irregular, were suspicious of licensing bills because they thought the 
laws might target them.  Older physicians who had not graduated from medical schools 
were especially concerned that the proposed law could bar them from practicing 
medicine.  In early February, Rogers spoke to the New York County Medical Society (a 
Regular medical society) but its members were cool to his proposal.  After Rogers 
finished his speech, a member of the county society “questioned if any action by the 
Society” would have had “the slightest effect” because the bill had already been 
presented to the state legislature and would soon be presented to State Medical Society.  
Essentially, some members argued that discussing the bill was a complete and utter waste 
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of the Society’s time.  Rogers quickly stopped the debate and convinced the Society to 
adjourn the meeting until later.50
Rogers not only lobbied the New York County Medical Society, the Medical 
Society of New York, and the New York State Medical Society, but he also contacted 
members in both the Homeopathic and Eclectic medical communities for their approval.  
Rogers realized that any effort to pass a radical regulatory bill would require the support 
of physicians across the sectarian divide.  Additionally, he argued that as long as the 
different sects could “pledge themselves to the common good” then they had to “unite.”51  
Rogers’ efforts to lobby the New York Homeopaths were essentially successful.  Later, at 
the 1873 meeting of the American Institute of Homeopathy (Homeopathy’s preeminent 
national organization), its Committee on Colleges reported that it approved of the 
Medico-Legal Society’s law because it advanced the “march of freedom over the barriers 
of bigotry.”  The Committee understood that the statute allowed physicians to select a 
system of medical practice for themselves, but permitted students to attend the medical 
schools of their choice without interference from their sectarian rivals.52  
Even though American Institute of Homeopathy approved of the bill, local New 
York City Homeopathic and Eclectic physicians attacked it.  By February, the New York 
Times reported that New York’s Homeopaths and Eclectics claimed that the bill would be 
“inimical” to practitioners of those two schools.  The Times reported that there was a 
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clear split in the medical community between physicians who believed that the act was 
designed “to put a stop to quackery and crime” or, on the other hand, “to concentrate 
unwarrantable power in a ring of five physicians…”  Proponents of the bill argued that 
the new law only reinforced existing New York law which already required physicians to 
join their medical society.  
Proponents were correct: existing New York law required all physicians to join 
their local medical society but the provisions related to “non-compliance” been 
eliminated previously.  After the “non-compliance” penalties were eliminated, physicians 
ignored the law.  The proposed law was designed to force physicians to join their local 
medical society and submit to the new five-person censor committee.  Under the bill, 
Eclectic and Homeopathic physicians could not only form their own sectarian societies to 
avoid being judged by Regulars, but the law encouraged them to do so.  The law 
authorized the boards of censors from local medical societies to bar physicians from 
practicing medicine if they engaged in unprofessional conduct such as performing 
abortions.53  
While the Times claimed that Eclectic, Homeopathic, and patent physicians were 
the strongest opponents of the bill, some Regular physicians also voiced opposition to it.  
Patent physicians were especially concerned because they believed that the bill could be a 
“death blow to their businesses."54  Patent physicians were justifiably concerned because 
they, unlike the other sectarians, did not have existing state or local medical societies.  
The public was also suspicious of patent medicine physicians because they were 
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perceived to be illegitimate.  Patent physicians also understood that Regular and Irregular 
physicians despised them.  Under the proposed law, they would have been at the mercy of 
the local medical societies while Eclectic and Homeopathic physicians could have 
conceivably created their own institutions.
While Rogers had reached out to Homeopaths and Eclectic, he contacted only the 
most prominent members of those communities.  He also failed to garner sufficient 
support even within the Regular medical community to ensure unified support.  While 
most of the medical societies declared for support medical licensing in principle, any 
efforts to create new licensing laws concerned both medical society members and 
unaffiliated physicians.  Efforts to push for licensing brought these opinions to the 
forefront.  
The state of New York printed five thousand copies of the Medico-Legal Society’s 
bill to be distributed to the general public.  Soon after these copies were published, 
opponents of the bill began distributing these bills with a new cover sheet that warned 
every physician who “was not a member of an Allopathic County Medical Society; of 
every advertising; of every proprietor of a patent medicine, and of every druggist who 
does a counter-practice” that their businesses would be destroyed. The circular accused 
the Regular physicians of exploiting the public’s “anxiety” to advance their own selfish 
good.  Additionally, newspapers were cautioned that only Irregular physicians paid them 
for advertising and that the law would negatively affect the newspapers’ “balance-
sheet[s].”  The circular achieved its goal and effectively stalled the bill’s progress in the 
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legislature.  Rogers went so far as to blame a member of Public Health Committee in the 
legislature for drafting the cover sheet and intentionally sabotaging the bill.55
The physicians who opposed the bill were justifiably concerned.  The bill stated 
that anyone who sought to practice medicine, surgery, or midwifery was required to 
obtain a license from the censors of their local medical societies in order to practice 
medicine.  If they failed to get a license, the bill stated that they could be arrested for a 
misdemeanor.  The bill also permitted the censors of the state’s medical societies to 
“summon” any individual who claimed through advertisements that they were a 
“practitioner of either medicine, surgery, or midwifery” and determine whether he or she 
was qualified to practice.  While censors not only were allowed to issue certificates, they 
were given the power to “revoke any certificate” of a physician who was convicted of 
any felony or misdemeanor.56 
During Medical Society of the State of New York 1872 annual meeting in Albany, 
Rogers dismissed the notion that charlatanism and quackery could be eliminated solely 
by educating the public to the dangers posed by these impostors.  He attacked the ability 
of any public awareness campaign to stamp out quackery as “a purely utopian idea.”57  
Even educated people were threatened by “impostures in medicine” because they were 
easily deceived.  Voluntary medical societies, like the Medical Society of New York, 
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failed to eliminate medical frauds because those societies could regulate only their own 
members.  Rogers argued that while these societies could punish members for fraudulent 
or unethical conduct, they could do little to prevent those unaffiliated individuals from 
practicing medicine.  Therefore, Rogers held that the only way medicine could be 
elevated was for each of the medical sects to “pledge themselves to the principle that the 
public good is before sectarian doctrine” and work with the “so-called other schools” to 
secure legislation to regulate the practice of medicine, which would require all physicians 
to be members of a sectarian society.  Without some type of restrictive legislation, Rogers 
stated that the public would continue to be at “the mercies of ignorant and criminal 
charlatans” because people were incapable of selecting good physicians on their own.  
Rogers maintained that the state had to direct the public to capable and qualified 
physicians.58 
When he presented his paper to the society’s members, they felt ambushed and 
were unprepared to address the topic in depth.  The day after Rogers presented his paper 
in favor of the 1872 regulatory bill, several members objected to his proposed licensing 
law.  After a heated discussion, the members passed a resolution opposing the medical 
bill proposed by Rogers.  Rogers believed that the negative publicity before the meeting 
undermined his presentation of bill and encouraged the members to oppose it despite 
their own interests.59  The Society’s members were concerned that they could be 
prosecuted by county boards composed of Irregular physicians for ethics violations or 
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incompetence.  While the bill encouraged sectarians to form their own local society, the 
proposed bill did not require county boards to be composed solely of Regular members.  
It would have been possible under the law, even if was unlikely, that if the only existing 
local medical society was either an Irregular or joint society, Regulars would have been 
governed by them.  Several physicians were appalled by the idea that their ability to 
practice medicine could be suspended by Homeopaths or Eclectics.  Rogers and some 
other Society members defended the proposed law and argued that Regulars would never 
be judged by Irregular physicians under the statute, but the opponents of the bill 
convinced the Society oppose it.  At the same time, they wholeheartedly supported the 
proposed laws seeking to strengthen the penalties for criminal abortion and approved, 
without any debate, those proposed statutes.60 
As New York’s Regulars debated the merits of the proposed bill, New York’s 
medical Eclectics were also in sharp disagreement over it.  Edward B. Foote presented a 
paper at the 1872 meeting of the New York Eclectic Medical Society in Albany titled 
“The Allopathic Crusade.”61  Foote argued that Regulars sought “to take advantage of 
some recent appalling cases of malpractice, to create an impression that the true remedy 
[lay] in the enactment of a stringent law.”  He accused leading physicians from both the 
Homeopathic and Eclectic schools of medicine of collaborating with Regulars to concoct 
and lobby for this licensing bill.  According to Foote, any efforts to regulate medicine 
were thinly disguised efforts to destroy Eclecticism and Homeopathy because “Allopathy 
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can never be trusted.”62  Several other physicians supported Foote’s objections and 
clearly distrusted the motives of the Medico-Legal Society.  
Foote also assailed the bill because he disagreed that it would protect the public 
from malpractice.  He even argued that Rosenzweig appeared from the newspaper 
accounts to be a “man of intellect and culture – just the sort a fellow as could pass an 
examination before a board of censors and receive a license to practice.”  Abortion was a 
widespread problem in New York City, Foote agreed, but he alleged the proposed law 
would do little to prevent it.  Foote quoted the New York Tribune, which had estimated 
that at least 50 abortionists practiced in the city.   Some reputable physicians were also 
believed to be willing to relieve “unfortunate ladies of their troubles for suitable 
consideration.”  Instead of eliminating abortionists, Foote argued that the law would 
instead be used as a way for Regulars to control the practice of medicine in the state.  
Because Foote believed that the law was a transparent attempt to seize control of 
medicine, he opposed any efforts to regulate the profession.  He found it disingenuous for 
the Medico-Legal Society to consult with prominent Eclectic or Homeopathic physicians 
while denying them membership to their society.63   
After Foote read his paper to the Eclectic Society, Dr. Alexander Wilder argued 
that while he disagreed with Foote’s assessment that regulation was unnecessary, he did 
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not trust Rogers and the Medico-Legal members’ motivations.64  While he admitted that  
“[w]e have friends, good and true, in the Medico-Legal Society” he also acknowledged, 
as Foote had, that “[n]one of us, however skilled, however able, can enter that Society.”  
Wilder urged the membership to be leery of the Allopaths, “especially when bringing 
presents.”  He admonished the Eclectic society and warned them that the Regulars 
demonstrated their hostility to Eclectic medicine in the past and said “[l]et us not forge 
fetters to be put on our own necks.”65
While Foote and Wilder were wary of the ultimate goals of the Medico-Society, 
not all Eclectics opposed medical licensing on principle.  Eclectics, like their Regular 
brethren, were concerned about the quacks and charlatans, especially since numerous 
quacks practiced under the Eclectic banner.  Organized Eclectics knew that these rogue 
physicians undermined the creditability of their medical sect in the eyes of the public.  
At the 1873 meeting of the National Eclectic Medical Association, the members 
passed a resolution that supported passing “laws by the various Legislatures of this 
Union” requiring that anyone who sought “to engage in the practice of medicine, surgery 
or obstetrics to pass a fair examination in the fundamental sciences” to demonstrate that 
the individual had a complete understanding of “the science of medicine and all its 
branches.”  Like the Regulars, the Eclectics believed that licensing was necessary 
because patients were “incapable of estimating – the scientific attainments of medical 
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practitioners.”  Additionally, medical schools throughout the country passed many 
students who were “grossly incompetent” and lacked sufficient “scientific attainments.”66  
In many ways, the case the Eclectics made on behalf of licensing was quite similar to 
their Regulars, but Eclectic support was more shallow.  Only the formally educated and 
organized Eclectics consistently favored licensing.  While Eclectics were aware of the 
problems quacks posed to their sect, they were not convinced uniformly that licensing 
was either necessary or capable of elevating Eclecticism.  Even worse, many believed 
that licensing was intended to eliminate them from the medical marketplace.   
In response to the successful opposition of the Medico-Society’s proposed 
legislation, the society withdrew its first proposed bill and introduced “an Act relative to 
the Medical Laws of the State of New York.”  This new Act was essentially the same 
proposed law with a few minor revisions.  Even though the revisions were modest, the 
bill surprisingly worked its way through both the New York House and Senate.  
Apparently, the name change and tweaks to the bill made it more agreeably to the 
legislature.  Eventually, the bill was passed by both bodies and forwarded to the governor. 
Governor John Thompson Hoffman vetoed the bill and stated that he did not want to 
interfere with the medical marketplace.  Rogers ultimately blamed the governor’s veto on 
the opposition within the Medical Society of the State of New York.  His assessment 
probably was correct because it was the largest and most prominent Regular society in 
the state.67
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This was not the first time that physicians had attempted to tie the criminalization 
of abortion with medical licensing statutes.  In Abortion in America, James Mohr 
described how “young physicians” from the Baltimore Medical Society persuaded the 
Maryland legislature in 1867 to pass a medical licensing bill that regulated the practice of 
medicine and stiffened the penalties for performing abortions.  While the bill was 
approved by both the legislature and signed by the governor, the medical licensing 
portion of bill was never enacted.  Soon after the bill’s passage, the legislature realized 
that the bill failed to include an enabling clause.  In order to enact the law, the proponents 
were required to re-pass an amended bill through the legislature.  Upon second reflection, 
the legislature stripped the bill of the provisions that regulated medicine, but kept the 
parts that strengthened Maryland’s abortion prohibition.68   
Other states also were trying to enact licensing laws.  Unlike New York, laws in 
many of these states were getting far less support.  Often these efforts were hampered by 
medical societies’ inability to successfully explain to legislatures why these laws were 
important.  In New York, the proposed licensing bill was paired with a popular abortion 
law.  New York physicians successfully tied to the two laws together and created a 
compelling case for licensing.  
Elsewhere, physicians were also floundering in their efforts to pass any type of 
licensing law.  For example, in Oregon, the Oregon Medical and Surgical Reporter 
strongly advocated for the creation of a medical registry to help patients distinguish 
between educated physicians and charlatans or frauds.  Unlike the proposed New York 
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law, which criminalized practicing without a license, the Reporter’s sole goal was to 
create a list that patients could consult to verify if their doctor was reasonably qualified.  
While a registry would not prevent charlatans, quacks, or frauds from practicing, the 
public would be informed about a physician’s skills and education.  Medical societies 
typically proposed such medical registration laws in states where there was very little 
support for criminalizing the unlicensed practice of medicine.  
While the Reporter advocated the creation of a registry, it claimed that the 
problem was the willingness of “individuals to swallow with marvelous capacity of all 
the assertions of pretenders” and that only if the public ceased to be gullible would 
charlatanism disappear.69  The Reporter argued that a registry might solve this problem 
because the public would have the opportunity to educate itself.  Oregon’s physicians 
from The Medical Society of the Third Judicial District, the precursor to the Oregon 
Medical Society, pushed for medical regulation during the 1870 House session, but these 
efforts met with little success.70  During the debate on House Bill Number 48, “A Bill 
Regulating the Practice of Surgery and Dentistry,” the society sent a communiqué to the 
Oregon House stating that it did not want a law that controlled the actions of its members, 
but it desired “the Legislature to enact by a law by which the practice of medicine shall 
be clearly defined and regulated.”71  The Society’s message did little to advance the 
proposed legislation, and the regulatory bill was eventually tabled.72  Oregon’s physicians 
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failed to create a compelling narrative to explain how licensing laws could protect the 
public.  
Still, the progress of the New York and Maryland licensing bills suggested that the 
opportunity existed for physicians to successfully push licensing laws through state 
legislatures. The most thoroughly organized physicians were carefully networked 
together through state and national organizations.  The licensing efforts in New York 
were well-publicized.  Even though the bill was vetoed by the governor, New York 
physicians had established a blueprint to pass licensing laws.
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CHAPTER IV 
MEDICAL LICENSING AND SANITATION REFORM
Physicians across the country quickly realized that it was necessary to link 
medical licensing to broader health reform if they wanted to pass anything.  In both New 
York and Maryland, medical societies tied licensing to abortion to overcome opposition 
and made at least some headway in state legislatures.  While the New York law was 
vetoed by the governor and the Maryland law was quickly repudiated the legislature, the 
tactic of linking abortion to licensing allowed medical societies in these two states to 
transform the debate of medical licensing from a sectarian battle to a public health issue.  
Previously, legislatures avoided medical licensing laws because they were viewed as 
remarkably transparent attempts by Regular physicians to marginalize their Irregular 
brethren.  This new approach allowed physicians to argue to state legislatures that 
medical licensing was actually an integral part of public health and not an effort to 
change the medical marketplace.  That way, physicians hoped to make these regulations 
more palatable to state legislatures.  While New York’s physicians piggy-backed 
licensing onto more stringent abortion laws, other state medical societies discovered a 
more appealing alternative.  Regular physicians in Texas, Alabama and California 
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determined that medical licensing would be more palatable to state legislatures if they 
tied it to sanitary reform.     
A year after the Medico-Legal Society’s bill was vetoed by New York’s governor, 
the Texas State Medical Association (TSMA) succeeded in passing the nation’s first 
operational medical licensing bill, titled “An Act to Regulate the Practice of Medicine.”  
The law both instituted medical licensing and created a board of health to enforce public 
health and sanitation laws.  This act required physicians to either be a graduate of a 
“regularly established and well accredited medical college” or procure a certificate of 
qualification from one of the newly created county boards of medical examiners.73  To 
advance these laws, physicians had to successfully argue to the legislature that state and 
county boards of health could not protect the public if the state failed to license its 
physicians. 
A year after the legislature passed the Texas medical bill, the Eclectic Medical 
Times accused “[t]he Old School Conspirators” of using the American Public Health 
Association and the creation of state boards of health as a Trojan horse for discriminatory 
medical licensing.  The Eclectic Times claimed that the Regulars were using this strategy 
in at least seven states across the country in 1875.74  The Eclectic Times’ accusation was 
accurate in Texas because the Texas legislature created a law that explicitly discriminated 
against Homeopaths and Eclectics.  The 1873 medical law required Texas counties to 
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appoint a “board of medical examiners” composed of three physicians of “known ability” 
and graduates of a medical college recognized by the American Medical Association.  At 
the time, the AMA explicitly refused to recognize any Irregular medical colleges and 
excluded Irregulars from its membership.  Not only were Irregulars barred from 
admission to the AMA, but the AMA prevented members from consulting with Irregulars 
on any medical matters.  The county, state, and national organizations could expel 
members if they violated this part of the AMA’s Code of Ethics.
Under the new law, physicians needed to get a license from their local medical 
board.  If the county they practiced in did not create a medical board, the law required 
applicants to petition the board in the closest county.  In western Texas, this requirement 
would have been especially difficult to comply with because doctors were potentially 
hundreds of miles from the nearest county seat.  Physicians presented diplomas or 
certificates of qualification and one dollar to the “clerk of the District Court of such 
county” within twenty days of beginning their practice.  Physicians who did not adhere to 
the requirements of this act faced a fine between fifty and five hundred dollars.  This 
statute specifically required physicians to present a degree of “Doctor of Medicine” and 
allowed for the appointment only of Regular physicians to the board of examiners.  This 
statute made it relatively easy for a Regular board to exclude Irregular physicians from 
practicing medicine across the state.  The perceived unfairness of the law quickly created 
an uproar in Texas.  
While many physicians supported the goals of the TSMA and favored passage of 
laws that excluded Irregular practitioners, Joseph M. Toner, president of the AMA in 
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1874, expressed skepticism that Irregulars would ever be denied the right to practice 
medicine.  Toner argued that Regulars may have hoped to eliminate “Irregular and 
incompetent practitioners from the profession by legislative enactment and penalties,” but 
“in our country” this result was unlikely.75  The AMA president knew that none of the 
medical systems had sufficient support or influence to eliminate any of the other 
organized medical sects.  While the TSMA passed a restrictive statute, Toner knew that it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to pass statutes excluding Irregulars from medical 
practice in other parts of the country.  
In the short run, Toner’s prediction proved prescient, even in Texas.  Irregulars 
vociferously objected to the 1873 law.  The Medical Eclectic, a journal based in New 
York and edited by Alexander Wilder, reported on efforts by the Texas State Board of 
Health “to prohibit the practice of medicine by any except graduates from institutions 
entitled to representation in the American Medical Association.”76  The Irregulars quickly  
and effectively lobbied for the repeal of the discriminatory law at the Texas constitutional 
convention in 1875.  As a result of this pressure, the Texas constitutional convention 
drafted Article XVI, section 31 of the new Texas constitution which nullified the 1873 
law and mandated that “no preference shall ever be given by law to any school of 
medicine.”77   
44
75 Transactions of AMA (1874): 76.
76 “No Eclectics or Homeopaths Need Apply” The Medical Eclectic, Vol. 2, No. 2: 69, http://
books.google.com/ebooks.
77 Texas Constitution 1875, Article XVI, section 31, http://books.google.com/ebooks.
The new Texas Constitution forced the TSMA to lobby for a dramatically 
different regulatory bill that steered “between [the] prohibitory provision [discriminating 
against medical sects]…and the danger of too great laxity on the other.”78  Because the 
new Constitution explicitly prevented discrimination against any medical sect, Texas 
Regulars compromised with their Irregular cousins and developed a new, less 
discriminatory licensing scheme.  The TSMA wanted to limit the influence of Irregulars 
but realized that the law would be enforceable only if it had “the unanimous and 
unbroken support of the physicians themselves.”79  In 1876, the Texas legislature passed a 
new law, which discarded the requirement that graduates have a medical degree and 
instead required each new applicant to pass a medical examination.  The law gave county 
courts the responsibility to establish examining boards to administer the test.  
While the TSMA argued before the legislature that the act would “establish a 
uniform, equable and unavoidable criterion by which to determine the qualifications” to 
practice medicine, the TSMA chairman for the Committee on the State Board of Health 
argued that the new law would not break down the barrier between Regular and 
Irregulars.  The chairman did not believe that Irregulars were capable of passing any 
medical examination, and he assumed that most of them would barred from practice.  The 
TSMA’s president argued that the new law would create a stronger and more permanent 
“partition” between Regulars and Irregulars.80  The TSMA told its membership that only 
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Regular physicians would benefit from an act requiring a medical examination of all 
applicants.  This was clearly wishful thinking by the TSMA.  
Instead of satisfying Texas Regular doctors, the new 1876 law enraged some of 
them.  A member introduced a resolution at the TSMA meeting that approved of the 
actions of the Travis County Medical Society for refusing to cooperate with Irregular 
practitioners to set up a mixed county board.  Many members of Travis County Medical 
Society not only refused to cooperate with the new county board, but accused the Regular 
physicians who did participate in the county board of collaborating with the enemy.  A 
newly appointed member of the Examining Board of Travis County addressed the state’s 
members and defended himself against accusations from both the TSMA and the Travis 
County Medical Society.  He argued that he was not a traitor by serving on the board.  
The members of the board argued that he was doing his duty and was desperately trying 
to protect the profession from “attacks by ignorant men.”  While some physicians 
supported the board member, another physician condemned him with exceptionally florid 
language that claimed the board member had gone willingly into “the midst of the 
enemies of truth and aided them in carrying on a warfare with virtue.”  Ultimately, the 
resolution divided the TSMA, and it decided to postpone the vote on any resolution either 
applauding or condemning the actions of the Travis County Medical Society for six 
months.81  
Even more problematic was that the Texas Regulars were saddled with a law they 
detested from the start.  In the Report of Committee on Legislation, Dr. Thomas Wooten 
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acknowledged that the law was polarizing and essentially apologized for dividing and 
demoralizing the state’s Regular physicians.  Still, he conjectured that it was essential for 
the TSMA and the state’s Regular physicians to take an active role in supporting the new 
law. If the state’s Regular physicians actively undermined the medical licensing law, 
Wooten believed that the state’s physicians would be reduced to “humiliation and 
helplessness.”82  
While Wooten’s concerns were understandable, ultimately they were moot.  The 
legislature, because of a drafting error, failed to criminalize the illegal practice of 
medicine without a license.  Consequentially, the medical licensing statute was crippled 
before it became active.  The legislature then withdrew its support for the law and 
amended it to allow county clerks to license anyone who possessed a diploma.83  Instead 
of creating a licensing statute, Regular physicians were stuck with a weak registration law 
they would spend decades trying to overturn.         
In a bizarre twist, one of the earliest cases challenging a licensing law in Texas 
attacked the first licensing law passed in 1873.  Even though the law became 
unconstitutional in 1875, anyone prosecuted between 1873 and 1875 was not protected.  
In one example, the county medical society accused a physician of practicing in Wood 
County without a license during this narrow timeframe.  After the physician was indicted, 
the defendant convinced a district court judge to quash the county’s indictment.  The 
county was forced to appeal the lower court’s decision to Supreme Court of Texas.  The 
higher court affirmed the trial court’s decision and found that while the indictment 
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alleged that the physician did not appear to have received a “certificate of qualification” 
from the Wood County board of medical examiners, it failed to state whether the 
physician procured a certificate from another county board.  The Texas Supreme Court 
determined that a physician did not necessarily need to receive a certificate from the 
county that he was practicing in.  The court ruled that physicians needed only a certificate 
from any county in the state.  The court also objected that the prosecution failed to 
determine if a physician had procured a license from elsewhere.  Interestingly, the court 
did not bother to ask a doctor to prove that he filed his diploma somewhere else in 
Texas.84  While the Texas Supreme Court might have complicated future prosecution 
efforts in the state, the court’s broad interpretation of the medical licensing statute 
essentially demanded additional due diligence by county prosecutors.         
Like Texas, the New York Legislature in 1874 passed another medical licensing 
act, but it did not exclude Irregular practitioners.  Essentially, physicians who were either 
“licentiates or graduates of some medical society or chartered school” could practice 
medicine without a license.  Only physicians who were not “medical graduates or 
licentiates” would be required to secure a certificate from the “censors of some one of the 
several medical societies of this State, either from the county, district or State society.”  
The state could charge physicians who violated the law with a misdemeanor and fined 
between fifty and two hundred dollars or a sentence of not less thirty days in jail.  
In reality, it would have been almost impossible to find physicians who did not 
meet at least one of the criteria to practice medicine.  The law exempted most physicians 
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from the necessity of obtaining any type of certificate from a medical society.  The law 
also did not bother to define what constituted a “chartered medical school” or explain 
which medical societies were recognized by New York.  In effect, physicians could 
practice medicine in New York if they met any of the following requirements: attended a 
medical school, was a member of medical society, or failed to secure a certificate of 
practice from a medical societies board of censors.  If physicians could not find a medical 
society that would either allow them to join or give them a certificate, they could create 
their own medical society.  
Needless to say, Dr. Stephen Rogers, the drafter of original proposed law, was 
horrified.  He lamented that the 1872 bill was vetoed because the 1874 law that was 
passed instead was toothless and failed to achieve any of the goals sought by the Medico-
Legal Society in 1872.85  Rogers’ low opinion of the 1874 “Act to regulate the Practice of 
Medicine and Surgery” was merited.  The New York Times stated that the law failed to 
“check quackery, but … provide[d] the opportunity whereby quacks and quackery may 
become legalized.”  The Times even accused various sectarian county medical societies of 
issuing certificates “either through thoughtlessness or venality” to candidates after 
cursory or nonexistent examinations.  Critics of the 1874 law argued that it allowed too 
many “unqualified persons in the medical profession.”86
In August 1874, the Sanitary Committee of the New York City Board of Health 
sought to enforce the new act.  The Sanitary Committee argued that the “so-called doctors 
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who have no recognition by any class of medically uneducated practitioners” and were 
primarily responsible for the most egregious deaths in the city.  Separate from the 
licensing law, the Sanitary Committee passed a resolution requiring “a new registration of 
physicians in the city” in order to keep closer tabs on the medical community in the 
city.87  
In September 1874, despite the limitations of the licensing law, the New York City 
Board of Health issued a legal opinion clarifying the new law.  The opinion stated that 
only three types of physicians were permitted practice under the new law: graduates of 
chartered medical schools, those already licensed by some legally authorized body, and 
persons holding a certificate from “one of the several medical societies of the State.”  
Additionally, the counsel for the Board acknowledged that “[n]o distinction between 
different schools of medicine” could be “recognized.”  Finally, the counsel observed that 
the law was both a “disappointment” for the “medical profession” and could be a 
challenge for medical societies to enforce unless the “societies have their own counsel 
and make a strong effort.”88
Contemporaneously to the licensing battles in Texas and New York in 1875, 
Alabama established another model for medical licensing in the country.  The 
membership of the Medical Association of the State of Alabama (MASA) asked the 
association’s Board of Censors to present the Alabama General Assembly with a bill that 
authorized the creation of a Board of Health with licensing authority.  The MASA, like 
most regular associations, was deeply concerned about the quality of the physicians in the 
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state.  The MASA issued a report that stated, “[w]e have too many doctors,” and the 
quality of medical education was “shamefully, low.”  Additionally, it acknowledged that 
the profession was “crowded with incompetents” and that medical schools had failed to 
guard “the fates of admission to its ranks.”  The problems with the medical profession 
was immense, the MASA’s report argued that the lack of standards were an “evil” that 
was destroying the credibility of the medical profession.  The MASA stated that if it did 
not act to pass a medical law, then the profession could be “utterly destroyed” by 
charlatans and quacks.    
The MASA argued that Alabama desperately needed to establish a state board of 
health because the state often suffered outbreaks of serious tropical diseases such as 
yellow fever.  Alabama needed a board of health to help it cope with these endemic 
diseases.  The MASA argued that there were “thousands of cases of sickness occur[ring] 
every year from diseases which might be prevented” resulting in an extraordinary amount 
of suffering that could not be “exaggerated.”  The MASA not only advocated for the 
creation of a board of health, but sought to create medical licensing as part of the board of 
health bill.  Thus again, a Regular medical association hoped to piggy-back licensing on 
another more popular public health bill.  In 1875, the Board of Censors introduced the 
proposed bill for the membership’s approval.  Although the proposed bill generally 
pleased the Board of Censors, the board still was not comfortable introducing the law in 
the legislature and stated that the “time has not yet come when it is expedient to 
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memorialize the General Assembly to enact it into law.”89  The Board failed to provide 
any adequate explanation why the state legislature was unprepared to pass the law.  
The bill proposed by the Board of Censors for MASA in 1877 had the potential to 
eliminate or severely limit the ability of future Homeopathic and Eclectic physicians to 
practice medicine in Alabama.  The Board refused to acknowledge this potential outcome 
and argued that the law ultimately would not interfere with the ability of any current 
physician in the state to continue practicing whether they were “regular, irregular or 
defective.”90  The proposed bill created medical examining boards across the state, but 
either the MASA or the county regular medical society would be responsible for selecting 
the member of these boards.  The MASA’s Board of Censors sought to create a number of 
decentralized county boards, and it was averse to allowing any physician from a 
dissenting sect to serve on any of the examining boards.  The various medical examining 
boards were tasked with determining the qualifications for physicians in their area.  The 
bill did not create any testing standard, but stated that the MASA would establish the 
criteria.  The bill was also vague about who would be responsible for licensing physicians 
if a county lacked a local examining board, but a physician could choose to be evaluated 
by the state examining board.  It would have been simple for a board of exclusively 
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Regular physicians to establish testing criteria that could have barred Homeopaths, 
Eclectics, or other Irregular physicians from passing the exam. 
Like many registration and licensing bills proposed in the 1870s, the MASA 
claimed that this bill would not need any or very little state money to manage licensing.  
In its letter to the Alabama’s General Assembly (the state legislature), the Board of 
Censors advocated on behalf of the proposed bill.  It stated that not only would the bill 
protect Alabamians from diseases and quacks, but it would not cost the state any money.  
The Board argued that regardless of the impact of the bill, the state of Alabama would not 
have to pay for the examinations or the enforcement of the bill in the future.  Licensed 
physicians would have to pay for all the county boards costs.  
The Alabama legislature, along with others around the country, were either 
incapable or unwilling to subsidize licensing because the country was still experiencing a 
sever depression.  In 1873, the United States’s economy was wrecked by a serious 
financial downturn and descended into long depression.  This downturn was triggered by 
the bankruptcy of Jay Cooke and Company, a major financial company.  Like many 
depressions in American history, the Panic of 1873 was triggered by rampant speculation.  
Greed overruled fear as Wall Street invested heavily in dubious railroad bonds.  Jay 
Cooke and Company’s bankruptcy triggered a banking crisis that spread across the 
United States.  The depression that followed the Panic of 1873 devastated state finances 
and emptied treasuries.91  States were not in a position to fund licensing and public health 
laws on their own.  
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The MASA, like other medical societies around the country, understood that any 
bill it proposed could not rely on state funds.  To solve that problem, the MASA proposed 
creating a quasi-government organization funded exclusively through licensing fees.  
Medical associations understood that there was very little public support for licensing 
laws in general, and therefore it was critical to create bills that would be budget-neutral 
for state governments.  While legislatures would not have established licensing laws if 
they had not been budget-neutral, the quasi-government organizations proposed by state 
medical societies often did not have enough revenue to robustly support these laws.  
Medical associations intentionally may have underestimated the cost of enforcing these 
laws and hoped that once these were established, they could get additional funding when 
the economy improved.     
Ultimately, the Alabama General Assembly passed a licensing law that was 
fundamentally different from the law proposed by the MASA’s Board of Censors.  While 
the 1877 law was modeled on the MASA proposal, the assembly changed it in several 
significant ways.  The MASA succeeded in convincing the legislature that the MASA and 
regular county associations should manage the examining boards, but to placate Irregular 
physicians, the Assembly distinguished between Regular and Irregular applicants.  The 
examining boards could only test Irregulars on the following subjects: “anatomy, 
physiology, chemistry and the mechanism of labor.”  Instead of creating multiple 
sectarian examining boards or requiring the examining boards to administer sectarian 
exams, the General Assembly curtailed the subjects that the Regular boards could test 
Irregular physicians on, and also contrary to the MASA’s proposed law, the Assembly 
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specifically stated that female midwives were not covered by this act or regulated by the 
MASA.92
The MASA’s Board of Censors was incensed by the changes made to the bill by 
the Assembly.  The assembly’s alterations bestowed Irregular sects with “quasi-
respectability.” Still, the Board was convinced the Irregular sects were still fated to expire 
in the long run.  The Board of Censors insisted that it only intended “to elevate, to purify, 
to regenerate, the regular professions itself.”  Despite these protestations, the Board had 
clearly hoped that the Assembly would put Irregular sects out of their misery sooner 
rather than later.  Instead of permanently destroying Alabama’s Irregulars, the Assembly 
not only granted them legitimacy, but created a lower standard for them.  
The Board of Censors was forced to explain to the MASA’s members that the 
lower testing standard actually was proposed to the Assembly by some Regular 
physicians in an effort to make the bill more palatable.  The Regulars who proposed the 
testing rules believed that Irregulars were incapable of passing any scientific 
examination.  The Board of Censors also tried to convince the MASA’s membership that 
this examination still would eliminate Irregular competition even if it was not as effective 
as the “indirect operation of the measures included in the original bill.”  The Board of 
Censors understood that forcing a board of Regulars to test Irregulars would impose “a 
very delicate and unpleasant duty” on them.   
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In an effort to minimize their disappointment, the Board of Censors assured the 
MASA that Alabama’s licensing scheme would still permit the decay of these sects.  The 
Board of Censors claimed that Eclectics were ready to “join the ranks of the regular 
medical army” at any moment and the only reason they maintained their Eclectic 
traditions was because it would take too much “time and money” to become Regulars.  
Homeopaths, while equally “doomed,” were a bigger concern because they still exhibited 
some signs of life around the country.  The Board of Censors summed up by saying that 
the Irregular ranks in Alabama were thin and would give the Regulars “little trouble.”93 
The Alabama law fundamentally differed from other laws around the country 
because it mandated examinations for all new physicians, yet avoided the creation of a 
centralized examination board.  Like the New York law, it relied on both the county and 
state medical societies to certify and enforce the statute.  Unlike New York, they were 
able to pass a law that excluded Irregular physicians from serving on licensing boards and 
examining physicians.  Because the Regulars controlled both the examining and 
enforcement aspects of the law, they had the opportunity to create an environment hostile 
toward Irregulars by enforcing the statute in a discriminatory fashion.  While the law 
made it possible for Regulars to discriminate against Irregulars, Irregulars did not have to 
study as many subjects for medical exams.  Additionally, the MASA struggled to create 
Regular medical societies in each county.  In a little under half of the state’s counties, 
there was little or no oversight of physicians.  
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During this same period, California’s Regulars also pushed the state legislature to 
adopt medical licensing.  While the California State Medical Society (CSMS) had been 
moribund for years, in 1870 the state’s Regulars reorganized the CSMS.  In 1870, the 
Legislature created a California State Board of Heath with the goal of looking “after the 
vital interest and physical condition of the people…”  The Board was composed of seven 
physicians from Sacramento and five doctors from other parts of the state.  The 
legislation did not bar Irregulars from serving on the board nor did it require it.  Still, all 
of the members of the inaugural board were Regulars.94  One of the chief responsibilities 
of the Board was to propose bills for the legislature that could improve public health.   
In 1874, Thomas Logan, one of the most prominent members of the CSMS and 
the permanent secretary of the California State Board of Health, began an earnest effort to 
enact medical licensing in California.  Logan made a strong case at the 1874 California 
Medical Society meeting that it was crucial for physicians to began to assert control “over 
admission to its ranks.”  He also argued that the disputes among the sects not only 
appeared to be “useless and unseemly” to the public, but they were counterproductive 
because these disputes “prevented or defeated all efforts to obtain legislation that would 
have … protected the people against medical frauds and ignorance.”  This conflict had 
weakened an already diminished profession.  “Physicians of moral worth and personal 
dignity” were reduced to opposing any measure that would allow them to be categorized 
as a physician along with the numerous “shams and frauds” littering their profession.  
Logan argued that as long “as the demand” for licensing “is made irrespective of all so-
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called schools of medicine” the Legislature would be unable to “refuse.”  Logan called on 
the CSMS to support a regulatory bill that would create an independent board of medical 
examiners that would license all applicants and criminalize the practice of medicine 
without a license.95
Logan was not the only person calling for the creation of medical licensing in 
California.  The Los Angeles Herald advocated on behalf of medical licensing in July 31, 
1874.  The editorial asked why ship pilots were required to secure licenses while 
physicians “were permitted to practice medicine without written evidence of their right to 
kill or cure the human family[.]”  The editors argued that unlike lawyers, “the ignorance 
and efficiency of the quack doctor” were not apparent until “one or more lives have been 
sacrificed.”  The Herald demanded that the state of California needed to require 
physicians to get a license in order to “suspend operations” by “these murderers.”96   
In 1875, Logan presented a bill to the CSMS that could be best described as a 
confusing jumble.  Instead of creating a single unified body, Logan’s bill dispersed the 
authority to grant licenses to four different groups which, in turn, could license 
physicians in three different ways.  First, physicians could present a “diploma” from a 
“bona fide” and “regularly chartered medical school” directly to the county clerk.  
Second, they could get a license from “a State Medical Society, or a State Board of 
Medical Examiners.”  Finally, physicians also could secure a “certificate of qualification” 
from the State Board of Health, any of the state’s medical societies, or a state board of 
58
95 Transactions of the Medical Society of the State of California During the Year 1873 and 1874, 
(Sacramento, H.A. Weaver, Printer, 1874): 49-61, http://books.google.com/ebooks.
96 “Show Your Diplomas,” Los Angeles Herald, Volume 2, Number 103, July 31, 1874, 2.  
medical examiners.  Additionally, the county clerk offices were required to determine 
whether a medical school was a “bona fide” institution.97  The proposed bill was 
originally presented by the California State Board of Health in its biennial report.  The 
bill was modeled on a Nevada registration law that was adopted a year earlier.  The bill 
did not license physicians who lacked a medical degree, and it would have been opposed 
by a number of state’s Regular physicians for that reason.98    
After the bill was read, one member of the California Medical Society expressed 
concern that it was too long and proposed adopting the Nevada registration law that had 
been approved there.  In lieu of approving the bill, it was submitted to a committee of 
three members who could reevaluate the proposal and report to the Society at a later 
date.99  The CSMS failed to reach any definitive decision regarding the proposal and 
essentially punted it to a later date.100 
Logan’s bill was not the only one presented that year.  The San Francisco Medical 
Society also proposed a similar law, but that one authorized the creation of a “Board of 
Medical Examiners.”  This board would be composed of seven practicing physicians who 
would be responsible for evaluating diplomas and conducting a “critical examination” of 
all medical licensing applicants.  If an applicant presented a valid diploma and passed the 
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licensing exam, the board would confirm the identity of each applicant to ensure that they 
were not practicing under an assumed name.  The Sacramento Daily Union questioned 
whether it was necessary to every physician who wanted to practice in the state.  The 
Union argued that it would be inappropriate for a select group of California physicians to 
question the judgments of American medical schools and “the Medical Colleges of 
Europe.”  The editors of the Union believed that California lacked physicians who 
possessed either the skill or credibility to question these august institutions.  They argued 
that California would be better served if they relied on these schools to furnish “evidence 
of competency” for the prospective physicians.101         
Finally, in March 1876, after a year of debate in the legislature, the California 
Assembly and Senate passed an act to “Regulate the Practice of Medicine in the State of 
California.”102  It permitted graduates of medical schools to practice without being tested 
by an examining board, but it differed somewhat from other licensing laws passed the 
1870s, because it authorized “each State Medical Society, incorporated and in active 
existence” when the bill was passed to appoint seven people to separate boards of 
examiners.  Potentially, each medical society in the state, including Homeopaths and 
Eclectics, could create their own boards, but there was a complication.  The California 
State Medical Society of Homeopathic Practitioners (CSMSHP) strongly supported the 
passage of this law and adamantly opposed a single unified board.  The multiple-board 
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bill was approved because CSMSHP brought “influences to bear” and persuaded the 
Legislature to side with the more liberal law.103  The statute mandated that in order for a 
medical society to supervise licensing its medical sect, the society had to require that its 
members were “to possess diplomas, or a license from some legally chartered institution” 
at the time when the law was passed.  The bill also sought limit the influence of nostrum 
peddlers by requiring any “itinerant vendors of any drug, nostrum, ointment or appliance” 
to pay one hundred dollars a month.104
Before the bill was passed, the legislature engaged in a lively debate about the bill 
and numerous amendments were proposed in an attempt to radically alter it before its 
passage.  The biggest debate centered around which existing physicians would be 
automatically licensed under the law.  The bill originally proposed that physicians who 
had practiced in the state for twenty years could apply for a license if they could get two 
recommendations from other physicians who were in good standing.  There were several 
attempts to reduce the number of years those physicians practiced in the state.  Initially, 
the author of the bill rejected a proposal to reduce the number from twenty to fourteen 
years, but a later amendment changed the twenty-year requirement to only five years.  
This undoubtedly helped the law pass the legislature, because far more physicians from 
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the three sects would have supported this law.  The legislature would have struggled to 
pass this law without adopting this significant change.105
The Sacramento Daily Union generally supported the passage of the state 
licensing law, but its editors expressed a few misgivings.  The Union was concerned that 
the provision requiring itinerant physicians to pay one-hundred dollars a month was 
potentially unconstitutional, but the Union still supported the measure because it attacked 
that “class of swindlers.”  Still, the editors were concerned that this provision explicitly 
discriminated against a “class of strangers” and could be undone by the courts.  The 
editors for the Union hoped this would be avoided because the law potentially would 
alleviate the antagonism among the three major sects.106  The medical sects also were 
pleased with the law and quickly sought to enact its provisions.          
Immediately after the law was passed, the CSMSHP set up its own examining 
board of seven members in April.  After forming its board, the CSMSHP faced many 
unforeseen circumstances.  The Secretary of the Homeopathic Board of Examiners 
reported that prospective physicians began offering large bribes to board members from 
each of the boards.  The Homeopathic secretary weakly proclaimed that fewer bribes 
were made to the Homeopathic board than “either of the other Boards.”  Still, physicians 
offered a variety of different bribes to members of the newly established Homeopathic 
board including “notes of $50 to cash of $200 to secure certificates,” potential business 
partnerships, “compensating favors,” and an offer to create “an endowment of untold 
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thousands” for a medical college.  The Secretary then assured the readership of the 
California Medical Times that even though he was “startled” and “nearly captured” by 
the offer to create a medical school endowment, these offers were “courteously but firmly  
informed that money, beyond the medical fee, would not buy certificates.” At the end of 
the day, the Homeopathic board issued eighty-nine licenses (sixty-five via diploma and 
twenty-four by examination.)107  
As the medical societies were establishing their boards, the law came under attack 
from multiple parties (both Regular and Irregular).  In 1877, the President of the CSMS, 
W. Fitch Cheney, M.D., ranted that the bill contained “many absurd provisions.”  The 
statute forced the Regular Examining Board to lose money because it did not authorize 
the board to charge enough to cover the printing costs of the exam.  In addition to losing 
money, the Examining Boards were required to hire more people to handle additional 
clerical work.  Cheney sought to amend the bill to allow the society to charge more to 
administer the exams.  Additionally, “three or four” members of the CSMS did not pass 
the medical examination, which cast the Society in a negative light.  One of the society’s 
members was outraged that the CSMS had done such a poor job policing its own 
members that quacks apparently infiltrated its ranks for years.108
Unlike Alabama, Regular physicians in California did not have to pair the state’s 
licensing law with a public health measure.  But they were significantly aided because the 
63
107 “Report of the Secretary of the State Board of Examiners” W. N. Griswold, M.D.,  The 
California Medical Times, Vol. 1, No. 2, October 1877: 26-29.
108 “Annual Address,” Transactions of the Medical Society of the State of California During the 
Years 1876 and 1877 (Sacramento, H. W. Weaver, Printer, 1877): 25–28, http://
books.google.com/ebooks.  
California Board of Health had been created the year before the licensing law was passed. 
Even though physicians did not piggy-back the state’s licensing on the creation of the 
board of health, members of the Board of Health in California strongly advocated on 
behalf of licensing as an essential component of public health.  The board members’ 
support for licensing was unsurprising because all of the members of the board were 
Regular physicians.  What was surprising was the state Regulars’ willingness to 
compromise with Irregulars.  In many states, Regular physicians proposed laws that 
clearly sought to limit the influence of Irregulars, but in California the leaders of CSMS 
fairly early on were committed to compromising with Irregulars.  The leadership of 
CSMS and the Board of Health in California never sought to eliminate Irregulars.  The 
Regulars’ willingness to compromise encouraged the state’s Irregulars to quickly support 
the law and overcame any objections in the legislature.
One of the most consistent problems faced by licensing laws was that as soon as 
they were passed, special interest groups immediately sought to amend them in the next 
legislative session.  Sometimes these amendments were proposed by Regular or Irregular 
medical societies, but often they were proposed to benefit a class of medical specialists  
who were disadvantaged by the existing law.  There were a wide range of amendments 
proposed in states around the country to help itinerant physicians, unrecognized 
specialities, or some other group.  California was no different.             
Even though the law was passed with overwhelming support from the state’s 
Regulars and Irregulars, Ira Oatman, Chairman of the Committee on Medical Legislation 
for the California State Medical Society, fought tooth and nail “to defeat” subsequent 
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legislation that upset the original compromise.  Oatman often worked with several other 
state medical societies to defeat any and all proposals to amend the licensing law from 
the Regular society.  In 1878, Oatman was faced with multiple bills that sought to upend 
the state’s law. There were so many proposed alterations and amendments to the 
licensing, and Oatman admitted that he struggled to keep abreast of all the proposals.  
Oatman’s struggle was not unique.  After licensing laws were passed, legislators 
constantly sought to tinker with them. 
Although, the California licensing law would be amended by the legislature in 
1878, Oatman held his own.  In addition to requiring examinations of all applicants, the 
new law explicitly authorized the creation of  Regular, Eclectic, and Homeopathic boards. 
Each of these boards was explicitly tied to the dominant state board for each sect.  
Additionally, the medical societies retained the right to change the members without 
interference from the governor’s office.  This effectively prevented any additional 
medical sects from creating their own medical examining boards, thereby establishing a 
sort of medical cartel among the three dominate sects.  Additionally, the law was altered 
to give the medical societies more money for examinations.  Physicians who submitted 
false diplomas would be fined an additional fifteen dollars by the board.  The examining 
boards also were required to refuse certificates to any applicant accused of unprofessional 
conduct.  Finally, itinerant vendors were required to pay for one-hundred dollars licenses 
if they wanted to sell any “drugs, nostrum, ointment or appliance of any kind intended for 
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the treatment of disease.”109  Essentially, Oatman and the CSMS were successful in 
achieving almost everything they wanted from the 1878 amendments.  Additionally, the 
1878 bill enabled more rigorous enforcement of the licensing law.  
One of the implications for the 1878 amendments was that non-graduates who had 
not presented themselves for an exam in 1876 had another opportunity in 1878.  The 
Board of Examiners for the Medical Society of the State of California began advertising 
in newspapers providing notice to non-medical school graduates that they needed to take 
a medical examination to procure a license.  One of the advertisements in the Sacramento 
Daily Union announced that all non-graduates had to go to San Francisco for the 
examinations.  The examining board did not bother to schedule exams for Sacramento.  
The advertisement indicated that the board informed applicants that it would question 
physicians about why they had failed to take the earlier exam.110  Allowing non-graduate 
physicians to apply for licenses even though they had failed to do so prior was a small 
compromise for California’s Regulars in order to achieve their primary goals. 
The Regulars’ successful push for licensing laws unnerved Irregular physicians 
around the country.  Efforts to license physicians had been stalled for decades until the 
1870s, but licensing was clearly picking up steam across the country.  More importantly, 
the Irregular medical societies were often placed in an extremely uncomfortable position.  
While Irregulars often favored creating state boards of health that were responsible for 
designing and enforcing sanitation laws, they saw that Regulars were piggy-backing 
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medical licensing on state board of health laws.  Additionally, most state’s Irregulars were 
less willing than the Regulars to compromise with Homeopaths and Eclectics.  
In 1875, at the twenty-eighth meeting of the American Institute of Homeopathy, 
members debated the recent push by Regulars to establish state boards of health and 
medical examiners.  J. P. Dake, a prominent member of the American Institute of 
Homeopathy from Tennessee, drafted a report which argued that the AMA and American 
Public Health Service were essentially in cahoots to create “a regular scheme” to “seize 
governmental power, and its employment for the benefit and aggrandizement of a 
particular school and class of medical men.”  Dake described these efforts as an attempt 
by the Regular medical societies to create “state medicine,” which he argued benefitted 
them.  He believed that state boards of health were created under the guise of promoting 
sanitation, but that these organizations actually were formed to advance Regular 
medicine.  The American Institute of Homeopathy members passed a resolution chiding 
the efforts of Regulars to pass medical licensing bills as an effort to promote “sectarian 
purposes and the aggrandizement of medical associations, to the disparagements of 
others…”111
While Alabama, California, and other states successfully passed rudimentary 
medical practice acts, Oregon’s Regular physicians efforts continued to stall.  Starting in 
1876, the Medical Society of Oregon (MSO) resolved that its legislative committee 
should promote two bills to the legislature: one bill advocating the creation of a State 
Board of Health similar to California, and the second bill mandating the hanging and 
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framing of a doctor’s diploma.  While some members of the Medical Society of Oregon 
were in favor of creating a board of health, they hoped that at a bare minimum the 
legislature would acquiesce to the “hanging and framing” bill.  
The “hanging and framing bill” proposed by the MSO as an alternative was a 
quirky scheme that required physicians to post their diplomas in their offices.  If they did 
not possess a medical degree, they would have been required to post a sign stating in 
large print: “Not a Graduate in Medicine.”112  While the leadership of the Medical 
Society of Oregon’s advocated on behalf of the more comprehensive board of health law, 
it was not able to get support from a majority of the society’s members despite a 
recommendation from a special legislative committee.113  The MSO failed to issue any 
resolutions regarding the proposed comprehensive board of health regulatory act.  
Instead, the MSO was resolved to promote the silly display law.114  The failure of the 
leadership of the MSO to promote a board of health demonstrated that a clear split 
existed in the Oregon Regular community.  This split was a result of mistrust between 
Regular medical school graduates and non-degreed doctors.  
Compared to some of the other licensing bills proposed around the country, the 
Oregon “hanging” bill was embarrassingly hokey and ineffectual.  Oregon’s Regulars had 
failed to effectively tie a medical licensing bill to either anti-abortion laws or the creation 
of a board of health.  The efforts by the Medical Society of Oregon to pass any 
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regulations were half-hearted and doubtful to succeed.  The Society’s silly attempt to 
distinguish between medical school graduates and non-graduates even generated 
opposition within the Society because it discriminated against many of the MSO’s own 
members.  While it demonstrated a growing rift between the state’s medical and non-
medical school graduates, it doomed any legislative efforts.  While New York physicians 
rallied around anti-abortion laws to promote medical licensing, Oregon’s physicians 
floundered to find a convincing argument.
Oregon’s failure to effectively tie licensing to public health prevented the state’s 
Regulars from advancing licensing.  Unlike Alabama, Oregon did not have the same type 
of demand for a state board of health as did Alabama.  Alabama constantly was faced 
with a rash of serious endemic tropical diseases.  Oregon was not.  Without any serious 
public health problems, Oregon physicians lacked the most credible argument for 
licensing.  Instead, state Regulars argued about informing patients that their physician 
lacked a medical degree.  There is little evidence to suggest that patients truly cared 
whether their physician was a medical school graduate.  Physicians needed help to pass 
licensing laws, and circumstances in Oregon were not particularly favorable for licensing 
supporters.     
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CHAPTER V
LICENSING PUSH GOES NATIONWIDE
While physicians in Maryland and New York tied together licensing and anti-
abortion laws to make medical regulation more palatable to their state legislatures, 
Illinois physicians focused on creating a board of health that would be responsible for 
both sanitation and medical regulation throughout Illinois.  While debating a resolution 
that asked “members of the State Medical Society” to lobby “the representatives from 
this district” to create a State Board of Health, the Jersey County Medical Society of 
Illinois advocated the creation of a state board of health with broad responsibilities.  They  
wanted to create a state agency that could limit the ability of former patients to file 
malpractice suits, require courts to pay physicians for medical testimony, regulate 
pharmacists, and establish a state board of medical examiners.  The Jersey County 
Society clearly sought to overcome any lingering opposition to medical licensing by 
pairing it with measures popular with both Regular and Irregular physicians.115  
The three most prominent medical sects agreed that boards of health were 
necessary because they advanced sanitation reform.  Even many Homeopaths and 
Eclectics were abstractly in favor of creating state boards of health because they could 
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ameliorate the lives of their patients, but they deeply mistrusted the Regulars’ push for 
boards of health.  Many Irregular physicians understood that generally “the individual 
does concern himself with the duties of the masses,” which made state boards of health 
essential.  These organizations needed broad powers to force citizens to comply with 
sanitary initiatives.  Dr. Tullio Verdi, a Homeopathic member the American Institute of 
Homeopathy Committee on Legislation, stated that Homeopaths “were hygienists by 
virtue” of their medical practice and should not “fear boards of health” so as long as 
Homeopaths and Eclectics were permitted to serve on the boards of health.  If Regulars 
worked with Homeopaths and Eclectics, than they could expect some assistance from 
their organized Irregular colleagues.116 
Illinois’s Allopathic physicians realized that they were going to have work with 
Homeopaths and Eclectics if they wanted to pass a licensing bill with teeth.  The 
president of the Illinois State Medical Society argued for this approach in 1876.  He 
demanded that his colleagues work toward the passage of a medical licensing law to 
protect the public from unqualified practitioners.  He also conceded that Eclectic and 
Homeopathic practitioners were, like Regular physicians, “devoted to their patients and 
profession.”117  He advocated détente between Regulars and Irregulars in Illinois, and 
argued that the Medical Society should pass “wise and impartial legislation” which 
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recognized only “well-educated men” but debarred incompetents, “whether Regular or 
Irregular.”118
In 1877, the state, county, and district medical societies in Illinois effectively 
pressured the legislature for action.  Illinois did not have any existing sanitation statutes, 
and the Illinois State Medical Society committee assigned to lobby for the bill found that  
“the average legislator” knew very little about sanitation.  Although the legislature was 
faced with managing serious economic problems because of a severe, national 
depression, the legislature did listen to the state’s physicians regarding sanitary reform.  
Additionally, the Regular legislation committee drafted a bill that it believed would 
successfully “avoid objective criticism and needless opposition.”119  In a departure from 
his predecessor, the new president of the Illinois State Medical Society, T. D. Fitch, 
promoted a bill creating a state board of health, but he was skeptical of the bills 
circulating through the legislature.  He stated that he was not “personally satisfied” with 
them because they were not drafted by the Illinois State Medical Society.120  
Fitch, along with other members of the Illinois State Medical Society, opposed the 
proposed bill because the most popular and likely to succeed bill in the state’s legislature 
in 1877 imposed a compromise on the Regulars, Eclectics, and Homeopaths.  Regulars in 
several states were still leery of any laws that required them to collaborate with 
Homeopaths and Eclectics.  There were members of the Regular medical society who still 
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hoped to use licensing to eliminate Homeopaths and Eclectics despite previous 
statements by members or officers of the Illinois Regular society.  It is understandable 
that they would have been unwilling to contemplate licensing laws legitimizing Irregular 
medicine.  
Typically, licensing laws needed to be paired with some type of popular medical 
reform in order to be approved by state legislatures during the 1870s.  While New York’s 
physicians initially sought to team it up with strict anti-abortion measures, board of health 
bills that also licensed Regular, Eclectic, and Homeopathic physicians were much more 
popular.  The legislatures in New York, Alabama, California, and Texas also 
demonstrated that state legislators were leery of marginalizing any of the major sects.  
Unlike Regulars who were wary of the bill, Homeopaths broadly favored the proposed 
law.  The law grandfathered in physicians who had already practiced in the state for ten 
years and required that Homeopaths and Eclectics serve on the board of health.  Later, 
Homeopaths around the country would question unified boards of health, but Illinois’s 
Irregulars were pleased that they were being included.121   
The most important licensing aspect of the Illinois Board of Health bill was that it 
gave the board to ability to determine whether a medical school was in “good standing.”  
If the board found that a medical school was not in good standing, graduates of that 
school would be required to pass an examination instead of being automatically licensed.  
Therefore, the legislature gave the state board of health the power to evaluate medical 
schools and to determine whether a school met the board’s minimum standards.    
73
121 Transactions of the 35th Session of the American Institute of Homeopathy, 1878 (Philadelphia, 
1879):  59-60, http://books.google.com/ebooks.
After the legislature created the Illinois Board of Health, the board sought to 
develop sectarian neutral criteria to evaluate the quality of medical schools.  The addition 
of Homeopaths and Eclectics on the board of health prevented it from classifying only 
Regular schools as being in “good standing.”  In addition to licensing Irregulars, the 
Illinois law included a provision for licensing midwives.  Midwives, like physicians, 
were licensed after presenting a diploma from a midwifery school in good standing, 
taking an examination in obstetrics, or demonstrating ten years of continuous practice in 
Illinois.  The Illinois board would eventually license large numbers of midwives.  Aside  
from evaluating medical schools, testing applicants, and licensing midwives, the board 
also was responsible for creating and enforcing sanitary and quarantine policies.  
Moreover, the Illinois law sought to centralize all state medical authority under one body, 
unlike the California and Alabama laws that divided licensing responsibilities.  
Soon after the legislature approved the law, the president of the Illinois Medical 
Society, J. L. White, M.D., sought to allay any fears Regulars or Irregulars had about a 
unified board.  While White was dismayed that the governor decided to install two non-
medical persons on the first board, White made an effort to acknowledge the 
contributions of Homeopathic medicine.   White stated that Homeopathy “prov[ed] to the 
world that a great majority of acute diseases will, unaided, so far as medication is 
concerned, terminate favorably.”  White’s compliment may be perceived as somewhat 
backhanded, but many Regulars would never have complimented Homeopathic medicine, 
much less acknowledge the limitations of the Regular medical practices.  Additionally, he 
acknowledged that the Boston Medical and Surgical Journal published an article that 
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demonstrated that when doctors treated patients without medicine they often had “most 
happy results.”122  Instead of accusing Homeopaths of practicing medicine fraudulently, 
he admitted that some of the tenets of Irregular medicine had merits.  White’s efforts to 
reduce the rancor between the sects demonstrated that there were Regulars who were 
willing to work with Homeopaths and Eclectics.            
The willingness to cross sectarian lines would be important because the Illinois 
medical practice act did not just create a system to regulate physicians; the law created a 
medical board that was responsible for public health, public records, and licensing.  By 
creating the Illinois State Board of Health, the legislature entrusted state medicine to a 
new quasi-governmental agency.  A member of the Illinois Board of Health best 
delineated the necessity and dangers of state medicine when he wrote that the Illinois 
Board was “charged with the protection of the health of the people from dangers which 
are beyond the control of public; just as its functions are derived from necessity and the 
necessity constitutes their limit; in their exercise, every unnecessary invasion of private 
right, every unnecessary interference with the perfect freedom of personal action, is a 
usurpation of power, an unjustifiable trespass upon the liberty of the citizen.”123  The 
board member argued that state medicine had three separate, but equally important goals:  
creating well-educated medical corps by casting out “ignorance, pretension, 
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incompetence, and all manner of quackery,” creating and enforcing sanitary regulations, 
and enforcing quarantines.124  
While the rationale for investing the state with sanitation and quarantine powers 
may have been “obvious and undisputed” to many people, regulating who could practice 
medicine was much less obvious.  Today it is assumed that the states should license 
physicians, but this was not as readily apparent to nineteenth-century Americans.  They 
would have agreed that enforcing quarantines or sanitary regulations was a proper role 
for government because it was the only body that had the authority and power to handle 
such actions, but licensing was different.  By licensing physicians, the state was imposing 
regulations on the operation of the free market.  Medical licensing also does not have the 
same observable and immediate effect on public heath as sanitation or quarantines.  
Because most states possessed provisions that grandfathered older physicians it would 
take some time before all the physicians of a state were vetted under the law.     
Instead of following Illinois’s more centralized model, the Kansas legislature and 
governor in 1879 approved a medical licensing act (modeled after the California licensing 
act passed in 1876), which delegated state authority to license doctors to the Kansas 
Medical Society and the state’s Eclectic and Homeopathic medical societies.  Each 
society appointed its members to each of their respective boards of examiners.  The act 
also permitted each sect to regulate its own members, without intrusion by Kansas’ state 
government.  Additionally, physicians paid licensing fees directly to their respective 
societies.  Some physicians were disappointed with the law because licensing applicants 
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could petition all three of the examining boards for a license.  After one board declared an 
applicant incompetent, the applicant could simply reapply to another board.125  The bill 
encouraged board-shopping by potential applicants.  There also would have been a 
perverse interest for the medical societies to license as many people as possible because 
they could amass more fees for their society.    
When the Regular members of the Kansas medical board attempted to exercise 
their authority, the Kansas attorney general challenged the constitutionality of the act and 
filed a suit in quo warranto against board members appointed by the Kansas Medical 
Society.  The suit asked the court to determine whether the board members had the 
authority to act under the 1879 statute.  The attorney general argued that the licensing law 
violated the Kansas Constitution because it granted state powers to the Kansas Medical 
Society, a private corporate entity.  The court agreed that Kansas was not entitled to 
delegate these powers to the Society and completely invalidated the law. 126  Soon 
afterward, Kansas reverted back to its original registration law.  Like physicians in Texas, 
Kanas physicians would have to wait more than twenty years for the medical community 
to convince the legislature to pass a more stringent licensing statute.  
The Kansas ruling is unique because several states relied on their medical 
societies to administer their medical practice acts, but only in Kansas did a court bar a 
state medical society from administering a licensing law.  The chief difference was that 
the Kansas Supreme Court relied on the state’s constitution to justify its ruling.  The law 
was not invalidated under the federal constitution and had little precedential value for 
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anyone who sought to challenge other state laws.  If the Kansas Supreme Court issued a 
broader ruling based on the United States Constitution, then it may have complicated the 
legal discussion surrounding licensing, but because the justices relied on state law their 
ruling was not particularly compelling or influential.      
New Jersey also avoided the sectarian disputes entirely by passing a medical 
registration act.  Unlike the Illinois medical licensing law, the New Jersey law did not 
allow physicians to regulate themselves.  Instead, county clerks registered anyone who 
presented a diploma from any medical college.  Unfortunately, county clerks had little 
incentive or ability “to discriminate between fraudulent and legal diplomas, and cannot, 
or do not, take the trouble to tell a medical from a literary or a dental diploma…”  A clerk 
even registered an individual who presented a document in Russian and claimed that it 
was a medical school diploma.  The clerk was not troubled that he could not read the 
diploma and simply registered the individual as a physician.  If clerks would register 
diplomas in Russian, it is unlikely that they took any time to distinguish among Eclectic, 
Homeopathic, or Allopathic schools of medicine.127  While several states passed 
analogous medical registration acts to New Jersey, they were mostly ineffective.  
Ultimately, states that employed medical registration acts were indistinguishable from 
completely unregulated states.
In 1879, the Medical Society of Oregon took a new tact in its quest for licensing, 
and its Committee on Medical Education issued a report arguing that there were far too 
many physicians in the United States and that physicians could not make a living because 
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of increased competition.  Not surprisingly, the Committee attacked the notion that the 
market should play any role in determining the merits of one doctor over another.  The 
Committee thought the public was essentially incapable of distinguishing between an 
educated and an incompetent physician.  The Committee expressed concern that medical 
schools were quickly churning out “unscrupulous charlatans.”128  The society’s president 
admitted that the lowest standards at European medical schools for attaining medical 
degrees were higher than the best standards in the United States.129
Concerned that even a medical degree no longer proved minimal competence, the 
MSO’s committee asked for the legislature to help to purge the ranks of “disreputable and 
ignorant pretenders.”  The Committee stated that the legislature should allow the MSO to 
form county Examining Boards.  These boards would examine every individual and 
compile a list of “worthy and well” physicians, which they would distribute to local 
newspapers.  The committee shied from attempting to pass governmental regulations 
prohibiting quacks from practicing because it believed they would be unenforceable; 
instead it was interested in granting these local boards limited private powers to regulate 
medicine.130             
The ineffectiveness of medical registration acts pushed many states toward 
adopting one of the medical licensing models.  The Illinois practice act emerged as the 
most influential licensing law of the 1870s and 1880s.  It served as a model statute for 
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numerous states because it created an acceptable compromise for both organized 
Regulars and Irregulars.  Illinois also provided advocates of medical licensing a model 
for how to enforce medical licensing laws.  The Illinois board decision to revoke the 
licenses of doctors it believed behaved unprofessionally was appealing to organized 
physicians who were comfortable with medical societies that disciplined their members.  
The Illinois medical board adopted principles of professionalism from the organized 
Regular and Irregular medical societies.  For years, state and local medical societies 
expelled members who violated their codes of ethics.  The Illinois board sought to enact a 
code to those used by state medical associations and enforce the principles that had 
governed these societies for years.    
Instead of targeting any specific medical sect, the Illinois board first focused on 
eliminating incompetents, regardless of their sectarian affiliation.  Many of the Illinois 
board’s enforcement actions focused on Chicago, which was overrun by scam artists and 
un-licensable medical practitioners.  Their efforts successfully reduced the total number 
of physicians in the state and dramatically increased the percentage of physicians who 
attended medical school.  The Illinois law not only evaluated medical schools, but 
required an examination of both non-graduates and graduates of schools not in good 
standing.  The Illinois Board of Health encouraged most medical schools to change their 
curriculum and adopt the minimum standards advocated by the board.  The Illinois board 
determined that the state’s licensing law allowed it to actively prosecute unlicensed 
physicians or licensed physicians who violated the board’s code of ethics.  Despite this 
claim, it is not clear that the medical act gave the board this broad authority.   
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By the end of the 1870s, eighteen states had passed some type of licensing law.  
Of these states, thirteen passed simple registration laws, while the remaining five passed 
laws that created examining boards.  The registration laws would prove to be ineffective 
and essentially useless over the next decade.  All of those states would soon be forced to 
rethink their legislation schemes, but in many cases, it would take years to secure new 
licensing.  Medical societies had lobbied effectively for licensing laws by tying them to 
board of health or anti-abortion laws.  Ironically, after states passed sanitation and anti-
abortion laws, it became difficult for medical societies to revisit medical legislation.  
California physicians were lucky that their board of health and licensing laws were 
passed in quick succession.  In many other states, these registration laws lasted for as 
many as twenty years.  Massachusetts, for example, was the first state to create a state 
board of health 1869, but Massachusetts Regulars did not secure a licensing law until 
1894.131
Ultimately, it is also ironic that physicians successfully linked medical licensing 
to sanitation reform.  Historian William Rothstein argued that “[p]ublic health 
programs...were of little interest to most nineteenth-century physicians.”  He claimed that 
physicians in urban areas “opposed compulsory reporting of contagious diseases” and did 
not see eye to eye with local public health authorities.  Physicians often did not have 
direct relationships with public health authorities, and they “ignor[ed] many aspects of 
public health.”  Rothstein attributes physician disinterest with public health and sanitation 
to the fact that most of their clients lived in “private homes who did not encounter the 
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sanitary problems of tenement residents.”   Rothstein’s point is valid.  Sanitation and 
public health were not part of physicians’ medical school training and they were not 
tested on these fields.  If physicians believed that public health was relevant to the 
practice of medicine, they would have made an effort to ensure that new physicians had 
at lest a rudimentary understanding of sanitation and public health issues.  The notion that 
states needed licensing to ensure that the enforcement of public health was a 
disingenuous ruse to make licensing more appealing to wary legislatures.132  
Alabama, Texas, California, and Illinois passed laws that created governmental 
licensing that had the potential not only to restrict the number of physicians in the state, 
but eliminated licensed practitioners that examining boards found unworthy.  In other 
states such as New York, Kansas, and Texas, weak registration laws were passed after 
physicians failed to secure operative licensing laws.   These laws were both 
unenforceable or ridiculously easy to circumvent.  Registration laws were not enforced 
strictly because most of those statutes failed to state explicitly who was responsible for 
enforcing them.  Alternatively, licensing law created quasi-public bodies that, if 
adequately funded, could administer their laws more robustly than the legislatures ever 
even intended.  While in the 1870s medical societies sought to pass any licensing law, the 
1880s would be defined by the states that implemented and enforced their statutes most 
effectively.
Advocates for licensing understood the public discomfort with overt 
governmental regulation of medicine.  Dr. Horace Wardner, president of the Illinois State 
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Board of Health, wrote an article for Illinois State Board of Health’s 1880 annual report 
where he outlined both the necessity and potential dangers of government regulation.  He 
stated: “State medicine is charged with the protection of the health of the people from 
dangers which are beyond control of private effort its just functions are derived from 
necessity, and the necessity constitutes their limit; in their exercise every unnecessary 
invasion of private right, every unnecessary interference with the perfect freedom of 
personal action, is a usurpation of power, an unjustifiable trespass upon the liberty of the 
citizen.”  Wardner believed that the Illinois State Board of Health was not intruding on 
individual liberty and was committed to determining whether a physician was “properly 
qualified to discharge his functions intelligently and with skill.”133            
The regulatory systems designed by medical societies in states such as Illinois 
demonstrated that legislatures were concerned about direct state action.  Instead of 
creating official government agencies, legislatures passed laws that mixed self-regulation 
and state powers.  In many situations the enforcement powers built into the medical 
licensing laws mimicked discipline systems already employed by state medical societies.  
The state boards were essentially medical societies augmented by state police powers.  If 
private medical societies could not effectively enforce discipline on their own, it was only  
natural that they would want to co-opt state police powers to reshape the medical 
landscape.  Instead of relying on the vagaries of the free market to regulate medicine, 
physicians wanted to rely on quasi-governmental medical boards to reduce competition 
and protect patients.
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CHAPTER VI
THE ECLECTIC DILEMMA
As states adopted medical licensing and registration laws during the 1870s, 
Irregular physicians faced a dilemma.  Irregulars understood that Regulars originally 
advocated on behalf of licensing as way to eliminate Irregulars, but many of them agreed 
with the overall goals of licensing.  The proliferation of unqualified medical practitioners 
concerned many Homeopaths and Eclectics.  Eclectics were especially apprehensive 
because fraudulent doctors often passed themselves off as Eclectics.  This further 
marginalized the weakest and smallest major medical sect.  Eclectics were disquieted that 
Eclecticism’s affiliation with outright frauds could undermine their standing as 
physicians.
Unlike Homeopaths, Eclectics did not practice a unified system of medicine.  
Eclectics were composed of a mixture of lonely local practitioners, botanic physicians, 
reformed Regulars, and graduates of Eclectic medical schools.  The very name 
“Eclectics” accurately described the differing medical practices of its members.  
Sometimes, Eclectics in the National Eclectic Medical Association (NEMA) did not even 
appear to agree on who was a legitimate Eclectic physician.  While, Homeopaths could 
draw on their unified medical system to assemble a more coherent and coordinated 
84
approach to medical licensing.  Eclectics lacked this cohesion when medical licensing 
became a defining issue.  Homeopaths demonstrated their unity and influence when they 
effectively blocked medical licensing in two of their strongholds, New York and 
Massachusetts, until the 1890s.134  Homeopaths’ influence was derived not only from 
their larger numbers but also the nature of their patients.  Urban and wealthy 
Homeopathic patients helped their physicians lobby in state legislatures on their behalf.     
 In contrast, Eclectics were in more precarious position.  While they lacked the 
power to block legislation, they worked with Regulars and Homeopaths to help craft 
potentially beneficial medical licensing laws.  Many Eclectics understood that medical 
licensing could improve Eclecticism’s standing in the medical community by eliminating 
frauds who hid under their moniker.  Eclectics faced a stark choice: cooperate with 
Regulars to draft helpful licensing or attempt to block licensing and risk further 
marginalization.  Eclectics were increasingly torn on how to proceed with medical 
licensing.
Even though Homeopaths had more influence in state legislatures than Eclectics, 
they were faced with many of the same choices.  In states where Homeopaths could kill 
licensing, they did, but in most states they were forced to compromise with Regulars on 
licensing.  In many ways, the debate within Eclecticism mirrored the debate in 
Homeopathy, but the Eclectic debate is noteworthy because leaders within the movement 
publicly attacked each other in their battle over licensing.      
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The passage and implementation of the Illinois Medical Practice Act created a 
major rift in the leadership of the National Eclectic Medical Association over the issue of 
medical licensing.  While many Eclectic physicians were concerned with licensing in 
other states, in Illinois the Eclectics worked with Regulars to create the Illinois Board of 
Health and establish medical licensing in the state.  Eclectics also served on the joint 
mixed State of Board of Health.  Dr. Anson Clark was not only the Eclectic representative 
on the Illinois Board of Health, but the editor of a leading Chicago Eclectic journal and a 
future president of NEMA.  The willingness of Illinois’ Eclectics such as Clark to align 
themselves with the state’s Regular physicians rankled the older members of NEMA.  
These older members were much less willing to cooperate with Regulars on either 
regulation or public health then younger physicians such as Clark.  Clark’s actions 
angered many of the older members because he openly advocated for a unified medical 
board instead of establishing separate boards for each of the sects.  
NEMA had focused on combating the new wave of licensing that began in the 
1860s.  Throughout that decade, unsuccessful licensing bills popped up all over the 
country.  During the 1866-67 legislative session, for example, a bill was introduced that 
would require physicians to be examined by the Ohio State Medical Society and be 
graduates of a medical school.  Ohio was the heart of Eclectic medicine, and this bill 
represented a serious challenge to Eclecticism.135  It became increasingly clear to 
organized Eclectics that they would have to combat potentially hostile legislation across 
the country.  The wave of medical licensing laws in the 1870s demonstrated that their 
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concern was legitimate.  However, it was the passage and implementation of the Illinois 
Medical Practice Act that forced open a crack in NEMA’s leadership and led to an 
ongoing debate over licensing within the group for the next decade.     
The passage of the Illinois law forced NEMA grapple with wave of new laws 
modeled after the Illinois law.  Unlike the American Medical Association, NEMA’s 
response to medical regulation was hampered by its membership’s disagreement about 
what constituted an Eclectic physician was and its members’ widely divergent views on 
medical regulation.  The debate over medical regulation exposed the fissures within the 
Eclectic community.  The older physicians, who cobbled together the Thomsonians, 
disgruntled Regulars, and medical reformers to give birth to Eclectic medicine in 1830s 
and 1840s, were a discordant group and predisposed to oppose any type governmental 
regulation.  These medical reformers had fought hard to eliminate medical regulation in 
the first of half of the century.  They believed that state regulations discriminated, 
marginalized, and limited their practice rights.  They viewed Regulars with suspicion and 
distrusted their motives in advocating for medical licensing.  
The younger generation of Eclectic physicians was not as hostile to medical 
regulation despite being trained by the original Eclectics.  Unlike their older colleagues, 
many of them were Eclectic medical school graduates.  They had very little in common 
with the illiterate Thomsonians who aligned themselves with Eclectics in opposition to 
medical regulation in the first half of the century.  This younger generation was more 
concerned with legitimizing Eclecticism than expanding its definition to include 
uneducated and marginal medical practitioners.  The second generation of Eclectic 
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physicians believed that they had to purge their uneducated colleagues from their ranks to 
legitimize Eclecticism.  Instead of fighting regulation, they often worked with Regulars to 
pass nonpartisan legislation.
Eclectics realized that Regulars needed Irregular support to pass licensing laws, 
and they knew that discriminatory legislation often failed in state legislatures.  Between 
1870 and 1880, Eclectics reported to NEMA that state legislatures were unwilling to 
discriminate against Irregulars.  A Nebraska report stated that its legislatures would not 
pass discriminatory legislation.  Massachusetts, Ohio, and Wisconsin successfully 
defeated bills proposed by the American Social Science Association designed to 
consolidate control under the old-school medical societies.  Even with these hopeful 
signs, medical licensing made Eclectics anxious.  
The debate over licensing within the NEMA sparked an outright war between two 
of its most prominent members: Dr. John King and Dr. Anson Clark.  While both 
physicians sought to downplay the severity of the clash, it is clear from their rhetoric that 
their battle represented a serious dilemma for NEMA.  The tenor of the debate suggested 
that both physicians believed they were fighting for the soul of the Eclectic movement.  
King and Clark attacked each other mercilessly to shape its policy.  King opposed any 
type of medical regulation, while Clark worked on the Illinois Board of Health with 
Regular physicians to regulate the practice of medicine in the state.  This heated debate 
created confusion with NEMA and spawned an awkward and ambiguous policy towards 
medical regulation.  Instead of presenting a united front and crafting a coherent policy, 
NEMA muddled its stance on medical licensing.  NEMA sent mixed messages and left 
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local and state societies to develop their own policies on licensing.  Whether NEMA 
could influence or shape the direction of medical legislation is unclear, but because of its 
befuddled position, it abdicated any leadership position it might have played in this 
nationwide medical debate when these laws were first being pushed through state 
legislatures.  
John King was a pioneer in Eclectic medicine and one of its most ardent devotees. 
In 1838, he graduated from the Reform Medical School of New York founded by Wooster 
Beach (1794-1868) in 1827.  As a graduate of the Reform Medical School, King ensured 
that he would be ostracized by the medical establishment as a “charlatan and quack.”136  
After graduation, he traveled extensively and settled in Kentucky where he practiced 
medicine until 1849.  He helped organize the first National Convention of Eclectic 
Physicians, and the attendees elected him secretary at the convention.  Between 1849 and 
1851 he served as the chairman of Materia Medica at the Memphis Institute.  In 1851, 
King joined the faculty at the recently founded Eclectic Medical Institute of Cincinnati 
(EMI) and taught there for the next four decades.  During his tenure, EMI became the 
leading Eclectic medical school in the country.  King established himself as one of the 
leading writers of Eclectic textbooks, such as the Eclectic Dispensatory, and published 
most of his books on Eclectic medicine while at EMI.  Eclectic physicians throughout the 
nineteenth century extensively used King’s textbooks in their medical schools.  He joined 
the second iteration of NEMA in 1872 and served as its president from 1878-1879.  
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Anson Clark was born in Massachusetts in 1836, but he moved to Cook County, 
Illinois, when he was five years old.  He graduated from EMI in 1861, and likely attended 
King’s classes as a student.  During the Civil War, he worked as a surgeon in the 127th 
Illinois Volunteer Infantry.  After the war, Clark moved back to Chicago and in 1868, 
became a member of the faculty and later its dean at the Bennett College of Eclectic 
Medicine and Surgery.  In addition to working at Bennett, he served as an editor at the 
Chicago Medical Times and a member of the Illinois General Assembly in 1871.  Starting 
in 1877, Clark served on the Illinois Board of Health.  During his fourteen years on the 
board, he served as both its treasurer and secretary.  As member of the Illinois board, he 
was responsible for regulating the practice of medicine under the 1877 and 1887 Medical 
Practice Acts.  Additionally, Clark served as the president of NEMA in 1880-1881 and the 
Illinois State Eclectic Medical Society in 1898.137  These two physicians were from 
different generations of Eclectics and they represented NEMA’s split on medical 
licensing.  
In 1873, NEMA began discussing the growing push for medical licensing in 
places such as Texas.  The organization passed a resolution for requiring “every person” 
hoping to practice “medicine, surgery or obstetrics” to pass a comprehensive examination 
covering “the fundamental sciences, comprehending a course of study necessary for the 
acquirement of a full knowledge of the science of medicine in all its branches.”  NEMA 
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believed that an examination was necessary because the general public could not 
determine “the scientific attainments of medical practitioners” as medical diplomas were 
so “freely granted” they had ceased to be “evidence of the scientific attainments” of their 
holders.138  Additionally, Eclectics could pass this exam as easily as Regulars and 
Homeopaths. This resolution went far beyond the goals of the Illinois Medical Practice 
Act.  It required an examination of non-graduates and graduates of medical schools that 
were not in good standing with the board.  The NEMA resolution would have required all 
physicians to take the medical examination.  This resolution is surprising because so 
many Eclectics were skeptical of medical licensing.
King, however, was not just skeptical about medical licensing; he was adamantly 
opposed to any medical licensing regulations.  In his presidential address of 1879 at the 
NEMA conference in Cleveland, he attacked medical regulation generally.  King argued 
that like religion, medicine did not require county, state, or federal regulation.  Instead of 
outsourcing medical licensing to the state, each school of medicine should be responsible 
for regulating themselves.  King believed that these laws did not protect the public and 
that they were an insult to the intelligence of the American people.  King stated that the 
proposed regulatory schemes would not advance medicine or science; instead they were 
simply the work of “bigoted scheming minds” that sought to elevate their own medical 
sect.  King was most concerned with the efforts of Regular physicians to regulate 
medicine because he considered their primary goal was to marginalize Eclectic medicine.  
Instead of elevating the medical profession, he believed that when the state legislatures 
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passed medical licensing and registration acts they violated the “spirit of justice” in the 
United States Constitution.139
Not only did medical regulation undermine Eclectic medicine, King felt that 
Regulars would continue to discriminate and torment Irregular practitioners.  Even after 
Eclectic physicians had complied with the Regulars’ “legal enactments,” Regulars still 
would refuse to consult with Irregulars and refer to Eclectics as “ignorant conceited 
quack[s].”  He could not imagine that Regulars would ever stop maligning and 
persecuting Eclectics, even if Eclectic physicians demonstrated that they were qualified 
for medical licenses.  King held that the Regulars did not seek to protect humanity from 
charlatanism, but instead sought to legislate the Eclectics out of existence.  Thirty years 
of discrimination by Regulars convinced King that Regulars could not be trusted to treat 
Eclectics fairly. A state report issued by the New York delegation at the 1879 convention 
supported King’s claims by emphasizing the historical efforts made by Regulars to 
degrade medical reformers.  The report remarked that Regular physicians in the first half 
of the century secured medical regulations that criminalized medical practice for Irregular 
physicians.  Additionally, Regulars were accused of actively seeking to drive Irregulars 
from the medical practice by encouraging former Irregular patients to sue their 
physicians.140  
The actions of the Illinois State Board of Health in 1879 against King’s own 
medical college, Eclectic Medical Institute (EMI), reinforced his belief that medical 
regulation was simply a Trojan horse to help Regulars destroy Eclecticism.  Fifteen days 
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before the 1879 NEMA conference, the Illinois State Board of Health determined that 
EMI was not a medical school in “good standing.”  The Illinois Board of Health had the 
power to determine whether a medical school was in “good standing.”  Graduates of 
medical schools in good standing did not have to take medical examination to practice 
medicine in Illinois.  According to the board, EMI, the most prominent Eclectic medical 
school in Illinois, was unacceptable because it insisted on only “giving two full courses 
of lectures in one year.”  At the beginning of the board’s existence, instead of evaluating 
each school individually, it sought to apply rather mechanistic standards to evaluate 
medical schools.  In 1878, the board determined that any medical school that had “two 
graduating courses in one year” was not in good standing.  While the board’s criterion 
was not particularly sophisticated, it was clear-cut.  The board could use the medical 
schools’ own literature to determine whether it satisfied their requirements.  This criterion 
made it possible to cheaply evaluate hundreds of medical schools in the North America 
and Europe.
Clark not only served as a member of the board that decertified EMI, but he 
explicitly approved of the board’s action.  A Chicago Medical Times editorial by Clark in 
July 1879 stated that the board was simply “striving to make medical education more 
thorough, more comprehensive and more fully in accord with the progressive spirit of the 
times.”141  The editorial chastised the “belligerence” of EMI and asked for the school to 
“gracefully yield” to the board’s demands.  The editorial went as far as to suggest that 
“students and preceptors to take note of the existing states of affairs.”142  Yet, Clark was 
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one of only two editors listed on the Chicago Medical Times byline.  Therefore, he 
probably wrote the editorial and even if he did not, he agreed with this editorial.  
Illinois board’s action against EMI most likely was not motivated by animus to 
Eclecticism, and Clark’s support for the board undermined King’s claim.  Also, the 
mechanistic nature of the board’s criteria would have complicated any attempts to punish 
only Eclectic schools.  The board also asked numerous Allopathic medical schools to 
comply with the board’s criteria.  Still, the editorial’s suggestion that “students and 
preceptors” should take note of the current situation did imply another reason for Clark’s 
strong support of the action against EMI.  While Clark simply may have agreed with the 
board’s position as an attempt to elevate medical education, he also may have had a 
financial stake in decertifying EMI.  As a faculty member of the competing Bennett 
Medical College in Chicago, he might have benefited by steering students to Bennett.  
Despite King’s attack against medical licensing, various state Eclectic medical 
organizations advocated on behalf of regulation in their legislatures.  The Nebraska 
delegation even stated that it was concerned that the state might pass medical regulations 
that were “too liberal.”   It sought licensing that not only protected the public from harm, 
but advanced the reputation of Eclectic medicine.  The Nebraska delegation also was 
concerned that charlatans often “assume[d] the name Eclectic” when they practiced 
medicine.143  The Kansas delegation conjectured that passage of its state law enhanced 
the reputation of Eclectic physicians and “confidently believed” that it would spur growth 
in the state organization.  Instead of aiding the Regular school, the Kansas report 
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indicated that medical regulation was “a great discomfiture” to them.144  Other Eclectics 
clearly were willing to forget past actions by Regulars and compromise with them if they 
could secure non-discriminatory legislation.  
During the next convention in Chicago in 1880, several members raised legitimate 
concerns about the reputation of Eclectic medical education.  In 1880, NEMA became 
aware that John Buchanan, one of the ringleaders of a large and notorious diploma mill in 
Philadelphia, listed serving as the president of NEMA as one of his chief credentials. 
Even though his statements and actions were fraudulent, NEMA justifiably was 
concerned that Buchanan’s claims could undermine faith in NEMA.  As a direct 
consequence of Buchanan and other Philadelphia entrepreneurs’ trafficking in medical 
degrees, the Pennsylvania legislature passed a medical registration act two years later 
designed to end this unsavory practice.  Benjamin Lee, a prominent Regular physician 
from Philadelphia, argued that act had at least “temporarily” closed the most egregious 
diploma mills.145 
Buchanan’s fraud encouraged members to discuss how diploma sales could be 
halted.  Members proposed a resolution at the convention to support the creation of state 
medical boards that would end the traffic of fake diplomas and medicines.  The proposal 
dictated that their support was contingent on the boards’ beginning to be governed by the 
major medical sects.  During Dr. Milbrey Green’s address to the convention in 1880, he 
emphasized that since 1873, NEMA supported regulations designed to prevent 
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“incompetent men” from receiving diplomas.  Green acknowledged that the country had 
been flooded with fraudulent diplomas from Allopathic, Homeopathic, and Eclectic 
schools of medicine.  He stated that it was critical for all physicians to unite against these 
practices because NEMA and other state medical societies could not eliminate these 
problems on their own.146  Green’s statement made it clear that NEMA needed to support 
some type of state legislation to eliminate diploma mills.  He also underlined the threat 
they posed to Eclectic medicine.  In Wisconsin, the state Eclectic society agreed with 
Green, and helped pass a medical licensing act that required physicians to possess a 
medical school diploma.  The Wisconsin report stated that Eclectics did not want any 
“half-breed Eclectics here and shall be glad to slough them off.”147
Other Eclectic physicians argued that medical regulation not only might eliminate 
fraudulent practitioners but improve relations between various medical sects.  The report 
from Anson’s Illinois delegation stated that medical regulation in the state thawed 
relations among the “Eclectic, Old-School or Homeopathic” physicians.  Instead of 
discrimination, the report stated that Eclectics no longer reported “unpleasant encounters” 
with other Regular physicians.148  When Regulars served side by side with Eclectics and 
Homeopaths, it made it more difficult for Regulars to demonize them.  The Illinois report 
suggested a brighter future for Eclectics if they were willing to compromise their views 
on medical regulation.
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Whether licensing immediately ameliorated relations between Regulars and 
Irregulars is debatable, but mixed licensing boards gave these physicians an opportunity 
to meet each other as colleagues and equals.  Clark stated that he did not feel threatened 
by the Regular physicians he worked with on the board. Where King saw enemies, Clark 
recognized physicians who were quite similar to himself.  They were medical school 
graduates, who were deeply involved with medical education, active in their medical 
societies, and published in medical journals.  These values and goals were shared also by 
organized, educated Eclectics and Homeopaths.   
While medical licensing was not necessarily a fait accompli in 1880, it was 
becoming clear that state legislatures were becoming more inclined to pass these 
regulations especially if they were tied to sanitation reform.  As Eclectics continued to 
debate the merits of licensing, the crawl toward nationwide licensing continued in the 
1880s.  While the 1870s was defined by these early efforts to pass any type of medical 
practice acts, in the 1880s, physicians, medical societies, and the newly created medical 
licensing boards often sought both to implement these laws and strengthen the newly 
created medical regulations.  In states where legislatures passed registration laws, 
medical societies immediately attacked these regulations as ineffective and useless.  
Additionally, after tying together boards of health and medical licensing, Regulars 
created a strong argument in favor of licensing and expanding their power.  Doctors 
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Medical licensing represented a fundamental change for physicians.  Instead of 
allowing the free market to determine the best and most successful, physicians coalesced 
around the idea that consumers were not capable of making informed health care 
decisions on their own.  For Regulars, the success of Eclectic and especially 
Homeopathic medicine demonstrated to them that patients could not tell the difference 
between good doctors and frauds.  Organized, educated Eclectic and Homeopaths also 
believed that licensing represented an opportunity to legitimize themselves to the public 
and their Regular competitors.  The debate within the National Eclectic Medical 
Association demonstrated that younger organized Eclectics believed they would benefit 
from licensing.  Both Homeopaths and Eclectic were deeply concerned because of the 
endless parade of frauds, incompetents and charlatans who called themselves 
Homeopaths and Eclectics who undermined the medical systems that they valued.  
While organized, educated Homeopathic, Eclectic, and Regular physicians 
supported licensing, large numbers of unorganized physicians still opposed any 
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regulation.  For the self-taught, isolated, immigrant, poorly educated, or more marginal 
doctors (Regular and Irregular), licensing represented a serious threat to their livelihoods.  
They were concerned that organized physicians sought to eliminate them from the 
practice of medicine through medical licensing.  
Aside from opposition from physicians, these emerging new quasi-governmental 
boards faced numerous challenges when they began operation.  Most of these new 
organizations were poorly funded, lacked infrastructure and encountered immediate 
opposition.  Many doctors were concerned that they never would be able to pass any 
licensing standards and had strong incentives to quickly challenge these laws.  
Unsurprisingly, these laws would face numerous and continuous legal assaults for the 
next thirty years.  
Three states, Alabama, Illinois and California, created three fundamentally 
different licensing schemes.  These laws passed early in this process and became different 
paradigms for other states to follow.  The legislature in Alabama passed a decentralized 
state law that relied on local medical societies to manage medical licensing.  In some 
ways this approach made sense.  The local medical societies, unlike the state association, 
would have a better idea of what was happening in their county.  Potentially, these 
societies would be better able to adapt to local circumstances.  On the other hand, 
Alabama was hampered because many counties did not have local societies.  
Additionally, most local societies had few resources to do anything much less manage the 
new law.  In Illinois, the legislature created a centralized board.  The Illinois Board of 
Health instantly sought to expand its powers beyond those granted in its founding 
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legislation by enforcing ethics rules.  The Illinois board consciously sought to serve as a 
national model for licensing.  The California legislature formed three separate boards for 
each of the largest medical sects: Regulars, Eclectics, and Homeopaths.  The split boards 
were created to prevent undue pressure on Irregulars and also some Regulars, as it was 
deeply concerned that a unified board would violate the American Medical Association’s 
ethics rule.  
All of the newly created state boards faced numerous problems trying to get their 
organizations off the ground.  Most of the boards relied on fees collected from their 
licensees to run the organizations but revenues often were barely enough to keep the 
organizations functional.  Additionally, the licensing boards were poorly planned 
experiments.  Often, the state legislatures passed licensing laws that were so poorly 
drafted that courts consistently nullified portions of them.  In some states, it was not clear 
who was ultimately responsible for enforcing the laws.  In others, legal enforcement was 
farmed out to private attorneys.  Physicians often did not even agree on what type of 
responsibility these boards should have.           
Each variation of medical licensing included advantages and disadvantages 
specific to its construction.  Perhaps the most unique system was the county control 
model passed by the Alabama legislature.  The Medical Association of the State of 
Alabama (hereinafter MASA) convinced the legislature to pass a decentralized medical 
licensing bill that operated differently from other states.  Alabama did not centralize 
control of the medical board at the state level but instead relied on local medical societies 
to test and license its physicians.  While most states created new quasi-governmental 
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bodies to administer the law, Alabama outsourced overall management of the law to the 
largest existing Regular medical society.  While MASA was licensing’s governing body, 
it had very little control over the county societies.  Additionally, the state board of health, 
which was approved at the same time, did not have any control over licensing.  The 
county medical societies had enormous amounts of leeway in both licensing physicians 
and enforcing the law.  Perhaps this statute is unsurprising for a former Confederate state, 
but the legislature’s unwillingness to consolidate control with a centralized board of 
health put the lion’s share of responsibilities on poorly funded or nonexistent Regular 
county medical societies.  
By 1880, Alabama’s medical association began administering the state’s medical 
practice act.  That year, MASA contacted county probate judges and certified that county 
associations (if the county had an existing society) were now authorized to license 
physicians and enforce the medical practice act.  MASA did conduct a small number of 
licensing exams (not all counties had county medical societies), but the county societies 
were responsible for licensing most physicians in their areas.  While MASA determined 
“the standard of qualifications required of persons to practice medicine” the county 
boards were ultimately responsible in implementing their standards at the county level.  
This would be an extraordinary source of frustration for MASA in the coming decades.  
By tasking county medical societies with the primary authority to license physicians, 
MASA was never convinced that its guidelines were being followed.149
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In addition to managing the law, the Alabama State Board of Medical Examiners 
conducted ten medical examinations for licenses during its first year of operation.  The 
state board conducted exams of physicians whose counties did not have licensing boards.  
Even though eight of the ten applicants previously practiced medicine in Alabama, only 
one applicant passed the board’s examination.  To protect the reputations of the 
unsuccessful applicants, the board did not publish their names.  Later, the state board 
would abandon this policy and publish the names of all applicants who applied for a 
license within the state.  The state board also bemoaned the fact that numerous applicants 
had complained that they were “too poor to afford the expense of medical schools” and 
pleaded with the board to sympathize with their problems.  Despite this, the board 
ignored the applicants’ pleas because it had a sacred duty as “faithful officers of the state” 
to protect the medical profession.  Additionally, some of the failing applicants already 
were eligible to practice in the state due to their previous experience, but lacked medical 
degrees and sat for the state exam.  Even though they were not required to successfully 
complete the exam, they wanted to pass the test to legitimize themselves to their 
patients.150  
As soon as county medical associations were vested with their new powers, they 
immediately began licensing existing physicians and prosecuting unlicensed doctors.  
MASA’s Board of Censors noted so-called “peripatetic practitioners” as a group that 
typically declined to be examined by the county boards.  When county boards learned of 
unlicensed “peripatetic physicians,” they quickly instituted legal proceedings against the 
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individuals.  Instead of fighting the boards, the Board of Censors stated that many of the 
physicians simply decided to leave the state.  The board cited two specific cases.  In one 
instance, a “traveling occultist [sic]” from Atlanta distributed handbills around Barbour 
County describing his medical skills.  While the “occultist” possessed a medical degree 
from a Baltimore school of medicine, he was not a resident of Barbour County or 
Alabama.  The county board refused to examine the occultist and commenced legal 
proceedings against him after he treated several patients in the county.  The occultist then 
traveled to another county where the county board threatened prosecution.  Finally, he 
traveled to Montgomery and asked the state board to examine him.  He failed the test and 
was forced to move back to Atlanta.  Another physician, Dr. William Clark, challenged 
the law after he was indicted by a grand jury and tried by the City Court of Montgomery 
for practicing medicine without a license.  While the court quashed the indictment (due to 
a technical problem), the court upheld the law and held Dr. Clark over on a $100 bond, 
because the court believed that he violated the medical practice act.151
By 1881, more than forty medical societies had been created in Alabama to 
administer the medical practice act -- up from seventeen in 1870.  Unsurprisingly, these 
medical societies were not created equal. The state board complained that several of the 
societies were “defective in discipline and in professional and public spirit.”  
Additionally, the state board reported that these societies did not adequately perform the 
basic tasks assigned to them by the medical practice act.  Instead, the county societies 
procrastinated, failed to act and, when they finally did act, performed their task in a 
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“perfunctory” manner that undermined the credibility of the state board and licensing in 
general.  Essentially, the state board quickly realized that relying on numerous county 
boards was an incredibly inefficient way to manage the medical profession and resulted 
in an uneven and unequal enforcement of the law.  Even though forty county societies 
had been created, there were sixty-seven counties in the state, and a third of Alabama’s 
counties still lacked any authority to regulate medicine.152   
The Alabama law also faced an immediate challenge from eight Irregular 
physicians who advocated the repeal of the licensing law because it placed the Alabama 
Regular medical society in charge of administering the law.  The Irregular physicians 
argued that MASA was incapable of treating them fairly because MASA and American 
Medical Association were openly hostile to all Irregular physicians.  Dr. William Murrell, 
a licensed Homeopathic physician, claimed that another Homeopath was informed by the 
Huntsville County Association that “no irregular shall practice in our county.”153  Murrell 
signed the letter with the seven other Irregular physicians to protest this blanket policy.  
The Irregular physicians highlighted the existing ban imposed on members of MASA by 
consulting with Irregular physicians in their memorial to the legislature.  The group 
sought to eliminate the role played by MASA in administering the state law and convert 
the law into a registration act.  The petitioners argued that probate judges, not committees 
of Regular physicians, should determine who could practice medicine in the state.  
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MASA responded to the allegations with a general statement, which argued that 
MASA and its county affiliates were testing Irregular physicians only on science and not 
medicine.  While Regular physicians were tested on twelve subjects, Irregular physicians 
were tested only on four (“Chemistry, Anatomy, Physiology and the Mechanism of 
Labor”).  MASA argued that it was not testing Irregular physicians on any principles of 
Regular medicine.  Additionally, while MASA and Regular physicians did not recognize 
Irregulars as professionals under their “thousand years old” Code of Ethics, they did not 
question the general right that Irregular physicians could practice medicine in Alabama.  
Finally, MASA argued that the few Irregular physicians in the state “had not been 
touched, or in any way interfered with by any of the Boards of Medical Examiners...”154  
While the law on its face did not discriminate against Irregular practitioners, there was 
little to prevent local Regular boards from refusing to license any Irregulars in their 
county.  MASA had little power to prevent the county boards from treating Irregulars 
unfairly. Still, it is difficult to determine if Irregulars faced illegal barriers to practicing 
medicine in the state.      
MASA’s claim that there were very few Irregular physicians in Alabama appears 
to be true.  In 1879, while the National Eclectic Medical Association assigned an 
Alabamian physician to keep the society updated on the status of Eclectic medicine in the 
state, it reported that the state did not have any society for medical Eclectics.155  There 
appears to be only one Homeopathic physician, William Murrell, in the state who was 
even a member of the American Institute of Homeopathy in 1880.  The admittedly 
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incomplete annual register of physicians for 1880 shows that only six Eclectics, ten 
Homeopaths, ten botanics, an Indian Doctor, a Thomosonian and three unknown 
Irregulars were even licensed in the state.156 The Alabama Eclectic Medical Association 
(AEMA) was not even formed until May 1884 with only twenty-four members.  The 
AEMA estimated that there were perhaps only sixty to one hundred “Eclectic” or 
“Liberal” physicians in the entire state.  
Additionally, AEMA stated that there were several Regular members who could 
be best described as “Reformed.”  Clearly, the AEMA wanted to classify the “reformed” 
Regulars as Eclectics, even if they were unwilling to adopt the moniker on their own.  
“Reformers and Old-School” were fairly collegial with one another even though the 
“Reformed” doctors could best be described as medical Eclectics.  Because of the 
collegial relationship between Reformed and Old-School physicians, Regulars did not 
expect to face much opposition to the passage of the medical practice act.157  
Additionally, the simple fact that the Regular society successfully convinced the Alabama 
legislature to assign the state’s Regular medical society to manage the state medical 
practice act demonstrates that the state’s Irregulars were not capable of managing even 
token resistance to the bill’s passage.  In most states, Regular physicians were forced to 
compromise with the other sects to pass any medical licensing bills.  Alabama’s Regulars 
were not required to compromise with Irregulars because it was not clear who they would 
have compromised with.
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The Alabama Eclectic Medical Association did not view the Alabama Medical 
Practice Act as a success.  It was skeptical of putting the state’s Regular society in charge 
of licensing and enforcement and they did not believe that the law was particularly 
successful at eliminating quacks and charlatans from Alabama’s medical ranks.  Despite 
agreeing with the Regulars that there needed to be at least minimum requirements to 
practice medicine in the state, Dr. J.W.R. Williams described the State Board of 
Examiners as inefficient and ineffective.  Eight years after the law was passed, the state 
board had asserted little control over half of Alabama’s “seventy-odd” counties and six 
hundred of the state’s approximately thousand Regular physicians.  Dr. Williams’ critique 
was not particularly surprising because it was becoming clear that Alabama’s 
decentralized law made it difficult for MASA to guarantee that only qualified doctors 
were being admitted.158
Unlike Alabama, Illinois passed a medical licensing law that consolidated control 
under a unified state board of health.  The Illinois board was comprised of a mixture of 
Regular, Eclectic, and Homeopathic physicians.  These physicians had an expansive 
vision for the state’s licensing law, and they quickly sought to regulate medicine in a 
meaningful way.  Instead of just licensing physicians, the board also began to evaluate the 
quality of medical schools across the country, enforcing a strict code of conduct, and 
actively prosecuted anyone who violated the law.     
The Illinois State Board of Health argued in its first annual report that the 
licensing law already made the state safer for its citizens.  The board estimated that nearly  
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3,600 of the physicians practicing in the state were not graduates of a medical school 
before the law went into effect.  They claimed that the licensing act had forced almost 
1,400 these physicians to either stop practicing or leave the state.159  Additionally, the 
board clearly sought to communicate to the state and its citizens that medical licensing 
was essential.  In addition to driving out non-qualifying physicians, complaints about 
physicians began pouring into the board’s offices.   Although the Illinois board conceded 
that it did not have either the resources or the personnel to investigate each of the 
grievances, the sheer volume of complaints indicated that the public was convinced the 
board was the primary check on dangerous or unethical doctors.  Physicians from around 
the state also filed numerous complaints against other physicians.  The Board was deeply 
troubled, however, when it learned that physicians often took advantage of the new rules 
to lodge complaints against their potential competitors were therefore “unreliable.”160
In an attempt to subvert the new licensing rules, bogus medical diplomas began to 
be sold soon after the licensing law went to effect.  The Board reported that as many as 
“400 bogus diplomas” were submitted as evidence of a medical degree by applicants 
because “diploma-shops” hoped that the board would recognize them because they were 
“issued by legally chartered institutions.”161  These institutions were considered legally 
chartered because they were created under Illinois’s business law, but they did not 
possess any more gravitas than that.  Unfortunately for diploma mills, the Illinois 
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licensing act gave the board power to accept only diplomas from medical schools that 
were in “good standing.”  The legislature strengthened this power by allowing the board 
to determine what “good standing” meant.  During the first year of the act, the board was 
not able to develop explicit criteria for what qualified as “good standing,” but it 
determined that institutions that “sold their diplomas” would not qualify.162  The board’s 
rejection of fraudulent diplomas was the first successful attempt to reform medical 
education by evaluating the merits of medical education.
The Illinois board did not stop at rejecting fraudulent diplomas.  It also conducted 
quasi-judicial hearings.  At times, it appeared that attorneys also prosecuted other illegal 
practitioners on their own volition.  In 1879, the Illinois board resolved to investigate 
physicians who were accused of “practicing specialties under assumed names” and of 
“defrauding” their patients.163   By 1880, the Illinois board was conducting public 
investigations of unprofessional conduct by both licensed and unlicensed physicians.  
Despite its limited resources, the Illinois board was committed to stamping out 
unprofessional conduct.  In 1880, the Illinois board reported that ninety-three suits were 
filed under the 1877 medical practice act. While prosecutors dismissed most of the suits 
after the defendants promised to vacate the state, Illinois courts convicted nine 
individuals under the Illinois law.164  
Glancing at these early proceedings reveal the type of conduct the Illinois Board 
sought to eliminate.  In 1880, the Board conducted several hearings about the alleged 
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misconduct of two licensed physicians, John Bate and Edward Osbourne.  Bate and 
Osbourne were accused of practicing medicine under assumed names.  Bate, a graduate 
of Chicago’s Bennett Medical College, had run a medical practice under the name “Dr. A. 
G. Olin” before he attended medical school.  “Dr. Olin’s” medical practice was well-
known in the community because Bate extensively advertised in Chicago newspapers.  
Bate was admitted to Bennett Medical College (an Eclectic medical school in good 
standing) only after he had agreed to relinquish his fictitious name and medical practice.  
After completing the program at Bennett and receiving his diploma, he immediately went 
back to work as “Dr. Olin.”165  Edward Osbourne, Bate’s nephew and another graduate of 
Bennett College, was accused of being Bate’s associate, and Osbourne also claimed to be 
“Dr. Olin.”   The Illinois board considered Bate’s practice offensive and illegal because 
“Dr. Olin’s Private Hospital” specialized in “chronic and sexual diseases of men and 
women,” “sexual debility, impotency, nervousness, seminal emissions, loss of memory 
from self-abuse or other cause.”  Dr. Olin also provided marriage guides, “[r]eliable 
female pills[,]” “rubber goods[,]” and “special care…for ladies during confinement.”166  
Bate’s and Osbourne’s ultimate sin was that they were accused by the board of procuring 
abortions for their patients.  
Bennett Medical College and Dr. Henry Olin, a Bennett Medical College 
professor and prominent member of NEMA, initiated the actions against Bate and 
Osbourne by contacting the Illinois board.  Both Bennett College and Dr. Henry Olin 
believed that their good names were being tarnished by their association with the 
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notorious “Dr. Olin” created by Bate.  Dr. Henry Olin had offered five-hundred dollars to 
Bate and later two-hundred-fifty dollars to Osbourne to stop using the moniker “Dr. 
Olin.”  Both Bate and Osbourne refused the offers and continued their practice.  
Osbourne’s and Bate’s defense consisted of the contradictory claims that they had 
not practiced under assumed names, but they then argued that the marriage guides were 
not offensive, they had not sold rubber products for a year (their lawyer argued that the 
advertisements were erroneous), and that their alleged abortion or “female” pills were 
ineffective because they actually were made of “brown bread.”167  The Illinois board was 
unimpressed by these claims and found that they were “guilty of gross professional 
misconduct” for practicing under assumed names and issuing unprofessional circulars 
and advertisements.168  The board revoked their licenses and later denied the application 
for a license of the physician C. Pratt Sexton after learning that the notorious Dr. Olin 
employed him.169
Another physician, Generous L. Henderson, faced similar allegations.  Henderson, 
like Bate and Osbourne, was a licensed physician, but he also practiced under the aliases 
“Dr. Stone” and “John Smith.”  Henderson was accused of selling products “offered by 
the vilest class of specialists” and performing “an abortion for $5.”170  Henderson sought 
to insulate himself from his alleged abortion practice not only by performing the 
abortions under the name “Dr. Stone,” but also by adopting another moniker “John 
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Smith.”  As “Smith,” Henderson would solicit and then refer potential clients to the 
fictitious “Dr. Stone.”  As “Dr. Stone,” Henderson would perform the abortion and collect  
the five-dollar fee.  The Illinois board revoked and cancelled Henderson’s license for 
“dishonorable and unprofessional conduct.” 171  
While the Illinois state board aggressively enforced the state licensing law, its 
enforcement did not unduly antagonize Illinois’s Irregular physicians.  In 1881, Dr. H.K. 
Stratford, reported to NEMA that not only were Eclectics thriving in the state of Illinois, 
but that there were “no unpleasant encounters with brother practitioners; but all seem to 
be on good terms, whether Eclectic, Old-School or Homeopathic.”  Additionally, the 
board’s pursuit of Dr. Olin was cheered by the faculty of the Bennett Medical School, an 
Eclectic institution.  By defending Bennett, the organized and educated Eclectics believed 
that the state board would not just benefit Regulars.  The Illinois board’s actions do not 
appear to have raised any initial suspicions within the Eclectic community that the law 
was a subterfuge effort to eliminate Eclectic physicians from the state.172
In addition to licensed physicians practicing under assumed names, the Illinois 
board was concerned about the potential damage caused by untrained individuals who 
had stolen or bought valid medical school graduation certificates and practiced under 
those names.  One of the more egregious stolen identity cases prosecuted by the Illinois 
board involved a physician allegedly named Henry A. Luders.  Luders claimed that he 
was a graduate of the medical school at the University of Gottongen [sic], and he 
submitted his certification of completion to the Board.  Despite Luders’ initial failure to 
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submit any letters of recommendation from the faculty on his behalf, the Illinois board 
issued him a license after some “reputable practitioners” finally vouched for him.  After 
stories regarding the quality of his practice circulated throughout his town, concerned 
physicians contacted the University of Gottingen.  The university informed the physician 
that Luders had practiced in the Duchy of Braunschweig until his death a few years 
earlier.173  Luders was not actually Luders, but an alias for man named Lambrecht who 
had stolen his identity.  Lambrecht, a barber, had fabricated the letters of recommendation 
and somehow came into possession of Luders’ diploma.  The Illinois board revoked 
Luders’ license, but not before Lambrecht, through his incompetence, butchered and 
killed a woman and her child during a botched birth.  After the local physicians learned of 
his deception, Lambrecht fled to Cincinnati before he could be prosecuted for violating 
the medical practice act.174  
In Cincinnati, Lambrecht enrolled in the Cincinnati College of Medicine and 
Surgery, but suddenly left after the Illinois board published its initial report describing his 
practice.  He then moved to Cleveland and enrolled in the Keokuk College of Physicians 
and Surgeons and received a diploma in 1884.  After graduating from Keokuk College in 
Iowa he moved to Bismarck, Dakota Territory where he was using the alias “William 
Lambert.”  The board cited Luders as a perfect illustration for “the necessity of the strict 
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enforcement of matriculation requirements and of proof of previous study and college 
attendance.175         
The board also sought to eliminate the influence of itinerant or traveling doctors.  
Before the Illinois legislature passed the medical practice act, the board stated that 
seventy-eight itinerant doctors practiced throughout the state and fleeced its “sick, 
afflicted, and credulous” citizens of no less than $225,000 a year.176  Of these seventy-
eight practitioners, only five were eligible for a license ten years later. The remaining 
itinerants successfully had received licenses under the exemption for physicians who had 
practiced for at least ten years.177  These itinerants made a living by combining show 
business and drug sales.  They would often hawk nostrums and cure-alls as “Indian 
Remedies” during performances.  These doctors would accompany or organize “Wild 
West” concert troupes in order to facilitate sales.  Some of these companies employed as 
many one hundred different people.  These medical practitioners had more in common 
with a traveling church revival than a medical practice.  These traveling physicians were 
difficult to track down because they could quickly leave the state for safer pastures 
outside of Illinois.  Additionally, they did a good job ingratiating themselves with local 
politicians who prevented prosecution. 
California’s model represented the third pattern of licensing.  In California, the 
legislature created three licensing boards one representing each of the three major sect.  
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These boards did not serve together, nor did they have any meaningful interactions.  The 
members of those boards were selected by the medical societies of the three different 
sects.  These examining boards were, organizationally speaking, under the board of 
health.  The state board of health was responsible for sanitation and compiling the 
meaningful health statistics for the state.  Unlike the examiners, the members of the state 
board of health were appointed by the governor.  The governor was not required under 
the law to appoint members of any particular sect to the board of health.  Thus, the three 
boards operated fairly autonomously.  The make-up and composition of the three boards 
served as the basis for a legal challenge to the state’s licensing law.   
In 1880, an unlicensed physician challenged the 1876 California Medical Practice 
Act (amended in 1878).  The physician who had been incarcerated for violating act filed a 
writ of habeas corpus that challenged the constitutionality of the law.  The inmate argued 
that the law illegally conferred upon three corporations (the Regular, Homeopathic, and 
Eclectic Boards of Examiners) special powers (the right to appoint members to each of 
these boards) in violation of California law.  He argued that any decisions made by the 
three boards were non-binding because they did not have a right to exist under the 
California constitution.  The inmate alleged that it was impermissible under the 
California constitution for corporations (including the state’s medical societies) to appoint  
people to the three governmental medical boards.  Essentially, the petitioner alleged that 
appointments should have been made by the governor and not the medical societies.178  
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The California Supreme Court rejected this argument and found that the creation 
of the three boards “did not exceed the limitation of its [the legislature’s] powers” and 
determined that they were not, in fact, corporations.  While the petitioner argued that the 
law was unconstitutional, the court did not bother even to address those issues because 
they were deemed irrelevant to his conviction.  Since the court failed to address the 
broader constitutionality of the medical practice act, this case was of limited value to 
other courts around the country.  The court essentially dodged the constitutional issue and 
allowed the law to survive.
By 1880, Ira Oatman, the physician in charge of the Regular Medical Society of 
California’s Committee on Medical Legislation, claimed that scores of the “lower order 
of charlatans from all pretensions” already had abandoned the state.  Like a similar claim 
made by the Illinois Board of Health, there appeared to be little evidence to support this 
statement.  While it certainly was possible that “lower order charlatans” had left the state, 
they could have just as easily stopped advertising and moved underground to avoid 
attention.  It did not appear that the examining board could afford an extensive census of 
California’s fraudulent or marginal physicians.179  
Even though he claimed the law was successful, Oatman was frustrated that the 
California law did not give the state’s examining board sufficient authority to fully 
regulate the medical profession.  Oatman was also concerned that members of his 
Medical Society proposed, the year before, to eliminate the state examining board and 
give all of the licensing power to the Board of Health.  The licensing law, as in other 
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states, faced constant challenges and efforts to amend it in the state legislature in the 
1880s.  Undoubtably, the Regulars who proposed this new law primarily were motivated 
by a desire to eliminate the Irregular boards.  Even though the California Medical Society 
presidents had demonstrated a willingness to compromise on legislation with the 
Irregulars, not all of the rank-and-file members were as pleased.  Licensing originally 
was proposed as a way to eliminate their competitors, not legitimatize them.  Not only 
did they seek to eliminate the three boards, they wanted to entrust the Board of Health 
with licensing because there were no Irregulars on that board.  
Oatman was suspicious because he was fairly certain that investing the board of 
health with that power would turn the licensing process into a blatantly “political, instead 
of [a] professional” one.  He was also noted that if this authority was granted to the board 
of health the legislature would require the board of health to be a mixed board.  Unlike 
other Regular members, he understood that Irregulars had sufficient political clout to 
preserve licensing for themselves.  His biggest fear was if Regulars refused to serve with 
Irregulars on a mixed board then a mixed board could be dominated by Irregulars.  
Consequently, he was adamantly opposed to unifying the board.  
While California Eclectics were justifiably suspicious of the Regular’s plans to 
create a single board, they were not necessarily opposed to it.  In California, Eclectics 
were looking to amend the California Medical Act, but they were not interested in 
weakening the law.  In 1880, The California Medical Journal (an Eclectic medical 
journal affiliated with the Eclectic California Medical College in Oakland) stated that the 
Eclectic Medical Society of California approved an effort to “require qualifications 
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parties practicing midwifery and obstetrics.”180  The Eclectics made it clear that they 
wanted to tighten restrictions, not loosen them for the individuals practicing in these 
areas.  The editors at the California Medical Journal did not even oppose giving up their 
own board as long as they received equal representation on a new unified examining 
board.  The journal favored allotting three members to the board from the three medical 
sects to ensure equality and justice for Eclectics.  While the sects maintained three 
separate examining boards, the board of health did not require a mixed board.  The 
Eclectics were concerned about equality because the board of health, at that time, was 
composed of only Regular physicians (the governor had the discretion to appoint 
whoever he wanted to the board).181  Organized Eclectics in the states were more 
interested in shaping licensing to fit their needs rather than eliminating it.  If anything, 
they sought to strengthen licensing and carve out a more powerful niche for themselves in 
any regulating authority. 
   In 1882, Oatman introduced a proposed law to the membership for approval.  
While he introduced the bill, he did not appear to fully support it.  He insisted that the 
existing law continue the practice of allowing the various medical societies to appoint 
members to the examining boards, but he wanted to include provisions that required 
apothecaries and druggists to have licenses, permit the examining boards to revoke 
licenses for unprofessional conduct (he wanted to preserve the right appeal to the state 
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societies), amplify the penalties for not complying with the law, and tax itinerant 
practitioners.182  Ultimately, the proposed law was approved by the membership, “but not 
adopted as a whole” because it required amendments.183  The committee on legislation, 
led by Oatman, did not bother to forward to the legislature because they were not 
comfortable with the bill and did not believe it would garner sufficient support. 
One of the defining features of the 1880s was a constant effort by various parties 
to rewrite state medical licensing laws.  This tug of war in most states was ceaseless 
during the 1880s.  Each legislative session, one group or another would propose a 
medical licensing law.  California was typical of other states in this regard.  In each 
session, Oatman and advocates for the existing law repeatedly were forced to beat back 
the various proposed laws.  Sometimes these laws were promoted by Irregular societies, 
but many of these laws sprang from other sources.184  In California, Oatman described 
bills that were proposed by individual doctors or groups of doctors who sought to carve 
out special rights for themselves.  
The process that Oatman detailed was not unique to California; licensing laws 
constantly were proffered during legislative sessions in several states. The constant 
efforts to amend these laws demonstrated widespread dissatisfaction with either the 
existence of these laws or how they operated.  Once these laws were established, state 
legislators were compelled to constantly tinker with the these laws.  The mixture of laws 
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seeking to both weaken and strengthen the laws showed that there still was not a 
consensus among the medical community or the general public on how medical licensing 
should be executed.  Legislatures in each of the states discussed in this chapter faced 
efforts to repeal and modify their state licensing laws in the 1880s, even though they had 
only begun to enforce them.              
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CHAPTER VIII
FIGHTING FOR LICENSING IN MISSOURI AND OREGON
Passing licensing laws was neither simple nor easy.  While a number of states 
passed various regulations during the 1870s, many others failed.  Regular physicians in 
these latter states were inspired by new licensing laws in Illinois and California, but they 
had difficulty convincing their local legislators that the laws were necessary.  Their 
efforts often were hampered by legislative disinterest, disorganized or nonexistent 
institutional support for licensing, and effective opposition by Irregulars that made 
passage difficult.  
Regulars in non-licensing states became increasingly concerned that the robust 
efforts to actively enforce medical licensing standards in other states would turn their 
states into magnets for incompetent physicians.  Organized physicians feared that an 
influx of these unqualified physicians could destabilize their medical marketplaces.  
Regulars from Illinois’s southern neighbor, Missouri, watched with envy and concern as 
the Illinois State Board of Health sought to regulate both entrance into the medical 
profession and the ethical standards of practice.  They were envious because their 
licensing efforts in Missouri failed and were concerned because they feared that Illinois’ 
unlicensed physicians would cross into their state.  
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Before 1882, the Medical Association of the State of Missouri was described as 
disorganized and demoralized since its inception thirty-two years earlier.  The Missouri 
association had failed to pass any serious medical regulations despite the typical 
complaints from its members.  The state passed a medical registration law in 1874 and 
amended it in 1879.  That law required physicians to register before practicing medicine 
and prevented them from collecting any fees if they failed to do so.  Like most 
registrations, it was considered ineffectual and physicians dubbed it “the Physician Farce 
Bill.”  Organized Regulars stated that the only reason the bill passed by the legislature 
was because it benefitted county clerks.185
However by the early 1880s, Missouri’s Regular physicians were committed to 
passing a medical practice act.  They decided to use the successful strategies employed by 
other states and tie a licensing bill to a new sanitation law and the creation of a state 
board of health.  In 1880, the president of the Missouri association pressured his 
colleagues to support the creation of Missouri Board of Health.186  Like other states, 
Missouri’s physicians were both inspired by the success of their Illinois brethren and 
fearful of an onslaught of incompetent Illinois physicians if they failed to pass their own 
bill.  In 1881, Willis P. King, the new president of the Missouri association, addressed the 
failure of the Missouri association to pass a new licensing bill.  Instead of attacking the 
legislature’s intelligence, a common but counter-productive practice, King stated that it 
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was the general “want of sufficient general intelligence in the medical profession” that 
prevented physicians from “command[ing] the respect and confidence of its citizens…”  
Essentially, he argued that physicians were their own worst enemy because medical 
education was extraordinarily defective in the United States.  Instead of requiring 
students simply to attend lectures at medical schools, King believed that they should 
require students to have a “thorough knowledge of medicine.”  In his mind, medical 
schools were more interested in collecting student fees than requiring students to learn 
about medicine.  Not only were medical schools failing to meet their obligations, King 
argued that county medical associations had a duty to continue the education of its 
members.  Physicians needed to work with the local medical associations to ensure that 
they were continually augmenting and updating their medical knowledge.187
King’s speech was not intended just for the members of the Missouri association 
-- he also was communicating directly to the state legislature.  He acknowledged that the 
American medical education system, in its entirety, was inadequate.  Instead of blaming 
legislators for failing to pass previous bills, he was conveying to them that he understood 
they lacked confidence in the medical profession.  While acknowledging the problems 
with medical education, he also sought to make it clear that only regulation could remedy  
the problem.  King’s speech in 1881 galvanized the Missouri association.  Not only did 
his words encourage the Missouri association to ramp up its efforts to pass a medical 
licensing law, King signaled a willingness to work with Homeopaths and Eclectics 
physicians.  Past reform efforts stalled because Missouri’s Regular physicians had sought 
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to create a system that limited the ability of Homeopaths and Eclectics physicians to 
practice medicine.  Two thousand copies of the speech were published, and the Missouri 
association put the copies into the hands of Missouri’s legislators.  Members of the 
association believed that his speech was the first salvo in an effort to secure meaningful 
legislation in the 1883 legislative session. 
Despite efforts to smooth over relations with Homeopaths and Eclectics, the 
membership of the Missouri medical association was not willing to compromise with 
their Irregular brethren at the beginning of the 1883 legislative session.  Whether this was 
stubbornness or an opening negotiating position is difficult to say.  The organized Regular 
physicians who lobbied the legislature initially sought to pass licensing that discriminated 
against Homeopaths and Eclectics.188  Despite King’s speech and a growing body of 
evidence that it would be impossible to pass licensing without the approval of the state’s 
Eclectics and Homeopaths, the Association’s lobbyists continued to push unacceptable 
laws.      
During the 1883 legislative session, Missouri’s Regular physicians finally realized 
they needed to pair the law establishing medical regulation with the creation of a state 
board of health.  As soon as it became clear that their initial bill was unacceptable, the 
Missouri Medical Association’s representatives changed their stance on licensing.  They 
understood that they could make a stronger case for licensing if the state board of health 
was given broad sanitary and quarantine powers.  Additionally, they finally 
acknowledged that any proposed licensing law could not discriminate against Eclectics 
124
188 Eickhoff, Dissertation, 47-48.
and Homeopaths.  After acknowledging this reality, the Missouri association successfully 
pushed through a regulation bill that closely resembled the Illinois medical practice act.  
Like the Illinois practice act, the Missouri Board of Health was authorized to determine 
the authenticity of an applicant’s diploma, administer an examination of non-graduates, 
and revoke medical licenses for unprofessional conduct.189 
Since the Missouri law was modeled after Illinois’ law, Regulars were required to 
sit on the state board of health with Eclectics and Homeopaths in a potential violation of 
the AMA’s Code of Ethics.  In 1883 at the Missouri Medical Association’s annual 
meeting, Missouri Governor Thomas Crittenden provided the opening remarks for the 
conference and asked the association’s members to cooperate with the Irregular board 
members.  When the governor concluded his remarks, physicians in attendance objected 
to the law and compromise with the Irregulars.  Physicians stated it would be impossible 
to cooperate with the state’s Homeopaths because they were con men who fleeced the 
state’s citizenry.190  The association even published another Regular physicians’ ode to 
AMA’s the Code of Ethics.  The physician wrote that the code was created because 
Homeopaths and Eclectics were heretics and “their practice inimical to mankind.”  The 
author dryly noted that only the physicians who happened “to live where Homeopathy is 
popular and encouraged” appeared interested in relaxing the code and permitting 
consultations with Irregulars.  He complained that “licensing a man to practice 
Homeopathy” was ten times worse than consulting during an emergency.  He also argued 
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that the practice would ultimately “license quackery instead of preventing it.”191 Like 
other Regular members, he was incensed that the association compromised with Eclectics 
and Homeopaths to pass medical licensing.  Even after licensing passed, organized 
Regulars were bemoaning its form. It was not surprising that the state board of health and 
the licensing law would struggle over the next decade.    
The paper presented at the association's meeting condemning the licensing law 
sparked a fierce debate during the group’s 1883 meeting.  One physician noted that 
similar boards in Canada had succeeded in “stamping out Irregulars.”  Another argued 
that due to the overpopulation of “incompetent practitioners” in Missouri, it was 
necessary to pass a law to protect the people of Missouri even if it did not advance “the 
interests of medical profession.”  A third physician noted that he believed the bill was 
designed to limit the ability of itinerant vendors to profit by selling their wares in 
Missouri.  He argued that section alone justified passage of the bill.  While some 
members expressed support for the new law, others were clearly distressed by the recent 
alliance with Irregulars.192
Soon after the Missouri legislature passed the licensing bill, the newly appointed 
member of the Missouri Board of Health sought the advice, counsel, and aid of the 
Illinois board.  In 1884, the Illinois board helped Missouri organize its own medical 
board of health.  Members of the two boards even attended each other’s meetings.  
Missouri members hoped to model the principles Illinois used to “establish precedents 
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and formulat[e] principles upon which to base decisions in the many difficult and delicate 
questions which continually present themselves.”  Dr. John Rauch, a member of the 
Illinois Board of Health, advised the board to adopt “the minimum requirements for 
Medical Colleges to held in Good Standing of the Illinois State Board of Health.”193  By 
convincing the Missouri board to adopt the Illinois standard, Rauch demonstrated both 
the appeal of the Illinois efforts to grade medical schools and expanded the Illinois 
board’s credibility.  
During the first year of the Missouri board’s existence, it denied Edwin G. 
Granville, a graduate of the Kansas City Hospital College of Medicine, a license to 
practice medicine because the Missouri Board of Health followed the Illinois Board of 
Health’s lead and determined that Granville’s medical school was not in “good standing.”  
Granville refused to take an exam for admission and filed a suit against the Missouri 
board demanding that it grant him a license to practice medicine in that state.  Similar to 
the Illinois practice act, the Missouri Board of Health was given the authority to 
determine what criteria constituted whether a medical school was in “good standing.”  
The Missouri board decided that three of the seven medical schools in the state did not 
meet their minimum requirements and refused to automatically admit their graduates.194  
Granville challenged the board’s ruling and took the board to court.  The Missouri 
Supreme Court determined that the state legislature intended “to rid this commonwealth 
of that class of medical pretenders known by the various designation of empirics, 
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mountebanks, charlatans and quacks.”  Instead of simply issuing in a perfunctory manner 
after an applicant produces a diploma, the court stated that the board had the power to 
determine whether a school was in “good standing.”  Citing a recent ruling by the 
Minnesota State Supreme Court, State v. State Medical Examining Board, the Missouri 
board determined that it did “not transcend [its] constitutional limits” by denying 
Granville’s application as long as that “discretionary power does not extend to 
discriminating against any particular school or system of medicine, and that, should such 
discrimination ever occur, the limits of discretionary power will have been passed.”195  
The Missouri Supreme Court found the Missouri law constitutional, but placed limits on 
the board’s power.  The court made clear that if Granville had been discriminated against 
solely on the basis of his medical sect, then he could approach the court again and get 
another hearing.  
The Missouri and Minnesota court decisions were two of the earliest rulings that 
found centralized state board’s health powers of sanitation, quarantine, and licensing to 
be constitutional.  Both the Missouri and Minnesota Supreme Courts addressed the 
constitutionality of the Illinois model even before Illinois courts ruled on this question.  
Unlike earlier court decisions, the Missouri and Minnesota courts found that these laws 
were constitutional uses of state police power.  The Missouri Supreme Court determined 
that because Missouri law did not discriminate against any particular school or system of 
medicine, it did not “transcend” its constitutional limits.  The Missouri court did not 
express any particular misgivings with the law or the discretionary powers granted to the 
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Missouri board by the state legislature.196  These courts were more than willing to permit 
these newly created quasi-government agencies to interfere with the private contractual 
relationships between patients and physicians.  Instead of allowing patients to determine 
who should treat their ailments, the courts were more than willing to intercede and allow 
a quasi-governmental agency to eliminate certain unacceptable physicians from the 
medical marketplace.
Neither of these courts looked at licensing laws from a patient’s perspective.  
Licensing laws potentially prevented patients from being treated by the doctor of their 
choice.  Instead, patients now had to rely on the boards of health to make these decisions 
for them.  Both courts were willing to accept their state legislature’s contention that 
medicine was different from other professions.  The unique nature of medical practice 
permitted government to intrude on personal relationships between physicians and their 
patients.  Neither court bothered to argue that licensing laws were an unfair intrusion of 
the free market.  These decisions and most future licensing cases demonstrated that courts 
were not necessarily committed to free markets.      
Even as the Alabama, Illinois, and Missouri medical boards were trying to 
consolidate and expand their powers, states like Oregon continued to struggle to pass any 
type of law.  In 1880, a House bill that proposed “to regulate the practice of medicine and 
surgery in the State of Oregon” failed again.  But unlike previous bills, it fell only two 
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votes short of passage in the House, which was the narrowest margin of defeat to date.197  
Encouraged by the positive momentum, the Oregon State Medical Association continued 
to discuss medical regulation at its next meeting.  In the report from the Committee on 
Medical Education, Dr. Phillip Harvey stated that California’s passage of medical 
regulation was forcing “mountebanks and impostors” into Oregon.  During the 1880s, the 
association often argued that Oregon was becoming a haven for charlatans, quacks, and 
medical incompetents.198  By this time, the association’s Committee on Legislation 
understood that the Oregon legislature would not pass any bills protecting specific 
medical sects.  The Oregon association, therefore, needed instead to focus on passing 
laws that tested applicants on “essential scientific knowledge.” 199  Instead of attempting 
to carve out a special status for Regular physicians, they needed “to be placed under the 
same legal relations to the State as the ‘pathies’.”  Only by ensuring that physicians were 
educated thoroughly in the sciences could the medical profession be rescued from “the 
grasp of total ignorance.”200  They hoped to “establish some competent tribunal in our 
State to decide the so-called genuineness of diplomas issued by some of the so-called 
Medical Colleges in other States.”201
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Even as the Oregon association was campaigning actively for medical licensing, 
Oregonian physicians and surgeons were not united behind those efforts.  A number of 
Oregon’s practicing physicians did not have medical diplomas, and they lacked the 
scientific knowledge necessary to pass a medical licensing exam.  The association, at 
times, was hostile to these physicians.  At the 1881 meeting of the association, C. H. 
Merrick, M.D. chastised members of the association and Oregon physicians for failing to 
demand medical regulation. 
“Why should Oregon be almost the last state in the Union to move in 
 this important matter?  Why should we suffer our state to become the 
 depository for nearly all the ignorant quacks and pretenders who have 
 been driven out of other states by their vigorous laws?  We find our 
 state flooded with druggists’ clerks, botch dentists and horse torturers 
 who have come here and assumed the title of ‘Doctor,’ and in many 
 instances unblushingly added ‘M.D.’ to their names.”202
Merrick asked why Oregon’s Regular physicians failed to “purge the 
state of these spurious and dangerous dabblers.”203  Despite the Regulars’ 
complaints about medical science’s public perception, Merrick claimed that 
they had made “very little effort to rescue it.”204   
But Merrick’s demand for a unified action by the medical community would go 
unfulfilled for another eleven years.  Whether this failure was due to dissent or simple 
ambivalence is not clear.  Merrick argued that if the legislature failed to act, Regular 
physicians should organize their own local county or district boards.  Those local boards 
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could test the competency of local physicians.  After testing of physicians, he advocated 
publishing the names of those physicians in the local newspaper.  While Merrick blamed 
Oregon’s doctors for failing to secure legislation or take appropriate action, the 
association’s president attacked the legislators as narrow-minded political hacks who 
were more concerned with determining which medical group or sect would benefit the 
most from any proposed medical legislation, rather than protecting the public.205   
In 1882, the Oregon association reached outside of its membership for support.  It 
had fewer than one hundred members at this time, and it lacked the influence to pass any 
legislation on its own.  The proposed bill in 1882 garnered even less backing in the 
House than the 1880 bill.206  Since the 1882 bill lacked support, instead of simply 
discussing a medical licensing act at its annual meeting, the association published a 
proposed bill in pamphlet form separate from its annual report.207  The association was 
reaching out to non-member physicians who did not read their annual report to garner 
sufficient backing for some type of legislation.  A medical licensing bill needed support 
from physicians outside the association to pass.
In 1884, the association did not mention medical regulation in its annual report, 
but W.H. Saylor, a graduate and professor at the Willamette Medical Department called 
attention to the habit of druggists prescribing medicine without a prescription.  Saylor 
grumbled about “[t]he pernicious habit indulged in by a large number of druggists – that 
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of prescribing for many of the minor and some serious diseases – should be discontinued 
by the profession…Its evil effect is not only felt by the profession in a pecuniary point of 
view, but its disastrous consequences are mourned by an honest and confiding people 
who suffer from ill-timed and injudicious treatment.”208  Druggists were allowed to 
prescribe medicines to patients without a prescription because this area was completely 
unregulated.  Saylor argued that a law governing the practice of medicine would prevent 
intrusions by druggists into the practice of medicine.209
Again in 1885, another bill to regulate medicine was proposed, but after the 
Committee on Education refused to endorse the bill, it was defeated.210  Discouraged by 
yet another defeat, the association’s leadership briefly considered a licensing bill 
proposed by the AMA for Oregon.  The AMA bill advocated the creation of a board of 
medical examiners composed of nine physicians.  The nine physicians were required to 
be graduates of legally chartered colleges or universities.  The nine board members would 
be chosen from a list of twenty-one names submitted by the association.  The board also 
would be granted power to summon medical practitioners to hearings regarding any 
unprofessional conduct on their part, and the governor could purge those physicians if at 
least two-thirds of the board voted for their removal.  Since the association was limited to 
Regular physicians, Homeopaths and Eclectics most likely would have been frozen out of 
the board.  The bill required that everyone, regardless of medical sect, would have to take 
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a test on anatomy, physiology, general chemistry, pathology, therapeutics, principles and 
practice of medicine, surgery, and obstetrics.  To sit for the examination, the applicant had 
to present proof of a diploma from a legally chartered medical college or university.  The 
bill defined the practice of medicine as treating or attending to any person for money, 
gift, or reward.211   
Ultimately, the association’s leadership conceded that the AMA bill was too 
extreme.  The legislative committee and even the association’s own membership both 
refused to endorse it.  The association could only agree that the AMA bill should be 
published in the group’s annual report and discussed at its next meeting.212  Under the 
bill’s provisions, every physician already practicing in Oregon would be required to take 
the exam.  The rights of older physicians to practice under this law were not protected, 
and they could foment opposition against any attempts to pass it.  Additionally, Regular 
physicians would not be able to become licensed if they simply had graduated from the 
local medical colleges.  Even though the association membership agreed to revisit the 
AMA bill the following year, the AMA bill was not mentioned in the subsequent report.  
Nonetheless, the 1887 legislative session convinced the association that they 
needed to develop a new plan and vigorously promote a medical licensing bill because 
the legislature came tantalizing close to passing a regulatory bill.  In 1887, a proposed bill 
to regulate medicine was defeated in both the House and Senate by just one vote.  
Additionally, the legislature demonstrated its willingness to regulate another type of 
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medical professional by overwhelmingly passing a bill to regulate the practice of 
dentistry.  Before the medical bill was defeated, the Oregonian newspaper even published 
an editorial in favor the bill.  The editorial suggested “the law ought to insist on proof of 
fair knowledge of those essentials of medical education that underlie all of the various 
schools.”  The Oregonian insisted that doctors should be required to know “enough about 
anatomy and surgery not to do mischief.”213 
A letter to the editor a few days after the defeat of the Senate bill clarified that 
under the proposed legislation, county clerks could issue licenses to graduates of 
reputable medical colleges and to physicians who had been practicing for three years and 
had one course of lectures.  The letter blamed the bill’s defeat on a single senator from 
Marion County.  The senator claimed that he received letters from reputable physicians 
urging the defeat of the measure.214  Whether the physicians opposed the measure 
because it was too lenient or too strict was left unstated.  A number of physicians from the 
association would have opposed the bill if it did not provide for an examination of 
incoming physicians; and a number of existing physicians who had not taken medical 
classes would also have opposed the bill.
During the earlier 1880s, some states finally did join the licensing party, but other 
states such as Oregon failed to so.  Unlike Alabama or Missouri, Oregon was not subject 
to dangerous tropical diseases that ravaged that region.  If Oregon had been affected by 
frequent yellow fever outbreaks, the state’s legislature may have been more interested in 
passing licensing legislation, but neither licensing nor public health were particularly 
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interesting to it.  Additionally, the state’s Regular medical society was hapless in its 
negotiations with state’s politicians.  Regular physicians were not going to convince 
Oregon’s state legislators to pass licensing by piggy-backing it on public health and 
sanitation laws.  The state medical association was going to have to provide additional 
incentives to motivate the state legislature. 
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  CHAPTER IX
THE CRESCENDO OF ECLECTIC OPPOSITION 
TO LICENSING
As state supreme courts around the country began to rule in favor of licensing 
laws, opponents were forced to double down against their passage.  If state courts refused 
to invalidate licensing, then the only way to stop licensing laws was to prevent their 
progress in state legislatures.  These early court decisions placed additional pressure on 
opponents of licensing within the National Eclectic Medical Association (NEMA).  The 
debate in favor of passing nonpartisan licensing legislation continued at the 1883 NEMA 
annual convention in Topeka, Kansas.  The president of NEMA, Andrew Jackson Howe, 
openly advocated the creation of “organized and efficient Boards of Health” as long as 
the “rules adopted” were equitable.  Howe cited the creation of the Missouri Board of 
Health as an example of acceptable nonpartisan medical regulation.  He even believed 
that this type of legislation eventually would eliminate the American Medical Association 
ethics rules that barred Regulars from consulting with Irregulars.215  Eclectic opponents 
of medical licensing became more vocal and boisterous in their opposition.  Organized 
Regulars already had demonstrated that they needed Irregular support in most states to 
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pass licensing, and the opponents of these laws in NEMA continued the attack to 
convince NEMA’s membership to oppose these laws and not compromise with Regulars.  
In 1884, despite the continued advocacy by leadership on behalf of nonpartisan 
medical regulation, NEMA’s position on medical licensing was in flux as John King and 
Anson Clark debated the topic at the annual convention in Cincinnati, the birthplace of 
Eclectic medicine.  King’s and Clark’s speeches at the convention demonstrated that they 
not only disagreed fundamentally on the necessity and legality of medical regulation, but 
represented the fundamental split within NEMA.  They had very different experiences 
with medical regulation up to this point in their careers.  King had taken part, along with 
his older Eclectic colleagues, in the dismantling of discriminatory state medical 
regulations in the 1840s and 1850s.  These earlier laws were passed by Regulars, and they 
were intentionally meant to marginalize Irregular physicians.  King was sickened by the 
fact that Eclectics now were working with Regulars, who he believed still wanted to 
eliminate Eclectics and Homeopaths.  On the other hand, Clark was twenty years younger 
than King and was not involved in this struggle.  Clark may have been against 
discriminated by Regulars during his career, but he still believed that he could 
successfully compromise with them and elevate the medical profession. 
At the 1884 convention, both King and Clark were invited to present their views 
on licensing to the membership.  Their disagreement was not limited to medical 
legislation; the heart of their disagreement centered on the definition of Eclectic 
medicine.  While King maintained an expansive definition and deemed numerous 
uneducated and marginal practitioners as medical Eclectics, Clark’s definition limited 
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Eclecticism to his organized and educated colleagues.  Numerous Eclectic medical 
practitioners, viewed by King as his brothers-in-arms, were seen by Clark as frauds and 
charlatans.  They were arguing not only about medical legislation, but about who 
comprised the legitimate heart and soul of Eclecticism.
In many ways this definitional debate was limited to the Eclectics.  While 
Homeopaths were threatened by licensing, they did not have the same problems defining 
Homeopathy.  Unlike Eclecticism, Homeopathy was the product of a single physician.  
As long as Homeopaths agreed to follow Samuel Hahnmann’s medical system, they 
automatically knew who was a Homeopath and who was not.  On the hand, Eclectics 
were defined by their diversity.  Medical licensing threatened this diversity because 
licensing was designed to eliminate medical practitioners who did not fit a certain mode.  
Medical licensing was beginning to coalesce around the notion that doctors needed to 
have a medical degree from a certain type of institution.  Any physician who failed to 
attend the right type of institution risked being marginalized or eliminated.       
King consistently opposed medical legislation in any form throughout his career 
and his position never changed.  King was convinced that any Eclectics who were even 
just lukewarm to licensing were essentially “traitors” because they have forgotten the 
sacrifice made by early Eclectics to overturn the medical legislation propounded in the 
first half of the century.216  He felt Eclectics had an obligation to oppose medical 
regulation in all its forms.  In his address, King made several provocative arguments in 
opposition to licensing -- arguments that were focused on undermining the growing 
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support for medical licensing in NEMA.  He attacked medical regulations and claimed 
that they were “despotic” enactments that violated the United States Constitution, which 
guaranteed rights “equally.” 217  Not only did licensing violate the constitution, it was 
ultimately a “system or spying, of oppression and of usurpation, fully equal to the 
Machiavellian absolutism of certain European nations.”218  King declared that American 
civil rights grew “out of the Constitution” and that any effort to eliminate these rights 
would establish a precedent for future deprivations.219  Even medical registration (the 
least onerous type of licensing) was described by him as “disgraceful, detestable, anti-
republican, and in opposition to that Amendment of the Federal Constitution intended to 
prevent caste monopoly.”  He simply could not understand why physicians who had 
practiced “20, 30 or 40 years” should be compelled to register with the state.220  
John King’s opposition to medical regulation did not stop there.  He also asserted 
that medical Eclecticism itself was an expression of American freedom and that any type 
of regulation would undermine the concept and practice of Eclecticism.  In King’s mind, 
Eclecticism represented not just freedom from the dogmatic views of the Old School, but 
mental freedom that could only preserved if “destructive legislation” was defeated.  He 
thought that medical regulation could weaken the strength of reformed medicine by 
limiting the freedom of its practitioners.221  Not only were individual physicians’ rights 
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curtailed by medical legislation, but licensing laws would prevent the general public from 
seeking treatment from whomever they desired.  The public wanted the same freedom in 
selecting their physician as they did in picking “their religion” or “their tailor.”222  King 
objected to the notion that only the state could evaluate physicians adequately and protect 
the public from fraudulent practitioners.  Instead relying on the state, the public should be 
permitted to evaluate physicians on their own. King assumed that malpractice law could 
more than adequately protect the public from incompetent or unqualified physicians.  The 
ability of citizens to sue their physicians, King argued, gave them sufficient enforcement 
power to ensure public health.223    
King fervently believed that Old School physicians could not be trusted to pass 
fair and equitable licensing acts.  Regulars used medical legislation in the first half of the 
century to marginalize and attack Irregulars, and King believed that the current push for 
licensing was no different.  He stated that only Regulars and their proxies favored 
medical regulation.  While Regulars argued that they sought licensing “to protect the 
people,” King did not believe that the people shared their concern.  The demand for 
medical legislation did not come from common citizens, but from Regulars and their 
proxies.  The Regulars were not trying to protect the public’s health and welfare; they 
simply sought to create a medical monopoly.  The public, according to King, was in a 
much better position to protect its health and welfare than state legislatures.
Additionally, Regulars were interested in preserving their “vacillating, uncertain 
system” of medicine.  According to King, Old School medicine was on the ropes and the 
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Regulars were advocating only for medical licensing while they still possessed some 
credibility.  While Regulars may have sneered and jeered at Irregulars from a distance, 
King argued that they had adopted Irregular medicine over the past forty years.  Previous 
theories and hypotheses considered essential parts of the Old School, especially heroic 
medicine, had recently been questioned or even rejected.  Over time, Regular physicians’ 
understanding of disease underwent dramatic changes.  King attempted to chart the 
changes in Old School medicine.  First, he stated that disease was believed to be caused 
by “certain conditions of the fluids of the system.”  Later Regulars altered this dogma and 
became convinced that disease was caused by “conditions of both the fluids and solids.”  
King declared that their understanding of disease was again being replaced by the “names 
of bacteria, bacilli, micrococci, microbes, or minute vegetable formulation in the fluids, 
in the solids, or in both.”224  The existence of competing sects of medicine was, in King’s 
mind, “prima facia evidence of the fallibility of regular practice” and a demonstration of 
the Regulars’ questionable reputation.225  King believed that only medical regulation 
could preserve the Regulars’ waning strength. 
King also argued that medical legislation, instead of protecting American lives, 
ultimately would imperil public health because it would prevent talented individuals from 
entering the practice of medicine. King stated that many successful physicians had 
practiced without diplomas and that it was unnecessary to have one in order to treat 
patients effectively.226  Medical legislation not only would prohibit numerous people 
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from practicing medicine, but if a “farmer, grocer or other non-professional person” 
discovered “a cure for cancer,” licensing would bar them from sharing their cures.227  
While King did not disparage medical graduates, he stated that “too much legal 
importance has been given to it” because a medical degree cannot ensure that an 
individual was a “safe and successful medical practitioner.”228  Medical students were not 
exposed to any educational material that could not be learned from a textbook.229  King 
did not believe that a broad education in math, science, anatomy, chemistry, “microscopic 
germs,” and dead languages would benefit physicians.  It was not uncommon for 
“illiterate men” to have a rare gift for treating the sick, but licensing laws would prevent 
them sharing their gifts with humanity.230   
The biggest tragedy in King’s mind was that honest, hardworking physicians and 
their families’ very survival were threatened by the specter of medical regulations.  
People, King stated, who faithfully executed their jobs as healers, would be classified as 
criminals for the same work that previously had been lauded.  The medical regulations in 
Illinois deprived many physicians of their rights and drove them from their homes.  King 
cited the fact that almost two thousand “Irregular” physicians had been forced out of 
Illinois by medical licensing as evidence that licensing was targeting their kind.231  
Instead of praising the efforts of the Illinois board to eliminate the least educated and the 
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most unorganized physicians, he castigated them for destroying the lives of thousands of 
able physicians.  King even went out of his way to defend the most reviled medical 
practitioners: nostrum peddlers.  Nostrum peddlers sold medicines and potions that not 
only possessed little medicinal value, but could be dangerous.  He pointed out the irony 
that Regular physicians often promoted nostrums while condemning their sellers as 
quacks.  If anything, the hypocritical position taken by numerous Old School physicians 
simply underscored the collapse of their allegedly superior therapeutic system.232
Finally, King claimed that ultimately “[r]estrictive laws are enacted” to generate 
revenue for the government.  When the government grants special privileges or licenses 
to some, but not others, it is a form of “indirect taxation.”233  As an indirect tax, it was 
antithetical to both the Constitution and American principles of freedom because it was 
essentially feudal in nature.234  These taxes were premised on the idea that citizens were 
incapable of taking care of themselves and needed a “master or law to take care of 
him.”235  King then extended the same objection to boards of health.  He stated that the 
nation successfully existed for more than one hundred years without these government 
boards.  All of the functions granted to boards of health had been handled successfully by 
local medical societies and local government authorities.  Americans were more than 
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capable of taking care of themselves without these indirect taxes or unnecessary 
boards.236
Unlike King, Clark’s statement on medical legislation was brief and tightly 
focused.  Clark believed that if Eclectics failed to embrace medical regulations, 
Eclecticism’s very existence would be endangered.  While he directed his attention on the 
impact of the Illinois Medical Practice Act over its first five years, Clark also briefly 
attacked several of the key arguments advanced by King in his address.  Clark’s primary 
goal was to assuage his fellow physicians’ fears and demonstrate that the success of the 
Illinois law benefited Eclecticism in the state.  Clark first noted that the state had a 
legitimate interest in protecting the health and lives of its citizens.  Therefore, he argued 
that protecting the lives of its citizens was part of its “police powers” and that the state 
had an absolute right regulate these matters.  King’s expectation that physicians should be 
exempt from government regulations was untenable, especially if their actions were 
found to “be detrimental to the welfare of the people composing the commonwealth.”237  
Clark essentially acknowledged that the state had broad powers to regulate medicine.  
Next, Clark stated that the “venomous” Eclectic objections were ultimately 
counterproductive and “shortsighted.”  While King claimed that Allopathy was 
collapsing, Clark acknowledged a readily apparent reality: Eclectics were vastly 
outnumbered by Regulars.  In most states, Eclectics comprised only one-sixth to one-
twelfth of the total number of physicians in the state.  Eclectics were a fairly small 
minority, and they needed protection from the state to elevate their standing and protect 
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their sect.  In lieu of fighting each and every law regulating medicine, Clark believed that 
Eclectics needed to organize and secure the rights that Regular physicians were willing to 
grant them.238
Clark did not have the same benevolent view of the Irregular rabble that King 
lionized.  Clark thought that the illiterate medical savants described by King were frauds, 
incompetents, and “medical mountebanks.”  King believed that these uneducated medical 
men were Eclectics, while Clark maintained a much more exclusive definition.  Clark 
would not have seen an uneducated Thomsonian practitioner as a qualified physician, 
even though King saw him or her as a colleague and equal.  Clark believed that Eclectic 
medicine’s principled stand for freedom “allowed frauds to fill our nest with more dirt 
and rubbish than all the decent ones could clear out.”  The uneducated physicians were 
not allies in a war against the Regulars, but threats to the reputation of organized and 
educated Eclectic physicians.  Unless the Eclectics purged their ranks of this “rubbish,” 
they could not be “respected.”239
Clark was thrilled that the Illinois Medical Practice Act chased one-thousand-five-
hundred people from their medical practices.  Instead of weeping for the displaced 
families, Clark was comforted that these individuals were forced to either abandon 
medicine or go to medical school.  He maintained Eclectics were not harmed by the 
board’s crackdown on itinerant physicians who lied about their skills in dishonest 
advertisements.240  Clark did not believe that any of these individuals could be classified 
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as Eclectics.  Clark argued that Eclectics actively had to secure their rights as qualified 
medical practitioners.  If they simply opposed all medical legislation, then Eclectics faced 
a precarious future.  If they cooperated with other organized and educated physicians they  
could ensure their survival.  Clark believed that Illinois and Missouri were outstanding 
models for Eclectics because qualified practitioners, whether Allopath, Homeopath, 
Eclectic, benefited from just, nonpartisan medical regulation.
King’s and Clark’s positions on medical regulation demonstrated the fundamental 
rift in Eclectic medicine.  King believed that medical regulation was a continuation of the 
ongoing war between Regular and Irregular medicine.  What King saw as a last desperate 
attempt by the enfeebled Regulars to preserve their status and legitimacy, Clark viewed as 
an opportunity to unite organized, educated medical practitioners and elevate medical 
Eclecticism.  King was unwilling to compromise on medical legislation, but Clark 
believed it was the best hope for helping qualified Eclectic physicians.  King was vested 
heavily in the success of Eclecticism.  He was recognized as a pioneer and leading 
scholar for the movement.  He had educated numerous physicians, including Clark, 
during his long career, and he understood that medical legislation could potentially unite 
medicine.  Instead of occupying its niche, Eclectic physicians might be incorporated into 
Allopathy if licensing succeeded.  King clearly was concerned that Eclecticism would not  
be able to maintain its separate identity and ultimately disappear.
Clark was less concerned with preserving Eclecticism.  He was a full generation 
younger than King, and he was willing to compromise with Allopaths and Homeopaths 
on licensing.  He did not hate the Regulars; he simply believed that their medical system 
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was fundamentally unsound.  His attack on unorganized, uneducated, and marginal 
practitioners confirmed his belief that medicine could not be effectively practiced by 
everyone.  Education and training were essential for physicians, and Clark simply did not 
want to be associated with traveling itinerants and illiterate herbalists.  Eclecticism 
accepted these individuals in the past, and he sought to eliminate their presence in 
Eclecticism and medicine.  If medical societies could not purge the ranks of quacks and 
charlatans, then he thought the states had a responsibility to protect their citizens.  Clark’s 
assessment of these individuals undoubtedly was shaped by his own experiences as a 
practicing physician and his work on the Illinois board.  The Illinois board conducted 
quasi-judicial hearings to punish physicians for misconduct and ethical violations.  In 
1880, the Illinois board prosecuted two physicians for practicing under aliases who 
assumed the identity of a prominent professor at Bennett Medical College, Clark’s 
employer. The Bennett faculty asked the board to prosecute the physicians and ultimately 
the charlatans’ medical licenses were revoked.241  Clark had seen that medical licensing 
could protect prominent Eclectic physicians from King’s rabble.
Interestingly enough, this generational gap also was appearing among the 
Regulars.  Local and state Regular medical societies were forced to work with organized 
Irregular practitioners to secure legislation.  These interactions softened their attitudes on 
Irregular practitioners.  The president of the Illinois State Medical Society argued for this 
approach at the society’s annual meeting shortly before the act was passed in 1877.  
While he demanded passage of a medical licensing law to protect the public from 
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unqualified practitioners, he conceded that Eclectic and Homeopathic practitioners were, 
like Regular physicians, “devoted to their patients and profession.”242  He advocated 
détente between Regulars and Irregulars in Illinois and argued that the medical society 
should pass “wise and impartial legislation,” which recognized only “well-educated men” 
but debarred incompetents, “whether regular or irregular.”243  
Many Regulars recognized that their understanding of medicine was changing, 
and some were beginning to acknowledge that the Old School profession did not have a 
monopoly on effective medicine.  By 1884, most Regulars had rejected the heroic 
therapeutics that defined their practice a century earlier, even if they were still being 
taught in Regular medical schools.  Organized Regular and Irregular physicians were 
beginning to resemble each other more than at any other time in United States history.  
While King still identified with the uneducated rabble, organized and educated Regular, 
Eclectic, and Homeopathic physicians began to see that they shared common interests. 
In a democratic vote, NEMA sided with King and agreed to publish ten thousand 
copies of King’s address to sell to Eclectics around the country.  The association also 
unanimously approved a resolution thanking King for “his able and scholarly address.”244  
In addition to recognizing King for his contributions, NEMA changed its official stance 
on medical legislation.  It passed a strong resolution stating “[t]hat while the National 
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Eclectic Medical Association is in favor of elevating the standard of Medical Education, 
it is opposed to all medical legislation.”245  
While the passage of this resolution might have suggested a major shift in 
NEMA’s official stance on licensing, the resolution was altered the very next day.  Instead 
of being a meaningful shift of its position, NEMA’s adoption of an outright opposition to 
licensing looked increasingly like a token of appreciation and respect to King for his 
contributions to Eclecticism.  A motion to insert “class” in front of “medical legislation” 
was adopted by NEMA.  This change rendered the entire resolution meaningless.  
NEMA may have opposed “class medical legislation,” whatever that meant, but it failed 
to state what it did support.  Did it support non-class legislation or no regulation at all?  
NEMA had not changed its position as much as guarantee its ambiguity.  
King failed to attend the next national convention because his wife was ill, but he 
sent a letter to be read at the conference.  Again, he emphasized his opposition to any 
form of medical regulation.  He stated that any Eclectics who supported medical 
legislation had “dough-faces and cowardly hearts.”  They had chosen to “lick the hands” 
of the Regulars who sought to “annihilate them.”  Instead of reforming physicians, 
Eclectics needed to focus their energy on educating the public.  If educated patients 
foolishly chose to seek treatment from quacks, it was “their American right and 
privilege.” 246
In 1886, King again addressed NEMA about the dangers of medical licensing.  
His arguments changed little from the 1884 debate.  He reemphasized that physicians did 
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not need a scientific education and that it was inappropriate for medical boards to test 
them on this material.  Uneducated physicians had advanced medicine in all three 
medical branches, and King believed that patients did not care if their doctor was an 
expert in science.  King also proposed forming medical societies composed of Irregular 
physicians and anyone else who opposed medical legislation.  He believed that the 
Knights of Labor, the largest national labor union in the United States at that time, could 
be used as an appropriate model for these new organizations, because “medical men, after 
all, are but laboring men.”  He asked Eclectics to “Organise [sic] Promptly” to fight 
medical legislation.  Not only should Eclectics unite with anyone who opposed medical 
legislation, they should “avoid and banish” dissenters.  King argued that Eclecticism 
faced extinction if they failed to organize themselves and fight.247
In 1885, NEMA attempted to clarify its position on medical regulation.  It passed 
three separate resolutions addressing licensing.  The resolutions claimed that it was still 
opposed to “Partisan Legislation,” but in favor of the board of health, as they were “not 
empowered to act prejudicially to any class of physicians.”  The final resolution stated 
that NEMA favored “testing the constitutionality of laws” that discriminated against 
Eclectics.  The resolution adopted the previous year, which opposed “all class medical 
legislation,” remained the official policy of NEMA.  While the new resolutions were 
clearly an effort to clarify its policy, they still did not advocate on behalf of anything.248    
While King and Clark were not able to materially alter NEMA’s official stance on 
medical licensing, Clark’s vision for medical licensing ultimately became reality.  By 
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King’s death in 1894, medical licensing had become a permanent feature of American 
life.  King’s complaints that medical licensing laws violated the Constitution were widely  
rejected.  While courts occasionally expressed some skepticism about the merits and 
necessity of licensing, they universally held that the state had a strong interest in 
protecting the health and welfare of citizens under its police powers.  Even in 1884, King 
would have been aware that these laws were consistently upheld.  Ultimately, he was 
engaged in wishful thinking when he stated that the laws were unconstitutional.  King 
sought to preserve the free market of medicine just as many other people were becoming 
weary of it.    
Noted historian and Eclectic physician, Alexander Wilder, highlighted the shifting 
Eclectic position.  By 1901, Wilder noted that even if Eclectics had “suffered persecution 
and resisted it manfully” at the hands of Regulars, they were not against licensing if it 
focused solely on “practitioners who follow methods and procedures that are not 
embraced in their category” instead of on Eclectics.249  King’s concerns ultimately were 
dismissed, and the Eclectics gradually moved towards Clark’s position.  King, however, 
was proven prescient in the end because when Eclectics accepted licensing, they 
gradually lost their distinctiveness and identity as a unique medical sect.     
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CHAPTER X
MEDICAL BOARDS PROSECUTE ILLEGAL PRACTITIONERS
This chapter includes material that was originally published elsewhere:
 Sandvick, Clinton, “Enforcing Medical Licensing in Illinois: 1877-1890” 
  Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine June 2009; 82(2).
The material is republished here with the explicit permission of the Yale Journal 
of Biology and Medicine.
Most of the state licensing bills passed before 1890 recognized the rights of 
Eclectics and Homeopaths to practice medicine.  In some states, supreme courts had even 
stated that licensing laws could not be used to discriminate against Eclectics or 
Homeopaths.  Therefore, early prosecution efforts focused on medical practitioners that 
both Regular and Irregular physicians wanted to purge.  Since Regulars originally 
pursued licensing as way to purge Irregular physicians, Regulars on licensing boards 
were forced to find new quarry.  Therefore, licensing boards targeted physicians 
(Regulars, Eclectics, or Homeopaths) who simply refused to procure a license, itinerant 
doctors, and medical practitioners who practiced types of medicine outside of the three 
recognized sects.  Despite severe funding limitations, the Illinois Board of Health 
aggressively pursued unlicensed practitioners.  State medical societies or physicians 
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would alert the board of health to potential violations, and then both the board of health 
and local prosecutors would pursue them.  Between 1880 and 1890, the Illinois Board of 
Health documented numerous prosecutions of physicians either for practicing without a 
license or for serious ethical violations.  
In one of the early cases, an alleged “Indian medicine man” named James I. 
Lighthall accompanied a traveling show composed of “40 to 100 persons.”  Lighthall 
used a number of colorful aliases to establish his bone fides including “Kansas Jim,” 
“Rastic Jack,” and “The Indian Medicine Man.”250  Lighthall and his concert troupe 
appeared several times in the board’s annual reports.  As an itinerant medical man, he 
would return to the state and sell his wares and services.  These included secret Indian 
“cure-all” remedies and teeth pulling.  Instead of applying for a medical license, Lighthall 
circumvented the medical practice act in a number of ingenious ways.  In 1883 and 1886, 
he hired licensed doctors “to shield himself from the law.”251  In 1886, he even procured 
“an itinerant vendor” license from the county clerk in Peoria.  A prominent local attorney 
convinced the clerk to give Lighthall a license even though the clerk lacked the statutory 
authority to do so.  In 1883, local physicians complained to the board about Lighthall, 
and he was arrested for violating the practice act.  In 1883, Lighthall left Illinois to avoid 
prosecution, but the Illinois board could not prevent his return in 1886.  
It was reported that Lighthall along with “a brass band, singers, gymnasts” were 
taking in over “five hundred dollars daily.  He has about twenty tents of various sizes, and 
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a large audience tent capable of holding several thousand….He (Lighthall) calls himself 
the ‘Diamond King’ wearing $30,000 worth of jewels on his person….his watch is 
encrusted with jewels and is worth $25,000.”  The editor of Georgia Medical Journal was 
appalled by Lighthall and asked “[w]here is Dr. L.A. Clark (Anson Clark) and the rest of 
them?”  If he “can run the traveling medial business in Illinois on a $100 per month 
license, a brass band, singers, and gymnasts, why can’t Dr. Anybody do the same?”  The 
Illinois board simply did not have the capital or manpower to prevent itinerants like 
Lighthall from conducting quick and profitable strikes into the state.252  Even though the 
Illinois board quickly revoked the licenses of the two physicians who worked for 
Lighthall on the grounds of “unprofessional and dishonorable conduct,” Lighthall 
continued his carnival show throughout Illinois.253  
Despite limited manpower, the Illinois Board of Health also actively investigated 
a number of physicians who sent allegedly false and potentially obscene materials 
through the United States mail.  The Illinois board issued a resolution that classified 
advertising or circulation of “marriage guides,” which described or illustrated pictures of 
venereal disease, or offered to prescribe drugs designed to prevent conception or procure 
an abortion as “grossly unprofessional.”254  At the same time, the Illinois board settled on 
a fairly broad definition of “unprofessional misconduct” taking part in fraudulent or 
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deceptive transactions, practicing under false aliases, or distributing circulars or handbills 
that were false or deceptive to attract patients.255  
In one case, the James Medical Institute was accused of sending circulars by mail 
to public school girls.  These circulars advertised nervine pills (pills of roots and herbs 
designed to cure “leucorrheoea or whites, nervous headaches, nervous debility, night 
sweats, melancholy feelings and general weakness” caused by “latent sexual feeling”), 
marriage guides, gentlemen’s and ladies’ rubber goods, and female pills.256  Smith 
Whittier, operating under the alias of “Dr. James” and the James Medical Institute, had 
successfully gotten the addresses of several public school girls and their female 
instructors.257  Whittier was arrested for his actions because his circulars violated decency 
laws maintained by the United States Postal Service.  The board was able to track down 
Whittier because he legally chartered the James Medical Institute under Illinois corporate 
law.  In an attempt to subvert the medical practice act, he and others had been legally 
chartering dispensaries, which could be accomplished for less than five dollars under the 
state’s corporation act, to give their enterprises the sheen of credibility.
Other states followed Illinois’s lead and sought to enforce professional standards.  
In Minnesota, E. C. Feller’s license was revoked by the Minnesota State Board of 
Medical Examiners.  He purchased advertisements in local newspapers claiming he had 
the “ability to speedily cure all chronic, nervous, blood and diseases of both sexes, also 
all diseases of the eye and ear, without injurious drugs or hindrance from business, 
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etc.”258  Since Feller knew that these advertisements were false and misleadingly, the 
Minnesota board revoked his license.  Feller appealed the board’s decision to the state 
supreme court. The Supreme Court of Minnesota did not question the Minnesota board’s 
authority and approved its decision in a fairly perfunctory decision.  The state supreme 
court agreed that knowingly advertising false cures to desperate patients was clearly 
despicable conduct and qualified as unprofessional and dishonorable conduct for a 
physician.259  
Illinois’s efforts to enforce these ethical standards ran into a snag during the long 
prosecution of another physician named Lucas R. Williams.  In 1880, Williams formed 
the corporation “Dr. Lucas’ Private Dispensary” to treat “private, nervous and chronic 
diseases.”260  He formed the dispensary with two other individuals, Axel W. Boye and Dr. 
George J. Williams.261  Williams established this corporation after he lost his license to 
practice medicine.  Williams created “Dr. Lucas’ Private Dispensary” in a blatant attempt 
to sidestep the Illinois Medical Practice Act, and he became a thorn in the side of the 
board for the next six years.  While the board clearly was empowered by its initial 
success in investigating unprofessional practices, its dispute with Lucas would 
demonstrate some of the limits of the 1877 law.  While the medical practice act had been 
found constitutional by various Illinois courts, Williams would demonstrate the difficulty 
of enforcing its criminal provisions.
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Williams received his certificate to practice medicine after he presented the 
Illinois Board of Health with his diploma and letters of reference soon after the law was 
passed.  Shorting after granting his license, the Illinois board learned that Williams was 
practicing under an assumed name, “Dr. Lucas.”  In addition to that, “Dr. Lucas” 
published a circular which the Illinois board found to be evidence of unprofessional and 
dishonorable conduct.  In the circular, Williams made a number of implausible claims.  
He stated that he had been in practice for more than twenty years (despite being only 
twenty-four years old), founded “the mammoth Bellevue Medical Institute in San 
Francisco,” and guaranteed that he had permanently cured all of his patients during his 
lengthy career.262  During his February 1880 hearing in front of the Illinois board, 
Williams stated that he was only practicing under the name “Dr. Lucas” because it was 
cheaper to advertise under the shorter moniker.  Even though he had been asked to stop 
the advertisements by the board in the past, he had not done so because he claimed to 
have an “unexpired contract with the newspapers.”  Needless to say, the Illinois board 
dismissed these excuses and quickly revoked his license.263
Approximately one month later, Williams reorganized his medical practice as “Dr. 
Lucas’s Private Dispensary” under Illinois corporation law, not the medical practice act.  
The board was powerless to revoke the charter of the “Private Dispensary.”  Williams 
began to practice medicine under the banner of his “Private Dispensary” and was arrested 
for violating the medical practice act.  Williams was prosecuted under Section 13 of the 
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medical practice act, which stated that “any person practicing medicine or surgery in this 
State without complying with the provisions of the act shall be punished…”264  After his 
conviction, Williams appealed the verdict of the criminal trial.
In 1885, Justice McCalister of the Illinois Court of Appeals rendered a decision 
that construed the authority of the board narrowly and eliminated its ability to revoke 
licenses and conduct investigations.  The court found that the medical practice act gave 
the board authority to conduct only two types of activities.  First, the board could conduct 
a simple verification of medical diplomas and the applicant’s identity.  Once the board 
verified the diploma and the identity of the applicant, it had absolutely no discretion to 
take any other action, ever.  After the Illinois board issued a certificate “its power [was] 
exhausted and forever gone.”265 Second, the Illinois Board of Health could administer 
medical examinations to applicants who lacked a medical diploma.  According the court, 
the Illinois board was not authorized to conduct investigations, hold hearings, or revoke 
certificates from graduates of medical schools.  Additionally, the court found that the 
board was authorized to consider the character only of the applicants who took an 
examination, not those who were automatically approved after graduating from a medical 
school in good standing.266  The court rejected the principle that the board had any power 
to regulate graduates of medical schools after they received their certificates.
The court was particularly angered by the Illinois board’s actions against 
Williams.  Under the 1877 law, people similarly situated to Williams could not appeal any 
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revocation of their certificates.  Instead they were required to resubmit their application to 
the same board that revoked it.  Justice McCalister stated it was “highly improbable that 
the Legislature” ever intended to give the Illinois board such “absolute power over the 
reputation and fortunes of … graduates of medicine.”  If the legislature invested such 
powers in the Illinois board, they would have been “flatly against the teaching of the 
sages of the law and the best traditions of our revolutionary history; for it naturally leads 
to and terminates in favoritism, abuse and oppression…267”  The principle that a medical 
school graduate’s hard work and money could be invalidated was particularly offensive to 
the court.  The court did not believe that it would ever be wise to give the Illinois board 
quasi-judicial enforcement powers.
While the board believed that the court’s decision completely misconstrued the 
legislative intent of the statute, the legislature passed a new act because the court’s 
decision pointed out that the board lacked the authority to revoke licenses for 
unprofessional behavior.  Despite the court’s strenuous objections to the board’s quasi-
judicial authority, the new bill attempted to eliminate any potential technical objections 
that could be made regarding the board’s authority.  Additionally, the 1887 bill clearly 
enumerated the powers possessed by the board and the basis of its authority.  The 
legislature sought to eliminate any ambiguous language contained in the first medical 
practice act.  Otherwise the only major difference between the two bills was that 
physicians could file an appeal with the governor if the Illinois board revoked their 
licenses.
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Most Illinois board members considered the first practice act to be a qualified 
success.  The Illinois board achieved some of the goals sought by Regular and Irregular 
doctors during the first ten years of the law.  When the law went into effect, Illinois had 
approximately 7,400 physicians.  These physicians were almost evenly split between 
graduates of medical schools (48.6 percent) and non-graduates (51.4 percent).  By 1887, 
graduates composed 89.2 percent of the 6,135 practicing physicians.  A majority of the 
10.8 percent of the physicians were only still practicing medicine in the state because 
they were exempted from complying with the licensing standards under the first law.  The 
Illinois Board of Health also claimed that 1,923 unqualified physicians left the state.  This 
number was repeated in numerous publications around the country and by Illinois’ own 
physicians.   
Even though the board did not bother to explain how it determined that 1,923 
physicians left the state, it was irrelevant.  Even if the law had not chased out 1,923 
physicians, few people questioned the veracity of the claim.  During its first ten years, the 
Illinois Board identified thirty-one diploma mills and widely published those schools’ 
names to the nationwide medical community.  Surprisingly, only forty-one licenses were 
revoked by the board for unprofessional or dishonorable conduct, despite have received 
more than two thousand complaints.  Had the board been better funded, it would have 
undoubtedly pursued more of these claims.  By 1887, the Illinois board restored six of 
these diplomas after the physicians met conditions imposed on them.  Most physicians 
considered the first bill a success and promptly supported the passage of the amended 
1887 law.    
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Soon after the amended law was passed, the state supreme court heard the case 
People v. John C. McCoy. John C. McCoy was a licensed physician in Illinois, but the 
board revoked his certificate for unprofessional conduct after reading several 
advertisements he purchased in St. Louis, Missouri, and Belleville, Illinois, newspapers.  
In the ads, he emphasized his extraordinary healing prowess.  The Illinois Supreme Court 
did not believe that advertisements could be used as proof to convict an individual for 
practicing illegally, and ruled that the “contents of these ‘advertisements’” were 
essentially “harmless.”268  While the court decided McCoy under the 1877 law, its 
decision made it more difficult for the Illinois board to prosecute individuals for 
fraudulent advertising.  The McCoy decision threatened the newly minted 1887 medical 
practice act because the 1887 law explicitly stated that purchasing false or misleading 
advertisements was unprofessional and could be grounds for revocation.  The decision in 
McCoy required the board to provide stronger evidence to support revocations.
By 1887, a large majority of states (thirty-nine states and territories) followed 
Illinois’s lead and passed either medical registration or licensing.  Seven states created 
statutes similar to Illinois’s and allowed state boards to determine whether medical 
schools were in “good standing.”   While only seven states evaluated medical schools, 
that was enough to force most of the nation’s medical colleges to comply with Illinois’s 
minimum standards.  Another five states at this time went beyond the Illinois 
requirements and forced all physicians, regardless of education, to pass their medical 
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examinations.  The remaining twenty-five states and territories had instituted only a 
medical registration law.269   
As medical boards were empowered, they continued their efforts to reform 
American medical education.  In its early years, the Illinois board focused simply on the 
number of terms of lectures taught at medical schools.  It had not developed any 
additional methods to police medical schools.  In 1882, the Illinois board requested that 
medical colleges require a minimum of three or more courses of lectures over a three-
year period.  In 1882, twenty-two medical schools complied with the Illinois board’s 
request, but by 1890, sixty-four schools required the three courses.  Over the same eight-
year period, the average duration of the terms went from approximately twenty-three 
weeks to twenty-five weeks.  The Illinois board also required medical schools to create 
admission standards.  In 1882, only forty-five schools had any meaningful admission 
standards, but eight years later, one-hundred-and-twenty-four schools had admissions 
standards.270       
As approval by the Illinois board became more important for medical schools, the 
schools voluntarily began to submit substantial amounts of information to the board.  
Schools started to send more detailed descriptions of their faculty, courses, admissions 
policies, laboratories, and clinical facilities.  The Illinois board’s publications on medical 
education became increasingly important and “attracted attention in newspapers as well 
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as in medical journals.”271  This allowed the Illinois board to require to schools to 
lengthen students’ studies and teach specific subjects.  
During the 1890s, the Illinois Board of Health continued to pressure medical 
schools to comply with its more stringent demands.  In 1896, the Iowa, Missouri, and 
Illinois medical boards held a meeting in Des Moines, Iowa, to discuss which standards 
the three boards should approve.  Collective action by the boards would put more 
pressure on schools to comply.  At the summit, the boards addressed admission 
requirements for medical students.  These boards wanted medical schools to require a 
certificate of “good moral standing,” “diplomas from literary or college or high school,” 
and testing of students on these subjects: English, grammar, arithmetic, elementary 
physics, United States history, geography, and Latin.”  While the boards struggled with 
developing criteria for medical school applicants, there was a general agreement that 
medical school admissions needed to be more rigorous.272
By 1896, the Illinois Medical Board began requiring increasingly specific 
information from medical schools to determine their standing.  Its reach began to include 
the physical conditions of medical schools.  The Illinois board had representatives 
conducting site inspections of schools such as the Dunham Medical College in Chicago.  
These inspector described the buildings, their leases, and the facilities.  The inspector 
noted the condition and number of laboratories.  The board refused to find that it was a 
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school in good standing because it lacked sufficient clinical facilities.273  The Illinois 
board’s efforts to regulate medical education were no longer limited to requiring certain 
of number of terms, but ensuring that students would receive a comprehensive medical 
education during those terms.  The Illinois board appears to have had sufficient resources 
to both manage medical licensing and enforce sanitary regulations.  The efforts and 
reports of the Illinois board “may have exerted more influence” than the reform efforts of 
any one college.274
While the efforts of the Illinois board were significant, they did not fundamentally  
improve medical education.  The worst medical schools were still awful, but the Illinois 
board created a mechanism and system that could change medical schools.  A number of 
schools were still more concerned with making money than developing well-prepared 
students.  Even in Illinois, predominately commercial schools such as Harvey Medical 
College thrived.  Harvey Medical College was perhaps “the most extraordinary example” 
of unrestrained commercialism because it ran “a day college, an evening college, a 
hospital, a free dispensary, a training school for nurses, a dime drug store, and an ‘out 
practice’.”275 
The Illinois law did have a noticeable impact on medical education.  By the last 
decade of the nineteenth century, Chicago was one of the largest and most important 
cities for medical education.  Chicago’s medical school enrollment grew dramatically 
during the Progressive era.  By 1896, it had more medical students than any other city 
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(one in nine medical students in the country was in Chicago), and its medical schools 
flooded the Midwest with physicians.276  All of the medical schools in Chicago needed to 
be in good standing with the Illinois State Board of Health to attract students.  As the 
Illinois boards required medical schools to add years onto their programs and provide 
clinical training, these schools compiled.  Additionally, many other states adopted the 
Illinois board’s determinations as their own. By 1890, the Illinois Board required colleges 
to provide four years of study and three annual courses of lectures as conditions for 
graduation.  Critically, forty-nine medical schools across the country compiled with the 
board’s demands by 1891 even as the board expanded its list of minimum requirements.  
Illinois’s state board of health already had altered medical education.     
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CHAPTER XI
LITIGATING MEDICAL LICENSING
After state legislatures approved medical licensing laws, physicians immediately 
challenged the constitutionality of these laws in court.  While it is difficult to say how 
many physicians contested these laws, hundreds of these cases wound their way through 
state appellate and supreme courts between 1873 and 1900.  Physicians brought these 
cases to courts either to nullify the statutes before they could be enacted or in response to 
being prosecuted for practicing medicine without a license.  While courts questioned 
these laws and occasionally found that they violated state constitutions, they consistently 
found that medical licensing laws were broadly constitutional under the common law 
police power.  No court in the United States ever found that states did not have the 
constitutional right under the police power to regulate physicians.  Therefore, while many 
of these cases questioned the constitutionality of these laws, people who wanted to 
overturn them successfully had to do so using other legal grounds.
Courts in several states were willing to nitpick at these laws to reverse 
convictions.  While courts consistently found these laws to be constitutional, they 
appeared uncomfortable with their broad reach and were unhappy because licensing laws 
often “contained some specifically objectionable feature.”277  These objectionable 
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features included carving out specific privileges for a select group of physicians, such as 
graduates of a particular school, or limiting fees for certain physicians.278 Altogether, 
courts found that licensing statutes were simply part of the state’s police power, which 
extended to the protection of “the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and convenience as the 
property of all persons within the state.”279  Still, the constitutionality of these laws was 
not cemented until the United States Supreme Court decided Dent v. West Virginia in 
1889.  The Williams case, which was cited in the previous chapter and decided before 
Dent, was just one example of judicial efforts to rein in these laws.  As has been shown in 
many situations, courts invalidated several licensing laws because they were poorly 
constructed by state legislatures.  Courts in Kansas, Texas, and Illinois, for example, 
either threw out certain provisions or invalidated laws entirely because state legislatures 
were not careful when they wrote the laws.       
In New Hampshire, a graduate of the Eclectic Medical College of the City of New 
York was denied a license by the New Hampshire Eclectic Medical Society (NHEMS).  
The New Hampshire medical practice act authorized the state’s three sectarian medical 
societies to elect boards of censors that were responsible for licensing the state’s 
physicians.  NHEMS’s board of censors denied his license because they found the 
physician “was unqualified and unfit to practise [sic] medicine, surgery and midwifery” 
and “unworthy of public confidence.”  The board claimed that even if it issued him a 
license, it would immediately revoke it.  The New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled that 




board.  The New Hampshire law required the board of censors to issue licenses to 
medical school graduates.  If the board of censors believed that applicants lacked the 
requisite skills to practice medicine, the board was required to prove that at trial.280
The Iowa Supreme Court determined that the State Board of Medical Examiners 
illegally denied an applicant after concluding that his medical school was not in good 
standing.  The Iowa Eclectic Medical College (IEMC) awarded the applicant a medical 
degree in 1890.  The Iowa State Board of Medical Examiners established that his school 
was in good standing when he was in attendance, but after he graduated, the board 
changed its mind.  The board denied him and every other graduate from the school 
licenses based on that determination.  The board reaffirmed its determination after 
holding a hearing with the applicant and the dean of the IEMC.  The court found that 
while the board had the right to decide that medical school was in good standing, it did 
not have the right to make that decision “arbitrarily and without restraint.”  The court 
ruled that the board’s action was illegal and that the board should have issued licenses to 
all the applicants of the IEMC.281  
While the California Supreme Court in Ex parte Frazer determined that the state’s 
medical practice act was broadly constitutional, the court did not evaluate every provision 
of the law.  The court reevaluated the law in a writ of habeas corpus, in the case Ex parte 
McNulty.  P. Roscoe McNulty petitioned the court after he was imprisoned for practicing 
medicine without a license.  In 1884, McNulty had been issued a license by the one of the 
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state board of examiners, but the licensing board revoked his license a year later after he 
advertised in the San Francisco Chronicle that he was a “specialist in certain enumerated 
diseases.”  Despite the revocation, McNulty continued to practice medicine and was 
arrested soon thereafter.
The court found that McNulty was imprisoned illegally because he had not 
violated the state’s practice act.  The law criminalized only practicing “without first 
having procured a certificate.”  Since McNulty procured a license from the board, the 
court ruled that it did not matter whether the board revoked his license later.  In a 
concurring opinion, two judges argued that the examining boards never should be 
allowed to revoke a physician’s license after granting one.  They argued that the police 
power did not grant the legislature authority to revoke a license for “what is styled 
‘unprofessional conduct.’”  The judges stated that the advertisement did “no harm to any 
one.”  The judges argued that revoking a licenses for advertising was just as ridiculous as 
if the board had ruled that “wearing any other hat than one a white color, by a physician, 
should be unprofessional” and punishable by a misdemeanor.
These cases demonstrated that while state courts had not ruled these laws to be 
broadly unconstitutional, they were on the lookout for provisions that were objectionable.  
In these cases, the courts were concerned that physicians were not given due process 
under the law.  The courts did not want licenses to be revoked or a medical school’s 
“good standing” taken away without formal procedures and hearings.  Some judges 
questioned whether state boards should be given the right to revoke any physicians’ 
licenses after granting it.  As physicians learned during the Williams case in Illinois, 
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courts were going to examine these laws carefully to determine whether provisions went 
too far.                      
While courts scrutinized these laws, they were averse to ruling that medical 
licensing laws were inherently unconstitutional.  In Alabama, the state supreme court 
upheld the validity of the medical practice act after an unlicensed physician sued his 
patient for payment.  The Supreme Court of Alabama evaluated the original practice act 
in the 1885 case, Harrison v. Jones.  In the case, Joseph Harrison sued his former patient, 
Joseph R. Jones, to collect payment for rendering care to Jones’s wife.  Unfortunately for 
Harrison, he failed to secure a license from either his county or state board.  Harrison was 
eligible for a license because he was a graduate of the Medical College of the state of 
South Carolina and the state board even printed a license for Harrison.  Inexplicably, 
Harrison declined to accept the certificate and failed to register in his county.  The court 
dismissed Harrison’s lawsuit and found for the defendant because any existing contract 
between the two was void.  It did not appear that Harrison challenged the legitimacy or 
constitutionality of the state’s medical licensing law, and the court did not even bother to 
address whether the law was constitutional.282  Despite Harrison’s conviction, he 
continued to practice medicine in Butler County, Alabama, and he later obtained a 
license.283
Later, the Supreme Court of Alabama found that the Alabama practice act failed 
to criminalize the practice of medicine without a license.  The defendant, Dr. S.W. 
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Brooks, moved to Russell County, Alabama.  Instead of going to the Russell County 
Board and securing a license, Brooks recorded his diploma from a “regular medical 
college in the state of Georgia” with the judge probate of Russell County.  The court 
found that the statute failed to criminalize practicing medicine in Alabama if the 
physician recorded his diploma with the probate court.  The court elucidated that if 
someone practiced medicine “without a diploma, without a license, and without a 
certificate of qualification,” it was much graver than the actions taken by the defendant in 
this case.  The court objected because Alabama Regular medical school graduates were 
allowed to simply register with the probate court and the court did not believe that 
Brooks should be treated any differently just because he had gone to school in Georgia.284  
Besides invalidating Brooks’s conviction, the court also reversed the conviction of 
another unlicensed physician on the same grounds.285
While the board of censors for MASA was heartened that the court did not 
invalidate the law entirely on constitutional grounds, the board was extremely distressed 
that the decision permitted “ignoramuses and quacks, whose sense of honor is very 
elastic” to “enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution.”  The board of censors 
maintained that regardless of this decision, the state and local board would continue to 
license physicians as it had in the past.  They simply hoped that new physicians would be 
honorable and comply with the previous interpretation of the law.  Unsurprisingly, the 
board of censors also called upon the members of the society to lobby the state legislature 
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to amend the medical practice act and permit criminal prosecution under the law.  The 
board realized that the only way to fix the act would be to completely amend it.286
The Alabama legislature acted reasonably quickly and amended the medical 
practice act.  In 1891, the state legislature remedied this problem and successfully 
criminalized the statute.  In 1893, another physician, Seaborn Bell, challenged the 
medical practice act after being indicted for practicing without a license.  Bell claimed 
that the new law was unconstitutional; he maintained that the indictment failed to charge 
the defendant with an offense that violated the laws of Alabama.  This time the Alabama 
Supreme Court spent little time addressing the defendant’s claim and found that the 
medical practice act’s previous problems had been remedied by the legislature.  The court 
simply stated that the defendant unquestionably violated the law and upheld his 
conviction.287
In California, Lee Wah, a Chinese druggist, sought to overturn his conviction for 
practicing medicine without a license.  Wah’s defense rested on his contention that he 
only practiced medicine in an emergency.  Under the 1876 California Medical Practice 
Act, any individual could practice medicine without a license in cases of an emergency 
and avoid prosecution.  Wah tried to exploit this exception to avoid a conviction.  Wah 
ran a Chinese medicinal herb pharmacy.  Two women bought “certain medicines, 
consisting of Chinese teas and herbs,” from him.  Wah contended that he had an absolute 
“right to prescribe, recommend and the teas and herbs to the ladies as an apothecary and 
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druggist, under his general merchandise license.”  Neither of the women paid for any 
services from him -- they only paid for the herbs and teas.  Wah argued that the women 
were informed by several physicians that their conditions were untreatable and ultimately  
fatal, so there situation constituted an “emergency” under the medical practice act. 
In the California Supreme Court, Wah objected to the jury instructions read by the 
trial court judge to the jury.  After stating that the jury had the right to decide what 
constituted an emergency, the trial judge informed the jury that Wah’s conduct was not an 
emergency and that they should disregard Wah’s claim.  In essence, the court nullified 
Wah’s defense.  The jury had little choice but to ignore Wah’s argument.288  Along with 
arguing exigent circumstances, Wah stated that he had not practiced medicine under the 
statute because he simply prescribed herbs and teas to the women.  As a druggist, he did 
not charge for any services he provided the women.  He simply sold herbs and teas.  
According to Wah, the medical practice was not designed to interfere with druggists, but 
“to prevent the legal qualification of quacks in the practice of medicine and surgery.289
The California Supreme Court did not agree and affirmed Wah’s conviction.  The 
court found that Wah did practice medicine under the statute and the women’s cases did 
not constitute exigent circumstances.  An emergency could be best described as a 
situation where “some person might get hurt, or faint, or fall in the street, and a person 
might render him assistance and him from pressing danger.”  A person could face 
criminal prosecution if he failed to render aid, but if someone believed that they may be 
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treated more beneficially or efficiently by a physician from a different school medicine, 
that was not an emergency.290  
The court’s ruling in Wah was questionable.  Did Wah’s services really constitute 
the practice of medicine?  The court did not even bother to explain how Wah practiced 
medicine when he prescribed herbs and teas.  The functions of druggists and physicians 
were different under California law.  Wah arguably, under the facts presented in the case, 
did not practice medicine.  It would have been difficult for the jury and judge to ignore 
the fact that Wah was Chinese.  By 1886, anti-Chinese sentiment was rampant in 
California.  This case occurred only four years after the Chinese Exclusion Act was 
passed.  Apart from outright discrimination, Wah was a Chinese immigrant and he was 
not permitted to testify on his own behalf in court.  He could not defend himself from the 
allegations in the complaint.  With the proliferation of various medical sects, whether 
someone practiced medicine was a legitimate question for debate.  Wah appeared to work 
primarily as a druggist.  When does selling drugs become practicing medicine?  In the 
1880s, people practiced several different types of healing practices and not all of them 
relied on prescribing medications or operating on patients.  The court in Wah’s trial did 
not even bother to cite any cases in support of its contention that Wah was practicing 
medicine.    
If the Court in Wah had looked, it possibly could have cited Bibber v. Simpson to 
assert a broad understanding of the practice of medicine.  In Maine, the Supreme Judicial 
Court for the Western District ruled that a clairvoyant practiced medicine when she 
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prescribed seances ranging from fifteen minutes to an hour for her patient.  She did not 
pretend that she understood anatomy or medicine, but she believed her treatment was 
helpful to her patient.  After her patient died without paying, she sued the patient’s estate 
for her fees.  The court stated that the services were “medical in their character.”  Under 
an old 1831 Maine law, physicians could only collect for services rendered if they had a 
medical degree or license from the Maine Medical Association.  This law was one of the 
last remnants of earlier efforts to regulate medicine during the first half of the century.  
The court stated it was irrelevant whether Bibber called herself “a medical clairvoyant, or 
as a clairvoyant physician, or a clear-seeing physician,” she was a physician under 
existing Maine law.  By prescribing seances, she was labeled a physician under Maine 
law and denied an opportunity to collect her fees.291  Unlike the court in Wah, numerous 
other courts have repeatedly cited Bibber for its extraordinarily broad interpretation of the 
practice of medicine.      
Courts struggled to determine who was practicing medicine under some of these 
practice acts.  In Smith v. Lane, a court found that massage was not within the scope of 
practicing medicine under New York law.  The plaintiff in the case demanded payment 
from the defendant for “rubbing, kneading and pressuring” the defendant’s body.  The 
plaintiff’s action was dismissed because the court found that he was not a licensed 
physician. The plaintiff appealed the case to the First Department of the Supreme Court 
of New York.  The plaintiff argued that his actions did not fit under the rubric of a 
physician; the medical licensing authorities in the state would not issue him a license 
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because massage did not fit under any branches of medicine.  In essence, even the state’s 
medical licensing bodies would have agreed that it was unnecessary to license him.  Even 
if a massage therapist exaggerated the effects of massage to a patient, it still did not 
constitute the practice of medicine.  Therefore, people who practiced massage did not 
need to procure a medical license to practice their therapy.  The court found that the 
practice of medicine was generally understood to include surgery and the use of 
medicines to cure, mitigate, or alleviate diseases.  Unlike the practice of medicine, the 
court found that the incompetent practice of massage posed little threat to the health and 
welfare of the general public.  Therefore, it was unnecessary to protect the public from 
any potential harm.  The court reversed the lower court’s opinion and found that the 
plaintiff could pursue his debt claim.292
Smith v. Lane grew increasingly controversial.  Other medical specialists cited 
Lane to claim that specialists who did not use medicine were not practicing medicine.  As 
other non-drug prescribing medical specialties were created, such as osteopathy, 
chiropractic medicine, and Christian Science, these specialists would cite the legal 
reasoning in Smith v. Lane to support their contention that they were not practicing 
medicine.  In theory, Smith v. Lane had little value as precedent because the decision was 
not adjudicated by the state’s highest court and it was not even binding for all of New 
York.  But the case provided useful legal reasoning for other challengers when they were 
prosecuted for violating licensing laws.  Perhaps more important is that medical societies 
and medical examining boards across the country viewed these drugless medical 
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specialties as serious threats and sources for medical frauds.  Several states, including a 
different court in New York in 1907, rejected the reasoning of the Lane court and found 
that manipulating the body could be considered practicing medicine.293  This issue would 
become increasingly contentious at the start of the twentieth century.
Wisconsin courts faced a difficult task determining whether a clairvoyant was 
practicing medicine.  The clairvoyant was sued for malpractice after he unsuccessfully 
treated the hip injury of a fifteen-year-old patient.  The clairvoyant was an unlicensed 
physician, but he held himself out as “competent to treat diseases of the human system.”  
He had treated numerous patients in the past.  In this specific case, the clairvoyant failed 
to conduct an examination of his patient and misdiagnosed his hip pain as rheumatism.  
The clairvoyant prescribed walking as the treatment for his patient.  Instead of getting 
better, the hip condition deteriorated.  Despite the noticeable worsening of the patient’s 
hip, the physician continued to prescribe walking as treatment and informed the patient 
that he was not in fact getting worse, but better.  The patient finally was not able to walk 
and lost the use of his leg.  Over time the patient regained some movement, but he “will 
be a cripple for life.”294  
The clairvoyant countered that he should not sued for medical malpractice as a 
physician, because he was not one.  Therefore, any potential damages against him should 
have been limited to an action for breach of contract.  The clairvoyant claimed that he had 
not violated any principles of clairvoyant medicine during his treatment of his patient, 
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because clairvoyants did not practice in accordance within any existing rules for 
physicians to treat or diagnose disease.  Instead “his mode of diagnosis and treatment 
consisted of voluntarily going into a sort of trance condition.”295  The clairvoyant’s legal 
position was designed to limit his monetary liability because the patient would have been 
entitled to far less money for a breach of contract than in tort.  
The court disagreed with the clairvoyant and determined that simply because a 
person resorted “to a peculiar nature of determining the nature of the disease and the 
remedy,” it did not exonerate any unskillfulness on his part.  The court held that 
clairvoyant physicians were still physicians and their actions would be evaluated against 
a more rigorous standard of care.  Instead of being compared only to physicians within 
their own medical sect, clairvoyants would be evaluated against “the ordinary skill and 
knowledge of physicians in good standing, practicing in that vicinity.”  The verdict 
against the clairvoyant did not disturb the original verdict, and the damages were 
upheld.296  Even though the clairvoyant case was a malpractice action and not a criminal 
prosecution, its definition would have been applicable to any licensing case.    
In another case, Davidson v. Bohlman, the plaintiff physician Davidson demanded 
payment from his patient Bohlman for a series of electric treatments for the defendant 
and several family members.  Davidson possessed an electric medical degree and he 
practiced in the state for thirty years as a physician, but he had failed to register at the 




from the case if he was unknowingly violating the state’s medical registration law.297  
Even though Davidson was the person who originally filed the lawsuit, he would have 
been better served by eating his financial losses then pursing the Bohlman family in 
court.  At trial, Davidson presented evidence that he conducted electric treatments on the 
family and put forward another physician to establish the going rate for that type of 
treatment in St. Louis.  The trial court found in Davidson’s favor, but after Bohlman 
appealed the trial court decision, Davidson and his counsel quickly learned that his failure 
to register as a physician barred him from collecting his debt.  In desperation, Davidson 
claimed that he was not practicing as a physician when he conducted the treatments on 
the Bohlman family despite the evidence he offered at trial.  He argued that electric 
treatments were not medical in their nature and should be treated differently from the 
standard notion of practicing of medicine.  Davidson could not have been too surprised 
when the court overturned the trial court’s decision and ruled in favor of the Bohlmans.298  
While various courts meandered around the notion of what constituted a 
physician, throughout the country state courts were united regarding the constitutionality 
of medical licensing.  Despite efforts by courts to rein in medical licensing laws, courts 
had been unwilling to claim that states lacked the authority to license physicians.  While 
courts may have expressed skepticism regarding certain aspect of licensing laws and 
struck down statutes that were poorly constructed, they were unwilling to go any further.  
Before the United States Supreme Court addressed licensing laws’ constitutionality, state 
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courts already had ruled that licensing and registration were constitutional under both 
state and federal constitutions.      
In 1888, Michigan’s supreme court ruled on the constitutionality of its licensing 
laws.  The state was operating at the time under a medical registration law passed in 
1883.  Michigan granted medical licenses to any practitioner who was a graduate of a 
“legally authorized medical college.”  Therefore, only graduates of diploma mills could 
be excluded from the practice of medicine by the state’s law because they would not have 
been considered “legally authorized.”  William W. Phippin was not eligible to obtain a 
license to practice medicine in Michigan because he was not a medical school graduate.  
Despite this hindrance, Phippin advertised in a Grand Rapids newspaper that he was 
physician.  While Phippin was not a medical school graduate, he claimed that he had 
practiced medicine in Canada for more than nine years and then another year in 
Michigan.  His experience in Canada did not protect him from being prosecuted in 
Michigan for violating its medical practice act.  The Michigan Supreme Court convicted 
him for “unlawfully advertising and holding himself out to practice medicine.”299 
Phippin realistically could not challenge the facts in the case, so instead he chose 
to test the constitutionality of Michigan’s law.  Like most attempts to challenge the 
constitutionality of the statutes, it was rejected.  Most courts, even the most skeptical, 
held that states had a right to regulate medicine under a state’s police power.  What makes 
the Phippin case intriguing is not the holding or facts of the case, but the dissent.  Despite 
the growing number of cases supporting the constitutionality of these statutes, two judges 
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still questioned the underlying wisdom of state medicine.  The dissenting judges viewed 
medical regulation as unnecessary and an unconstitutional restriction of individual 
freedom.  They came to this conclusion because they believed these laws prevented 
patients from consulting with the physician of their choice and barred some potentially 
qualified individuals from practicing medicine.  
The dissenting justices argued that this was the first instance where “citizens … 
have been prevented from employing such medical aids and advisors as they have seen 
fit.”  They were concerned that licensing would eliminate dissenting views in medicine.  
Instead of an active dialogue, those with “new or peculiar views” would be completely 
shut out.  Apprenticeship should not have been rejected in favor of formal collegiate 
medical education because there was only one medical school in the state and medical 
education was uneven throughout the country.  The justices described the quality of 
medical schools outside Michigan as “notoriously imperfect, and some [were] fraudulent.  
There can be no possible equality under such a system.”  The justices also were 
concerned that potential physicians who did not agree with the two medical systems 
taught at the Michigan medical school would be prevented from receiving a medical 
education.  Licensing would create an “aristocracy in a free government.”  People with 
talent and experience would be prevented from practicing medicine, while “a mere quack 
or ignoramus, without learning or experience, with a bogus certificate, or a bona fide 
graduate” could become a physician.  Examinations, they argued, would have been a 
much fairer method to evaluate applicants for licenses and would not exclude physicians 
who did not attend medical school.  By 1888, most states had provisions that still 
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permitted non-graduates to take the medical examination and practice medicine.300  While 
this dissent expressed lingering doubts about the fairness of medical licensing, those 
objections would be swept away by Dent.  
In 1882, the West Virginia legislature passed a licensing law that on its face 
looked similar to other state laws.  When the law was implemented, it created both a state 
board of health and medical licensing board at the same time.  Anyone who wanted to 
practice medicine in West Virginia was required to obtain a certificate from the state 
board to practice.  If a physician practiced for ten consecutive years, he or she was 
required to submit evidence of their practice in the state to either the state board of health 
or two members of a local board of health in his “Congressional district.”  The only 
stated rationale for denying a certificate was if the affidavit was “false.”  Additionally, if a 
physician had not practiced for ten years, he or she could submit a diploma from a 
“reputable medical college.”  The state board determined which schools were reputable 
under the law.  If the physician was not a graduate and did not attend a “reputable” 
medical college, he or should would have to submit to an examination which tested all or 
majority of “its departments.”  The licensing statute required anyone practicing obstetrics 
and surgery to comply with all the provisions of the law.  Unlike other licensing laws, 
Regulars controlled the state board of health and intentionally discriminated against 
Irregular physicians.  The state board deemed only Regular schools to be “reputable” 
under the law.  All Irregulars were required to take the examination.    
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Unlike the state board of health in Illinois, Regulars did not have to share the 
board of health with Irregulars, and the legislature did not even bother carving out a 
different testing standard for Irregulars.  In Alabama, even though Regulars controlled the 
state board of health, Irregulars were not tested on Regular medicine.  West Virginia law 
permitted all physicians to be tested on Regular medicine.  Essentially, Regulars in West 
Virginia were able to create a law that insured their domination of medical practice in the 
state.  West Virginia was unusual because it was one of the few states that was able to 
achieve the original goals the AMA and Regular medical societies had for licensing.301  
Unsurprisingly, due to discriminatory enforcement of this law, Irregular physicians 
challenged its constitutionality.
Frank Dent was a physician who started his “lucrative practice” in West Virginia 
in 1876.  Because he had practiced medicine in West Virginia for fewer than ten years, 
Dent was required to submit his diploma to the board of health.  According to the statute, 
Dent submitted his diploma from the American Medical Eclectic College of Cincinnati, 
Ohio, to members of the board of health.  The board of health denied his application 
because it determined that his school was not “reputable.”  Instead of sitting for the 
licensing exam, Dent continued to practice medicine without a license.  Dent was later 
indicted and convicted for practicing medicine without a license.  Dent never disputed the 
fact that he practicing medicine.  He was fined fifty dollars and required to cover “costs 
of the proceedings.”  Dent appealed the trial court’s decision to the Court of Appeals of 
the state of West Virginia, which affirmed his conviction.
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 Dent’s alma mater, the American Medical Eclectic College (AMEC) of 
Cincinnati, Ohio, was somewhat problematic.  While the West Virginia law appeared to 
be administered in a discriminatory manner, the AMEC may not have been the best 
example of a quality Eclectic medical school.  The details regarding the school are 
extremely sketchy.302  It is certainly possible that the West Virginia board’s finding that 
the school was not reputable could have been justified.  Putting the AMEC’s credibility 
aside, clearly West Virginia was blatantly partisan in the battle of the sects.  In front of the 
United States Supreme Court, the attorney general for West Virginia argued that its board 
of health could not only legally exclude Irregulars from practicing medicine in the state, 
but was also justified in doing so.  “Regular physicians had no obligation to prove that 
their practices” were superior to Eclectic medicine.  These statements by the attorney 
general eliminated any doubt that even if AMEC had been a credible school, it still would 
not have been deemed reputable by the board because the law was “engineered policy” to 
benefit “elite” West Virginian Regular physicians.303
 The United States Supreme Court ultimately sided with West Virginia in this case.  
While Justice Field in his decision acknowledged that people had a “right” to practice a 
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“lawful calling, business, or profession” and the state was not allowed to arbitrarily 
restrict this right, the state’s desire to protect society was not arbitrary.  He stated that the 
“power of the State to provide for the general welfare of its people authorizes it to 
prescribe all such regulations as, in its judgment, will secure or tend to secure them 
against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well as deception and fraud.”  
Due to the nature of the medical profession, Justice Field argued that a state could 
understandably be compelled to prevent people from practicing medicine without a 
license if they were not considered to be “fully qualified.” Additionally, Field did not find 
that there was anything “of an arbitrary character in the provisions” of the West Virginia 
statute because Dent could have taken an examination to become licensed after his 
license was denied.  Field acknowledged that if Dent had been denied a license after 
passing the state’s examination, he would have had a legitimate claim.  He then could 
have petitioned the state courts to order the board of health to license him, but Dent failed 
to do that.304 
 The Dent decision ended any reasonable claim that licensing laws were 
unconstitutional.  Physicians would continue to include constitutional claims in their 
efforts to invalidate licensing, but those efforts were foolhardy and a waste of paper.  The 
Supreme Court’s ruling was clear and concise.  This decision also laid the groundwork to 
expand state licensing beyond medical licensing.  Dent has become a touchstone case and 
has been cited numerous times.305  Dent has been expanded to state authority to license 
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all types of professions, including the practice of law.  Dent also was critical to the 
expansion of medical licensing because it removed any doubt that these laws were legal.  
The West Virginia law was quite possibly enforced by the state board in a more 
discriminatory way than any other law in the nation.  If the Supreme Court refused to 
overturn a law that was explicitly enforced excluding Irregulars on somewhat suspect 
grounds, then it would be hard to imagine a law that would be invalid on constitutional 
grounds.  The courts ruled that states had a right to pick sides in the medical sectarian 
disputes.  Dent v. West Virginia confirmed the growing consensus that medical licensing 
laws were constitutional and a valid use of the police powers.
Litigants after Dent were forced to shift their constitutional claims from federal to 
state law.  In 1892, R. H. Randolph, an unlicensed Oregon physician, challenged the 
constitutionality of the licensure act under the Oregon Constitution, but his claim gained 
little traction.  Randolph argued that the law violated the state’s constitution because it 
grandfathered in physicians and surgeons who practiced in Oregon before the act was 
passed.306  Randolph argued that the act discriminated against out-of-state physicians who 
moved their practice to Oregon.  The Oregon Supreme Court again upheld the licensing 
act because the state had the power to enact laws to protect the general public from 
“ignorant pretenders and charlatans.”307  Nearly every state’s special provisions for 
physicians who had practiced in a state for a certain length of time were upheld because 
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those physicians were seen as having experience, which offset the degree requirement.308  
Efforts to nullify practice act under state constitutions were not successful.
Still, despite the Dent decision, courts would struggle to define the practice of 
medicine after 1890.  Instead of arguing that the laws were unconstitutional, medical 
specialists argued that they were not physicians and not regulated under the acts. The 
endless variety of medical treatments and sects made it difficult for courts to determine 
who was or was not practicing medicine.  Determining who was a medical practitioner 
was a far more important debate than if the laws were constitutional.  Moving into the 
1890s, examining boards, medical societies, and prosecutors would continue to try 
expand the notion of who was practicing medicine and force them to get medical 
licenses.  Even though the question of constitutionality was settled by Dent in 1889, 
courts would face numerous future licensing cases on narrower legal grounds.  Over the 
next twenty years, courts would be forced to define the practice of medicine as new 
medical specialties expanded in competition with the three major medical sects.  
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CHAPTER XII
IF AT FIRST YOU DON’T SUCCEED... 
While physicians in most states managed to pass one form of the three major 
licensing schemes, other physicians, like those in Oregon, continued to struggle to 
advance any form of medical regulation.  Oregon’s Regulars proposed several 
unsuccessful bills over the years and were running out of patience.  Physicians began to 
sound the alarm that Oregon soon would become a haven for quacks and incompetents 
from other states.  Oregon’s physicians did not want physicians who could not get 
licensed anywhere else to flood into the state.  In 1888, the Oregon State Medical 
Association (hereafter OSMA) made yet another dedicated push to pass some type of 
medical regulatory act.309  This time, the OSMA was willing to grease the appropriate 
palms to push the licensing bill through the legislature.    
At the 1888 annual OSMA meeting, the legislative committee appointed Charles 
C. Strong and five other members to spearhead the lobbying effort.  According to Strong, 
the committee chair, they were told by the OSMA leadership “to go to work” on passing a 
medical licensing act.310  In December 1888, a month before the legislature’s general 
session, the legislative committee sent out a fundraising letter to its members requesting 
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ten-dollar pledges because the committee confidently stated “that such a law will be 
passed” if they could raise enough money.  The committee stated in the letter that it 
hoped to raise one-thousand dollars.  Eventually, the committee raised three-hundred-
and-five dollars in pledges from the members.  The committee never explained why it 
needed the money.311
To limit opposition and debate within the medical community, the legislative 
committee refused to draft a bill “until shortly before it was sent to the legislature.”  
Strong wanted to avoid telling members specifically what type of medical bill they were 
planning to propose.  After receiving the fundraising solicitation, several physicians who 
had been practicing in Oregon “ten, fifteen or twenty years without a diploma, began to 
ask, ‘What kind of bill are you going to pass?  Are you going to shut us out?”  Strong 
evaded this question by sending postcards to any members who requested information 
about the bill; the cards stated that “the Committee ha[s] not as of yet drafted a bill.  We 
have substantially agreed that a bill must be a reasonable in all its provisions; and it has 
proposed to not disturb the present relations of anyone practicing medicine and surgery at 
the time the bill becomes a law.”312
The legislative committee approached legislator and Regular physician, Dr. James 
V. Pope, to introduce the Oregon association’s bill in the House.  Pope studied medicine 
in St. Louis and worked as a physician during the Civil War, but he was not a medical 
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school graduate.313  After Pope introduced the bill, he abruptly threatened to scuttle it.  
Strong wrote, “[N]ow came the point to find out where the shoe pinched with Dr. Pope; 
but I knew it pinched somewhere, and surmised that probably he wanted the credit of 
introducing and passing the Medical Bill, and wanted it to be known as Pope’s bill.”  
Strong also stated that rumors had spread in the legislature that the OSMA raised a lot of 
money to smooth passage of the bill. 314  
The legislative committee sent one of its members to meet with Pope in Salem, to 
determine why he intentionally tried to stall the bill.  The member  magnanimously 
offered to name the medical bill “Pope’s Bill” and told him: 
 “but in a way as not to accuse us of bribery--to be careful about 
 that--that we had $200 down here, and if he would draw a draft 
 on me for $200 I would recognize it, and he could see where the 
 corruption fund was and where it was used.  Well of course that 
 knocked it all into ‘pi.’” 315
After the OSMA offered Pope two hundred dollars and told him who else they 
planned to give money to, the bill began moving swiftly through the legislature.  Within a 
few days of the committee’s meeting with Pope, Pope was selected to serve on a special 
legislative committee to review the legislation.  Pope’s committee acted quickly and 
offered a few amendments.  The only meaningful amendment created an exemption from 
licensing for any physician who practiced in state at the time the law went into effect.316  
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Pope’s amendment provided broader protection for any physician than what the original 
bill offered.  Under the original bill, Oregon physicians who had practiced in Oregon 
could have obtained licenses, but the licenses would have stated whether the doctor had 
attended medical school.  Pope’s amendment ensured that physicians who were practicing 
without a diploma, such as himself, would not be listed any differently than other doctors 
in their community; the county clerk’s registry would indicate only that Pope and his ilk 
were simply practicing physicians and surgeons.  The local registry would not state 
whether a physician went to medical school.
During the legislative session, the local newspaper, The Morning Oregonian, 
covered OSMA’s push for licensing.  While the Oregonian, the state’s largest newspaper, 
supported medical regulation, it published an article about the fight to further regulate 
physicians in Massachusetts that was occurring at the same time.  An attorney speaking 
before the Massachusetts legislature testified that medical science failed in treating 
patients, and argued that the doctrine of supply and demand was the best way to regulate 
medicine.317  A letter to the editor of Capitol Evening Journal lambasted the so-called 
“quack bill” as an attempt to eliminate competition.  Additionally, the writer was aghast 
that the bill invested enormous power with a three-physician medical board.318  These 
complaints were essentially the same ones that scuttled previous medical regulation. 
The bill passed and authorized the creation of a medical licensing board and 
established specific criteria to receive an Oregon medical license.  The medical board 
consisted of three members who had the power to approve three separate types of licenses 
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that would permit the practice of medicine.  First, individuals who could establish that 
they received a diploma or license from a legally chartered institution of good standing 
could qualify.  Second, the board could issue licenses to anyone, regardless of educational 
background, by administering a test that evaluated the qualifications of the potential 
practitioner.  Finally, doctors and surgeons already practicing in Oregon at the time the 
act was passed could simply register with the office of the county clerk sixty days after 
the act’s approval and continue their practices.319  Anyone who practiced medicine in 
violation of this act was guilty of a misdemeanor.  
Even though the bill had passed, the OSMA still feared that the governor would 
veto it.  Governor Sylvester Pennoyer had expressed several concerns about the bill.  If 
he chose to veto the bill late in the legislative session, it would have been at least two 
years before the bill could be reintroduced.  Fortunately for the OSMA, Pennoyer decided 
not to veto it.  Instead, Pennoyer issued a non-signing statement arguing that the bill 
should have been vetoed because it gave the medical board too much power to take away 
a physician’s diploma for unprofessional conduct.  These broad powers were not 
circumscribed because the act failed to define dishonorable conduct, but Pennoyer instead 
decided “to obviate any difficulty by appointing as examiners men known to be cool-
headed and conservative.”320
After almost fifteen years of failure, the OSMA finally succeeded in passing a 
regulatory act by paying a two-hundred dollar bribe from the “corruption fund” to a 
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legislator who then passed an amendment to protect his own medical practice.  
Additionally, the remaining one-hundred-and-five dollars were distributed to other 
legislators on Pope’s suggestion.  Despite Pope’s self-dealing, his modifications to the bill 
made it more palatable to Oregon physicians who were practicing without diplomas.  
Pope’s concerns were similar to other physicians in the state, and those doctors would 
have opposed the 1889 bill without those changes.  The conclusion that the three-
hundred-five dollars raised by the association was intended for bribes is unavoidable.  It 
is not surprising that Strong was cagey about explaining what the money was for.  Strong 
also acknowledged that even with Pope’s help and the OSMA members’ money, getting 
the bill passed was extremely difficult; “[i]f they knew the way that committee worked, 
the difficulties that arose, and the pressure brought to bear, the thumb screws we used 
here and there of one kind or another.”321
The legislative committee of the OSMA was not satisfied with the final bill, but it 
was willing to accept it because the committee was convinced that the bill could be easily 
remedied in the future.  Even though the act fell “far short of perfection,” 
it fundamentally altered who could become an officially sanctioned physician in the state. 
The OSMA, like most other state societies, decided it was more important to pass 
something then to continue without any licensing law.322  Strong also stated that the bill 
would silence the dissent of diploma-less practicing physicians.  As long as any future 
bill did not encroach on those physicians’ rights, he argued that they would support future 
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legislation.  He stated it would be in the best interest of those physicians to support “the 
most stringent law against the admission of others.”323  Strong understood that “it is to be 
hoped that it may go through a course of evolution that may ultimately bring our State 
abreast of the other states and territories in respect to legislation to regulate medicine and 
surgery.”324     
Under the original 1889 act, physicians and surgeons were required to receive a 
diploma from a medical institution in good standing, but the act explicitly stated that the 
medical board was not permitted to discriminate against the holders of genuine licenses 
or diplomas from a licensed medical school or system.  Therefore, the Oregon law did not 
discriminate against Homeopaths or Eclectics but due to sloppy drafting, the law not only 
avoided discriminating against any of three major sects, it prevented the board from 
excluding physicians who acquired medical degrees from diploma mills.325  In the end, 
Strong was correct.  Even though the law originally was amended to eliminate the 
drafting problem, the 1891version was modified in several ways, and it ultimately 
resembled the original bill proposed by the OSMA rather than the bill promulgated by 
Pope.  
The report of the State Medical Board to the OSMA by James Dickson, M.D, a 
member of the new board, addressed these changes.  Dickson told the OSMA that the 
phrasing of the original bill was flawed and the board’s lawyers were concerned that if 
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the law was challenged, it most likely would be scrapped by the courts.326  The 1891 
amendment eliminated this problem by augmenting the power of the medical board to set 
its own standards for medical schools.  The board was no longer obligated to admit any 
physician who had graduated from a university if it had a proper charter.  Instead, the 
board was allowed to set certain rules, as had been originally intended, to determine what 
the board considered to be a school in good standing.  The board immediately decided to 
require that medical schools mandate three sessions of six months each of school and no 
two of those sessions could be in one year.  The board, in essence, adopted the 
recommendations of the Illinois State Board of Health.  Unlike Illinois, Oregon did not 
have the resources to conduct any meaningful investigations on its own.327  
Under the promulgated standards, Dickson postulated that graduates of forty of 
the existing one-hundred-and-thirty-five American medical institutions would be forced 
to take an exam under Oregon law.  The 1891 revision also placed physicians who 
registered with the county clerks under the control of the medical board.  Under the 1889 
Act, the board lacked jurisdiction over these physicians and could not discipline them for 
dishonorable conduct.328  The 1891 act remedied the problem and compelled all 
practitioners to submit themselves to the board for a license.  Not only did the medical 
board draft standards; it immediately exercised its statutory authority and began rejecting 
applicants. 
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In 1895, Oregon again altered its medical licensing law by requiring all applicants 
to pass a licensing exam.  The 1895 amendment also expanded the power of the Oregon 
Medical Board to revoke the license of a physician for unprofessional or dishonorable 
conduct including any physician who was originally exempted in the first law.329  Soon 
thereafter, the Oregon board immediately targeted physicians in the state.  The 1895 
statute specified the grounds for unprofessional or dishonorable conduct:  Taking part in a 
criminal abortion, employing “cappers” and “steerers,” obtaining a fee and claiming the 
ability to cure an incurable disease or condition, betraying a professional secret, using 
untruthful or improbable statements in advertisements, conviction of any offense 
involving moral turpitude and habitual intemperance, and advertising medicines claiming 
to regulate the monthly periods of women.330  
State medical boards throughout the country were adopting similar licensing 
criteria.  Before 1890, only nine states adopted codes of ethics, but during the 1890s, 
twenty-four more states developed codes of conduct for physicians.  These codes 
governed what grounds could be used by the board either to deny a license or revoke one 
after issuance.  Typically, “the exercise of the same wide discretion cannot be extended to 
a case where, when one has been regularly admitted, the revocation of his license is 
sought under another independent provision of the statute.”331  Like Oregon’s, these 
codes typically barred unprofessional or dishonorable conduct, procuring abortions, gross 
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immorality, false statements and promises, false advertising, distributing indecent and 
obscene material, and the fraudulent use of diplomas.332  Several of these criteria were 
similar to those adopted by the Illinois board in the 1880s.  
The Oregon Medical Board enforced its ethics code and revoked the license of an 
Astoria physician, Otis Burnett Estes, for providing an abortion.  Estes was a Regular 
physician and a graduate of College of Physicians and Surgeons at St. Joseph, Missouri.  
Estes had been described in the community as “Daddy Estes” because he had delivered 
more than two-thousand-five-hundred babies around Astoria, Oregon.333  Estes’s was 
convicted in the Oregon criminal court of performing an illegal abortion.  After his 
conviction, a local Astoria physician, Dr. Oswald Beckman, filed a complaint against 
Estes with the state medical board.  At the hearing, the full board heard the case against 
Estes.  The prosecution questioned three witnesses at the hearing:  Sophia Schultz and 
two other Astorian physicians.  Schultz was Estes’s patient and she recanted her earlier 
testimony and stated that Estes had not performed an abortion.  Estes’s counsel 
introduced sixty-four affidavits from Astorian citizens in support of the physician.  
Despite Estes’s support and Schultz’s testimony, the full board revoked Estes’s license. 334 
Estes challenged the board’s decision to revoke his license, and the trial court 
reversed the revocation.335  While Estes was convicted of performing an illegal abortion, 
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his patient recanted her testimony during the license revocation hearing and claimed that 
she was confused and sick with a fever during the criminal trial.336  His patient’s inability 
to speak English also hampered the efforts of the prosecutor to cross-examine her.  The 
prosecution failed to provide any other admissible evidence to support the charges.  The 
board also failed to file an appeal of the circuit court’s decision in a timely fashion.337  
The board was forced to reinstate Estes as practicing physician and surgeon.  The Estes 
cases demonstrated the difficulty in enforcing ethics laws.  Even though Estes was 
convicted of performing an abortion, the court was not willing to use that conviction as 
evidence against Estes.  Medical boards had to prove their cases in their own 
administrative hearings.   
Even as Oregon’s physicians were amending their practice act in 1891, another 
state, New York, that was slow to adopt actual licensing slowly began to move forward.  
In 1891, the New York Medical Practice Act finally went into effect after laboring under a 
mishmash of laws for almost twenty years.  While there is no any evidence that New 
York’s Regulars resorted to bribery to pass the bill, it was an incredibly difficult task for 
other reasons.  Even though New York was one of the first states to pass a medical 
licensing law complete with an examining board (later vetoed by the governor) the state’s 
Regular physicians were stymied in their efforts to pass another law to create an 
examining board.  While there had been efforts to reform the medical education from the 
state’s public medical schools, Regulars had not come any closer to forcing the state’s 




Unlike doctors in California and Illinois, New York’s physicians, both Regular 
and Irregular, repeatedly failed to compromise with each other and pass a bill acceptable 
to the each group.  Additionally, the state’s Regulars were divided between two 
competing medical societies.  The state’s original medical organization, the Medical 
Society of the State of New York, was excommunicated by the AMA after it admitted a 
former Homeopathic physician.  The split eroded cooperation among the state’s Regular 
members and made it more difficult to pass licensing.   
Still, New York’s failure to pass a licensing law is surprising in one respect.  Even 
if the state’s Regulars were divided, the medical society would have appeared to be the 
perfect organization to compromise with the state’s Homeopaths and Eclectics.  The 
medical society had driven the AMA to distraction after its physicians rejected the AMA’s 
strict anti-consultation prohibition in the 1880s.   Its rejection of the AMA’s Code of 
Ethics represented a serious threat to the AMA’s authority and demonstrated a willingness 
to treat the state’s Homeopaths as colleagues rather than enemies.  At first glance, the 
flexibility of the state’s largest Regular medical society would have appeared to suggest a 
willingness to compromise with state’s Irregulars on a licensing law, but, unlike other 
states, Regulars did not have much sway over the legislature.  New York’s Homeopaths 
were influential in the state’s legislature and they refused to compromise with the 
Regulars.338
In several ways New York’s inability to pass a licensing law mirrored 
Massachusetts.  Not only did both states have powerful and influential Homeopathic 
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societies, they already had created state boards of health.  Massachusetts established the 
first state board of health in 1868, and New York built its own in 1880.339  Advocates for 
medical licensing had their greatest success when they tied licensing to public health 
bills, but in Massachusetts and New York they did not have that option.  In 
Massachusetts, it was exceptionally hard to argue that medial licensing was an essential 
part of public health, because the board of public health thrived in the absence of 
licensing.  New York was running into a similar problem.     
At the February1889 Homeopathic Medical Society of the State of New York 
annual meeting (before the 1889 medical licensing was passed), Dr. William Helmuth 
acknowledged that relations between Regulars and Homeopaths in New York had 
improved dramatically over the years.  He stated that the Regulars’ “tide of persecution 
by the old sectarians and the violence of their invective is no more.”340  Despite the 
thawing relations between Regulars and Homeopaths,. Helmuth insisted that each sect 
should still have its own examining board.  The Homeopaths successfully prevented a 
unified board from being created, and Helmuth argued that there was no reason to give in 
now.  Helmuth most likely understood that Regulars desperately wanted licensing and 
would eventually agree to the Homeopaths’ demands.   
Regulars in the Medical Society of the State of New York were becoming 
increasingly desperate.  New York’s Regulars were extremely frustrated that they could 
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not get any traction for instituting a licensing board.  In 1886, the society proposed 
creating an examining board with nine members.  The bill failed because the Regular 
medical society insisted on six of the members being Regulars.  The state’s Homeopaths 
had little incentive to create a board that permitted Regulars to outvote them and 
vociferously opposed the bill.  In 1889, the Regulars again discussed a bill, the same 
“compromise bill” that was originally drafted in 1885.341  That bill still established a 
nine-person board, but the Regulars wanted only a simple majority of five.  The 
physicians who pushed for this new configuration failed to explain why this would be any 
more palatable to Irregulars or what incentive they had to agree to it.  One physician who 
favored the bill even acknowledged that the society had to “conform to their 
(homeopaths) wishes” if they wanted to secure passage of any bill.  The bill proposed 
would not have accomplished that, and it is astounding that after twenty years, they had 
not figured that out.342
During an open discussion at the society’s meeting, a member bemoaned that he 
had “little faith in the sincerity of the better class of homeopaths to work in harmony with 
us on the bill.”  Still, he was willing to support a bill that “drop[ped] the question of 
therapeutics.”  Even though some members still wanted licensing to give more powers to 
the state’s Regulars, most doctors in the society realized that there was absolutely no way 
Homeopaths would agree to a unified board with a majority of Regular members.  The 
member’s suggestion also did not inspire opposition or angry responses from the other 
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members.  The lack of acrimony on this issue is illuminating because during the previous 
thirty years any suggestion that therapeutics be eliminated from a licensing bill had 
sparked heated debates.  While the board did plan to submit another bill with a unified 
board, the members were resigned to accepting any bill they could get approved.343
The Regular medical society submitted another licensing bill to the legislature 
that included a unified board.  Homeopaths immediately voiced outrage and united in 
opposition to the bill.  Their opposition was extremely straightforward.  The state 
Homeopathic society believed that a unified examining and licensing board represented 
an existential threat to Homeopathic medicine.  Instead of a unified board, New York’s 
Homeopaths proposed a law modeled after the California licensing law.  Instead of one 
board, the three major medical sects would have their own separate boards.344            
 The outcry that a unified board represented a threat to the survival of 
Homeopathic medicine was perhaps overdramatic, but there was increasing concern 
within the Homeopathic ranks that unified boards posed a serious threat to the 
distinctiveness of Homeopathic medicine.  While these Homeopaths were primarily upset 
about the potential for Regulars to prevent Homeopaths from being licensed, there were 
legitimate concerns about the long-term viability of Homeopathic medicine.  Regardless 
of whether the therapeutic differences had blurred among the three medical sects, there 
was some evidence that unified boards had discriminated against Homeopaths in the past.  
Homeopaths pointed to the fact that the unified medical board in Canada licensed more 
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than 1,350 Regular physicians between 1870-1890 and only nineteen Homeopaths.345  
Still, it is difficult to pin down any place in the United States where there was widespread 
discrimination against Homeopaths.  Regardless, New York’s Homeopaths had little 
incentive to compromise.  Eventually, New York’s Regulars relented in their pursuit of a 
unified board and agreed to Homeopathic demands.  Like Oregon’s Regulars, New York’s 
Regulars finally were willing to soften their views and pass a licensing law.  
When New York’s medical practice law went into effect in 1891, three separate 
sectarian boards of seven members each were established.  The board positions were 
filled by members of the three statewide sectarian medical associations: the Medical 
Society of the State of New York, the Homeopathic Medical Society of the State of New 
York, and the Eclectic Medical Society of the State of New York.  Those members were 
appointed by the Regents of the University of New York, the organization traditionally 
responsible for medical education in New York.  The Regents also developed the medical 
examination for each of the three boards.  Aside from questions on therapeutics, the 
examinations for each board were identical.  The law required all physicians to pay a 
twenty-five dollar fee and submit evidence that they were “twenty-one years old and of 
good moral character, has a medical diploma or license and studied medicine for three 
years, ‘including three courses of lectures in different years in some legally incorporated 
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medical college or colleges’ before they received their diploma or license was conferred 
upon them.”346
After the New York law was passed, J.P. Dake, a prominent Homeopathic 
physician from Tennessee and member of the American Institute of Homeopathy’s 
Committee on Medical Legislation, addressed its creation.  While he acknowledged that 
New York Homeopaths generally were pleased with the “very cumbersome, round-about” 
law, he said this law was unlikely to work anywhere else in the United States.  He did not 
believe that should be used as an appropriate model for medical licensing anywhere 
else.347  
While Dake was critical of the New York Law, one of his colleagues on the 
committee, H. M. Paine, was marginally enthusiastic.  While Paine was skeptical about 
whether licensing improved medical care, he argued that the New York law was an 
“unparalleled” victory for Homeopaths over Regulars.  He also stated that despite the 
New York Homeopaths’ success, it was still critical for Homeopaths to continue fighting 
against the creation of unified boards, like the one created in Oregon in 1889.  He was 
dismayed that licensing and especially unified boards still had the potential to “to repress 
independent and original inquiry and discourage invention and improvement” of 
American medicine.  Paine criticized Homeopaths for pursuing unified boards with the 
hope of achieving equal representation because they had “never been indorsed [sic] by 
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the allopathic school, on account of the risk to themselves of being controlled by the 
homeopathic and eclectic members of a board.”348
It is obvious that New York and Oregon laws differed because New York’s large 
Homeopathic population was able to shape its licensing bill.  Homeopaths and Eclectics 
in Oregon clearly did not have enough power, or perhaps failed to pay large enough 
bribes, to state legislators to influence the Oregon bill.  Each of these examples also 
illustrated how difficult it still was to pass medical licensing in some states.  In Oregon, 
Regular physicians resorted to bribery, while New York’s Regulars had to overcome 
hostility by the state’s Homeopaths and the inability to curb their ambitions.  Even though 
Oregon and New York were two of the last states to pass medical licensing, the few 
remaining would take anywhere from five years to a decade more to pass meaningful 
licensing laws.    
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CHAPTER XIII
OSTEOPATHS AND CHRISTIAN SCIENTISTS
As Regulars, Eclectics, and Homeopaths asserted control over medical 
practitioners through licensing, they faced two serious challenges to their authority: 
Osteopathy and Christian Science.  Medical specialists from each of these specialties 
concluded that they could treat disease and human ailments more successfully than 
physicians from the three major medical sects.  Neither of these medical specialities 
considered that advances in medical science were correct and both rejected the emerging 
germ theory.  While Regulars, Homeopaths, and Eclectics had argued over the past thirty 
years about which sect was the most scientific, Osteopathy and Christian Science 
dismissed scientific medicine entirely.  Osteopaths manipulated the body to treat their 
patients health, while Christian Scientists convinced their patients that disease was a 
metaphysical dilemma rather than a physical one.  Because of their unusual treatments, 
licensing boards struggled with how to deal with them.  
In response to these new challengers, state licensing and examining boards tried 
to bring these new drugless specialities under their purview by expanding the definition 
of practicing medicine.  Regardless of the treatment protocol, licensing boards insisted 
that these care providers were practicing medicine under existing medical practice acts.  
They began prosecuting specialists who did not secure licenses under existing laws.  
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Osteopaths, Christian Scientists, opticians, midwives, and other medical professionals all 
came within the crosshairs of licensing authorities after they expanded their interpretation 
of the “practice of medicine.”  Osteopaths and Christian Scientists received extra 
attention because they were perceived by the three major sects as the greatest threats to 
their control over licensing.349  
The threat posed by Osteopathy and Christian Science galvanized cooperation 
among Regulars, Eclectics, and Homeopaths.  The three major sects did not want to 
expand licensing to these newer sects, and they sought to limit their expansion by forcing 
these medical specialists to operate under existing licensing laws.  In many states, 
Regulars and Irregulars worked together to eliminate these recently minted competitors.  
Some Irregulars even contemplated phasing out separate state licensing boards in favor of 
unified boards to minimize the Osteopathic threat to their practices.350  Courts also 
struggled to classify these new medical specialists.  Medical licensing boards prosecuted 
Osteopaths and Christian Scientists for practicing medicine without a medical license, but 
the courts across country came to widely disparate conclusions.  Unlike determining 
constitutionality of licensing laws, courts struggled to classify these new medical 
specialists.    
Andrew T. Still, a former Regular physician from Missouri, developed the 
treatments that morphed into Osteopathy during the 1870s and 1880s.  In 1874, Still 
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renounced Regular medicine and became a magnetic healer.  Magnetic healers passed 
magnets over a patient’s body to restore the flow of the “invisible magnetic fluid” that 
circulated throughout the body.  Magnetic healing was developed in Austria in late 
eighteenth century and migrated to the United States.   Magnetic healers postulated that 
people became ill when this fluid pooled inside the body instead of flowing freely. 351  
While practicing magnetic healing, Still added bonesetting to his practice to 
attract more patients.  Bonesetters alleviated pain by moving bones back into alignment.  
Bonesetting had been practiced since colonial times, and these specialists were dispersed 
widely throughout the country.  After learning the bonesetter trade, Still became 
convinced that bonesetting could do more than just address simple aches and pain.  He 
argued that it had the potential to cure chronic conditions such as asthma.352  
During the 1870s and 1880s, Still traveled around Missouri and demonstrated his 
healing techniques.  He avoided prosecution for his work because he was licensed as a 
Regular physician.  Still’s demonstrations intrigued numerous people, and he convinced a 
number of people that his techniques had merit.  By 1889, he was successful enough to 
establish a hospital in Kirksville, Missouri.  At this time, he proclaimed to the public that 
he had discovered a new branch of medicine.  Next, Still opened an Osteopathic school in 
Kirksville.  After establishing the American School of Osteopathy, he began to draw the 
attention of the Missouri State Board of Health and the medical societies of three major 





The medical societies of the three sects were concerned about Osteopathy’s 
growing popularity, and successfully lobbied the Missouri legislature in 1889 for a law 
requiring anyone who manipulated bodies to treat disease to pay a licensing fee of one-
hundred dollars per month.  Even though the law was approved, state authorities 
neglected to enforce it.  In 1893, the three sects then lobbied for another law that required 
Osteopaths to be graduates of medical schools in good standing.  The only school of 
Osteopathy in the United States was Still’s and it would not have satisfied the Missouri 
board’s requirements for this rating.  The Missouri legislature rejected this bill and 
instead passed a bill legalizing Osteopathy.  While this first law was vetoed by the 
governor, another law in 1897 that legalized Osteopathy was passed and went into effect 
across Missouri after the governor, an Osteopathic patient, refused to veto it.  Osteopathy 
spread rapidly from Missouri into neighboring midwestern states over the next decade.354
Unlike Osteopaths, Christian Scientists did not manipulate bodies.  Instead, 
Christian Science had been described as a “medicoreligious hybrid” that combined 
physical well-being with religious beliefs.  In 1875, Mary Baker Eddy published a book 
titled Science and Health.  This widely read text started the Christian Science movement 
and created a unique example of faith healing in the United States.  While Christian 
Science initially was perceived as simply another type of faith healing, over time it 
acquired notoriety and acclaim unusual for spiritual healing.  During the 1880s and 
1890s, the movement picked up steam and became a legitimate challenger to scientific 
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medicine.  By the 1890s, state courts and legislatures debated whether Christian 
Scientists practiced medicine under state licensing laws.355
Despite widely exaggerated claims by members of the medical press that there 
were more than one million Christian Scientists practicing medicine in the United States 
in 1890s, it was likely that there were no more than fifty thousand Christian Scientists in 
the entire country.  Additionally, few of these adherents worked as faith healers.  
Regulars, Homeopaths, and Eclectics were not overrun by a horde army of faith healers 
despite their repeated assertions to the contrary.  Christian Science was a small religious 
community, but physicians were outraged by the religious beliefs espoused by Mary 
Baker Eddy and her adherents.356  
Christian Scientists dismissed the traditional remedies of Homeopathic, Eclectic, 
and Regular medicine.  They also argued that Louis Pasteur’s germ theory was fabricated. 
Instead of medicine or physical manipulation to cure illnesses, Christian Scientists relied 
on religion and metaphysics.  Historian Rennie Schoepflin argued that faith healers 
appealed to Progressive-era Americans because their central claim was that disease was 
caused by the “fallen human nature.”  As the United States rapidly changed during the 
Gilded Age, many Americans were concerned that society was becoming increasingly 
immoral.  Christian Science offered an intriguing alternative to people who were 
concerned about the constantly changing understanding of science and medicine.  The 
central belief of Christian Scientists questioned whether physicians were even necessary.  
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The dramatic shifts by the three major medical sects away from their traditional 
understanding of disease and to new theories such as germ theory also might have 
alienated Americans.  Even if earlier medical practices were ineffective, patients might 
have found them more comforting than the new alternatives.  Paradoxically, even though 
Christian Science rejected the existence of disease, patients paid Christian Scientists to 
cure their illnesses.357
Just as Regulars had demonized Homeopaths and Eclectics in the past, licensed 
physicians from the three medical sects worked together and relentlessly attacked these 
new medical specialists.  Licensing united the three sects against these new interlopers.  
While the sects still viewed medicine somewhat differently, their differences were not 
nearly as great as those between them and these new medical apostates.  Additionally, 
Regulars, Eclectics, and Homeopaths dominated medical licensing, and they did not want 
these specialities to flourish unchallenged.  Licensed physicians directed their state 
organizations to prosecute Osteopaths and Christian Scientists.358
There were several early decisions that addressed whether Osteopaths needed to 
be licensed as physicians under existing licensing laws.  Typically, Osteopaths defended 
themselves by claiming that they were not physicians and did not fit within the existing 
licensing laws.  In Missouri, the state legislature passed an exemption in 1892, but 
Osteopathy presented a conundrum for most state courts.  Courts struggled to develop a 
consensus on whether Osteopathy was a practice of medicine.  Interestingly, courts ended 
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up analogizing Osteopathy to Christian Science.  Typically, if courts believed that 
Christian Science was a medical practice, then they would come to the same conclusion 
about Osteopathy.359   
Not only were the court decisions at odds, but Osteopaths also were forced to 
make contradictory arguments about their medical specialty.  They advertised that their 
medical system could cure numerous ailments.  They also were competing with 
physicians from the three major medical sects for patients.  While Osteopaths primarily 
treated patients for chronic conditions, they argued that Osteopathy could treat other 
types of diseases and deserved to be viewed as more than simply a system of body 
manipulation.360  From their patients’ perspectives, Osteopaths performed the same 
services as licensed physicians.  Osteopaths achieved their results by different methods, 
but their clients would have viewed Osteopaths as doctors.  When licensing and state 
boards of health prosecuted Osteopaths for practicing medicine, Osteopaths argued that 
they were not physicians despite their public pronouncements to the contrary.  From a 
legal perspective, Osteopaths made a credible argument.  They contended that they did 
not practice medicine because they did not prescribe drugs.  It may have been a solid 
argument in court to compare to Osteopaths to nurses or massage therapists, but it also 
would also have undermined their credibility as legitimate healers.  Osteopaths wanted to 
be seen as more than just nurses.361  
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Eugene Holt Eastman was one of the first Osteopaths prosecuted for practicing 
Osteopathy.  Eastman was unique because he was tried in two separate states, Illinois and 
Ohio, for practicing Osteopathy in two consecutive years.  He was a graduate of the 
newly formed American School of Osteopathy in Kirksville, Missouri.362  As a practicing 
Osteopath, Eastman’s treatment “consisted wholly of rubbing and manipulating the 
affected parts with his hands and fingers, and flexing and moving the limbs of the patient 
in various ways.”363  Eastman argued to the Illinois Board of Health that he was not a 
practicing physician because he did not prescribe medicine or use instruments to treat his 
patients.364  The Illinois board ignored his arguments and determined that he was a 
physician.  The Illinois board ruled that Eastman was a physician because he stated that 
his treatments could cure a “long list of diseases” relying only on the “manipulation, 
flexing, rubbing, extension” of his client’s limbs.  Both the Illinois board and the court of 
appeal simply defined medicine as “the art of understanding diseases and curing or 
relieving them when possible.”365  Under this definition, Eastman was found to be 
practicing medicine and his conviction was upheld.
After the Illinois board’s decision, Eastman left Illinois and moved to Akron, 
Ohio, late in 1896.  In Akron, he continued his Osteopathic practice, but within one 
month he was charged with practicing medicine without a license.  Contrary to the 
Illinois Court of Appeals, the Court of Common Pleas in Ohio did not believe that 
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Eastman was a practicing physician.  The court refused to find that Osteopaths, 
clairvoyants, mind healers, faith curers, massage therapists, and Christian Scientists were 
physicians under the Ohio licensing statute.  If the legislature sought to ban or regulate 
these practices, the court argued it would need to do so explicitly, as Iowa had done.366
In 1899, the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Liffring supported the earlier lower 
court decision in the Eastman case and confirmed that Osteopathy did not constitute the 
practice of medicine in Ohio.  A grand jury indicted William Liffring for practicing with a 
license, but went to circuit and quashed the indictment.  The state sought to overturn the 
lower court’s decision and prosecute Liffring for violating the state’s licensing law.  
Prosecutors argued that medicine had “a wider significance than has the word drug.”  
They also cited “The Ohio Osteopath,” which was published by the faculty of the Ohio 
Institute of Osteopathy.  This publication identified fifty diseases that could be treated 
successfully by Osteopathy.  The court disagreed and found that the practice of medicine 
required the use of “drug or medicine.”367
In Nelson v. State Board of Health, an Osteopath named Harry Nelson filed a 
petition of equity to enjoin the Kentucky State Board of Health from harassing him.  
Nelson was concerned that the board was going to prosecute him for violating the state’s 
practice and he sought to short circuit their efforts.  They refused to enjoin the board from 
enforcing the law against Nelson.  After the lower Law and Equity Division entered a 
judgment in favor of the board, Nelson asked the Kentucky court of appeals to reverse the 
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decision and force the board to recognize his college, the American College of 
Osteopathy in Kirksville, as legitimate under the state’s medical practice act.368
The Kentucky Court of Appeals determined that American College of Osteopathy 
was not a reputable medical college, but it still found in Nelson’s favor.  The court found 
that Osteopathy did not constitute the practice of medicine and it was unnecessary to for 
the board to evaluate Nelson’s school.  The court stated that because Osteopaths did not 
prescribe drugs or conduct surgery, they were not physicians.  Therefore, Nelson’s 
medical speciality was not covered by the Kentucky medical practice act, and the state’s 
board of health had absolutely no right to interfere.  The American College of Osteopathy 
was not legitimate medical school because its graduates did not practice medicine.  The 
court cited Liffring in support of its decision.369                 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska also wrestled with a similar question of whether 
Osteopathy was a recognizable part of the practice of medicine.  Charles Little, an 
Osteopath, was convicted of practicing medicine without a license.  Little argued at trial 
that he was not a physician under the Nebraska medical practice act.  The Nebraska 
Supreme Court rejected Little’s argument and found that “those who practice osteopathy 
for compensation come within the purview of the statue as clearly as those who practice 
what is known as ‘Christian Science,’ and therefore this case f[ell] within the principle of 
State v. Buswell.”  While the court acknowledged that other courts’ decisions around the 
country were “in conflict with it,” it was satisfied with its decision because Osteopaths 
and physicians had the same goals.  They both sought to restore “the patient to sound 
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bodily or mental condition.”  The court was not interested in quibbling over whether the 
practice of medicine required physicians to prescribe drugs.370 
Unlike the court in Little, the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision focused directly 
on the notion of whether the practice of medicine required use of medicines.  In Bragg v. 
State, E. Eugene Bragg was convicted by the Jefferson County Criminal Court of 
practicing medicine without a license and violating the Alabama medical practice act.  
Bragg appealed to the state’s supreme court to overturn his conviction.  Bragg’s defense 
was that he was not engaged in the practice of medicine because he did not use 
medicines.  The court rejected his claim and stated “the word medicine has a technical 
meaning, is a technical art or science, and as a science the practitioners are not simply 
those who prescribe drugs or other medicinal substances as remedial agents, but it is 
broad enough to include and does include all person who diagnose diseases and prescribe 
or apply any therapeutic agent for its cure.”  The court cited Bibber v. Simpson in support 
of its decision.  As discussed earlier in Bibber, the Maine Supreme Court determined that 
the actions of a medical clairvoyant constituted the practice of medicine.371  Bragg is 
another example of a court that took a broader interpretation of what constituted the 
practice of medicine.  
Since, the courts were deadlocked over the issue of Osteopathy, Osteopaths 
quickly realized that the only way to ensure the survival of their medical speciality was to 
lobby for their own licensing laws.  While a majority of courts exempted Osteopaths 
from licensing laws, Osteopaths wanted their practice to be not only be legal throughout 
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the country, but legitimate.  Like Regulars and Irregulars, Osteopaths quickly organized 
themselves in medical societies and created research journals.  Aside from giving 
Osteopaths a sheen of respectability, the infrastructure gave Osteopaths a way to wage a 
concerted campaign to secure licensing.  Between 1897 and 1901, fifteen states passed 
separate licensing laws for Osteopaths.  Unsurprisingly, most of these state were in the 
Midwest, but New York, California, and Connecticut also passed laws favoring 
Osteopaths.372  
These new laws were not ideal.  In order to secure medical licensing, Osteopaths 
lobbied in favor of laws that were not always particularly beneficial to them.  They 
struggled to get traction in state legislatures, because Osteopaths were hampered by their 
small numbers, the relative youth of the specialty, disorganized campaigns, and lack of 
agreement among themselves about the type of laws that were most appropriate.  In many 
states, efforts to secure legislation flamed out.  In the states where Osteopaths secured 
licensing, they often were placed at the mercy of licensing boards that they did not have 
any representation on.  
One of these states was Illinois which passed a new licensing law in 1899 
designed to license Osteopaths and other medical specialists.  Under the new law, the 
practice of medicine was broadly defined to include physicians who practiced medicine 
and surgery in all their branches and anyone who wished to practice a specific system of 
medicine without the use of medicine or instruments.  This law was designed to put the 
state board of health in charge of all medical practitioners including midwives, 
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Osteopaths and potentially Christian Scientists.  Physicians from the three major medical 
sects controlled the board and Osteopaths had little say over how the law was 
administered.  Even under the 1887 medical practice act, practitioners who rubbed or 
manipulated their patients were classified as physicians.373  Suffice it to say, the state’s 
new law did not necessarily help Osteopaths.  Under Illinois law, Osteopath were 
required to meet the same standards as all other physicians.  They were not given a lower 
standard to become a physician in the state.  Laws like Illinois‘ would require 
Osteopathic schools of medicine to rethink their school’s curriculum to help their students 
pass licensing exams.    
Still, Osteopaths did benefit from a majority of courts’ unwillingness to interfere 
with their practice rights.  Despite the split between the courts, a clear majority ruled that 
Osteopathy did not constitute the practice of medicine.  In some ways, these decisions 
suggested that the ambivalence expressed earlier by courts about medical licensing in 
general.  They did not hesitate to hobble these laws because of sloppy drafting or 
overreaching provisions.  By finding Osteopathy to be outside the practice of medicine, a 
majority of courts sent a clear message to state legislatures that they would not allow an 
expansion of who was a physicians without explicit legislation classifying Osteopath as 
doctors.  
While these decisions typically favored Osteopaths, the outcome was still 
problematic.  These court decisions essentially stated that Osteopaths were not equal to 
physicians as healers.  If Osteopaths wanted to be considered by the public to be 
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legitimate, they needed to gain state validation.  Osteopaths already had been somewhat 
successful in establishing licensing laws in several states between 1892 and 1904, but 
they wanted to create separate licensing boards controlled by Osteopaths and expand the 
legislative recognition of their sect.  With separate boards, Osteopaths could develop their 
own criteria for licensure and increase the status of legitimate practicing Osteopaths.  In 
California alone, the newly established Osteopathic board between 1901 and 1907 issued 
more than nine hundred certificates to practice Osteopathy.374  Even as Regulars, 
Homeopaths, and Eclectics were moving toward unified boards, Osteopaths realized that 
separate boards could preserve their unique sect.  
The American Osteopathic Association developed a model law that was similar to 
licensing laws used to create Regular, Eclectic, and Homeopathic boards.  Osteopathic 
physicians throughout the country pushed for licensing based on this model.  While they 
did not always succeed, as historian Norman Gevitz pointed out, this effort was fairly 
effective.  Despite pushback from the three major medical sects, Osteopaths secured 
practice rights in thirty-nine states and created seventeen independent boards around the 
country by 1913.375  By 1923, Osteopaths secured licensing in forty-six states and about 
half of those states created separate osteopathic boards.  Osteopaths established a secure 
foothold in America and have never relinquished it.  Contrarily, after the major sects 
established unified boards and the AMA admitted Irregulars to its ranks, Eclecticism and 
Homeopathy began their slow decline.   
220
374 Dudley Tait, M.D., “Report of the Committee on Medical Education,” California State Journal 
of Medicine, Vol. VI, No. 5 (1908):  161, http://books.google.com/ebooks.
375 Gevitz, 54-56.  
Christian Scientists were never able to acquire the same type of legislative 
protections for their practice rights as Osteopaths.  Arguably, they did not need protection 
from medical licensing laws because state courts were less willing to rule that they 
practiced medicine.  Unlike Osteopaths who did everything in their power to look, act, 
and behave like traditional doctors, Christian Scientists’ practices were dramatically 
different.  As Osteopathic medical schools began to teach students about surgery and 
obstetrics during the first decade of the twentieth century, Christian Scientists still 
focused on religion and metaphysics.376  Osteopathy quickly began to adopt aspects of 
Regular medicine, and it was even wryly noted by a Regular medical journal that the 
American School of Osteopathy recommended a book list to its students where one-
hundred-and-twelve of the one-hundred-and-eighteen books were written by Regulars.377  
Even more problematic was that when Christian Scientists treated patients, they did not 
behave as doctors and their practices did not resemble traditional medical care.  Even 
though Osteopaths did not utilize drugs, they physically performed active services such 
as manipulating limbs, joints, and muscles.  The differences between the two specialities 
were stark.           
Christian Scientists claimed “that the work of healing through Christian Science is 
accompanied by religious instruction or spiritual teaching which is calculated to destroy 
the foundation of disease.”378  Following Mary Baker Eddy’s teaching in Science and 
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Health with Key to the Scriptures, they argued that Jesus “demonstrated the power of 
Christian Science to heal mortal minds and bodies.”379  Eddy believed that she 
rediscovered Christ’s healing powers after analyzing the Bible.  Essentially, she 
contended that the “mind govern[ed] the body, not partially but wholly.”380  Christian 
Scientists stated it was a sin to take drugs to alleviate suffering or to cure a disease.  
Because the mind governed the body, medicines were unnecessary.  Instead of medical 
treatment, Christian Scientists offered their patients a unified “system of medicine” and a 
“system of ethics” that promised a complete “system of healing.”381  Christian Scientists 
never pretended to be physicians because they believed that doctors were completely 
unnecessary.   
Medical licensing authorities were concerned about the spread of Christian 
Science and began actively to prosecute them for violating licensing laws.  Even though 
they did not behave like traditional physicians, Christian Scientists made it clear that their 
methods could cure human ailments.  Like physicians, they also readily accepted 
payment for their services.  Christian Scientists argued that their system of healing was as 
valid as any other, and defended themselves from overzealous licensing boards by 
alleging that any interference with them was a violation of their First Amendment right to 
freedom of religion.  Clifford Smith, a judge and Christian Science advocate, argued that 
medical regulations discriminated against other healing practices “create[d] a monopoly, 
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and in effect establish[ed] a state system of healing”382  that unfairly discriminated 
against Christian Scientists.  State licensing boards in several states actively pursued 
Christian Scientists.  Historian Rennie Schoelpflin combed through state courts records 
and identified several cases where Christian Scientists were prosecuted for practicing 
without a medical license.  In most of the cases Schoelpflin found these practitioners 
were ultimately exonerated by lower level courts or appellate, but this was not universally 
true.  Some states courts did find that Christian Scientists were practicing medicine.383       
In Nebraska, a Christian Scientist, Ezra M. Buswell, was charged with violating 
the Nebraska medical practice act.  Buswell was acquitted by the district court after it 
ruled that he was not practicing medicine.  The Court of Appeals came to the opposite 
conclusion and found that Buswell was a physician.  Buswell had studied with Mary 
Baker Eddy at the Metaphysical College in Boston.  Buswell was convinced that 
Christian Science was valid system because he was cured of his ailments after his 
conversion.  Buswell stated that he had never administered any medicine to his patients.  
Instead, his treatment centered on reading the scriptures and prayer.  Buswll stated that 
when a person “request[ed] aid and c[a]me to us for and assistance we treat them as a 
mother treats her child that is frightened of objects it fears…we seek to dispel the fear by 
showing them the presence of love…Perfect love casts out fear.”  Buswell admitted 
treating as many as a hundred patients in the previous eighteen months this way.384  
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Buswell stated that payment was not mandatory and he would “leave the question 
to them and God.”385  Still, Buswell hoped his patients would compensate him for his 
services.  He informed his patients that, “[i]f they are not willing to part with the sacrifice 
themselves, it is not expected that those should reap the benefit.”386  The expectation of a 
fee or a gratuity prevented Buswell’s actions from being classified as either “an act of 
worship” or “the performance of a religious duty,” according to the court.  The court 
found that the payments were exchanged for services rendered.387  The court also found 
that Buswell believed that he was similar to a physician.  The court was convinced that 
Buswell “engaged in treating physical ailments of others for compensation.”388  It should 
be noted that the Nebraska Supreme Court found that both Osteopaths and Christian 
Scientists were practicing physicians and held an expansive notion of the “practice of 
medicine.”     
In 1898, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island disagreed with the Nebraska 
Supreme Court and found that Christian Science was not a medical practice.  Walter E. 
Mylod was adjudged “probably guilty” by a district court based on the complaint of the 
secretary of the Rhode Island State Board of Health.  Mylod was convicted after a 
witness testified that he sought Mylod’s help to treat malaria.  Mylod informed the 
witness that he was a doctor and continued to pray for ten minutes during their meeting.  






titled A Defence [sic] of Christian Science.  The witness then paid Mylod one dollar for 
his services and left his office.  Another individual also sought treatment from Mylod and 
received a prayer and copy of a different book, A Historical Sketch of Metaphysical 
Healing.  The second patient also paid Mylod one dollar for each of his visits.  Mylod 
told his patient that he needed to look on the bright side of life because “thought governs 
all things.”389
The court found that Mylod did not practice medicine. Even though Mylod 
referred to himself as “Dr. Mylod,” the court argued that claim did not prove he was 
actually a physician.  Mylod neither attempted to ascertain what ailed the witnesses nor 
took any actions to treat them except praying for them and giving them a book.  Even 
though the secretary of the board of health testified that “physicians often cure disease 
without the use of drugs or medicine,” the court held that “prayer for those suffering from 
disease, or words of encouragement, or the teaching that disease will disappear and 
physical perfection be attained as a result of prayer” did not constitute the practice of 
medicine.390
 In another Christian Science case, the Supreme Court of Ohio was faced with 
determining whether a Christian Scientist who was paid for his services by patients was 
practicing medicine under the Ohio Medical Practice Act.  Unlike the Osteopath in 
Liffring, the Christian Scientist in this case was subject to the 1902 medical practice act, 
not the 1896 version.  The 1902 law expanded the definition of the practice of medicine.  
The new law invalidated Liffring and brought into question an earlier lower court 
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decision stating that under the 1896 law, Christian Scientists were not practicing 
medicine.391  
In the case, the justices admitted that they did not know anything about Christian 
Science.  They relied on evidence presented at trial that Christian Scientists considered 
their practices to be “treatment.”  “If the defendant prayed for the recovery” of the patient 
and cured the patient, then the Christian Scientist “was practicing healing or curing 
disease.”  The medical practice was designed to regulate “the public health and the 
practice of healing,” and it was irrelevant how medical specialists achieved their results.  
In other words, the court found it was “the conclusion of disease” and “not the method of 
treatment” that was subject to the medical law.  The court also rejected the defendant’s 
contention that the law discriminated against his religious beliefs.392
These cases demonstrated the difficulty courts had in defining whether Christian 
Science was the practice of medicine.  William Purrington, the legal counsel for the New 
York State Medical Association at this time, was forced into the uncomfortable position 
of both agreeing that Christian Science was the practice of medicine and disagreeing with 
the principle that praying for patient was barred by licensing laws.  Unlike the Ohio 
Supreme Court in Marble, he believed that it was the method of treatment that was 
regulated and the intent to treat disease that triggered licensing laws.393  Purrington was 
opposed to prosecution of Christian Scientists under licensing statutes.  Purrington’s 
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views most likely were contrary to the beliefs of most of the physicians in the New York 
State Medical Association.   
Ultimately, like Osteopaths, Christian Scientists sought protection from state 
legislatures.  Christian Scientists pursued two different paths with state legislatures.  In 
some cases they attempted to argue that they deserved to be licensed professionals.  Some 
leaders of Christian Science movement in the 1890s and 1900s sought to professionalize 
its ranks by establishing orthodox practices, creating medical journals and societies, and 
building Christian Science medical schools.  These efforts were controversial and did not 
draw support from Eddy.  Other members of the church took an alternative path and 
argued that they should be exempted from licensing laws because they were practicing 
their religion.  After several states “prohibited Christian Science practice or forced 
practitioners to comply with medical practice acts”  and others exempted Christian 
Scientist from medical practice acts and protected their rights, Christian Scientists began 
to favor lobbying for exemptions from licensing laws.394  These two different approaches 
to legalization represented a split within the Christian Science community between 
healers who made a living treating patients, on one hand, and religious adherents, on the 
other.
Christian Science was less successful than Osteopathy in acquiring legal 
recognition in the twentieth century.  Schloepflin identified thirty-eight states between 
1900-1915 that attempted either to ban the practice or force all Christian Scientists to 
comply with medical licensing laws.  But over the twentieth century, many states 
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gradually carved out limited exemptions for Christian Scientists.  As licensing and 
examining boards continued to apply pressure to Christian Science, leaders within the 
Christian Science community shifted away from the professional practice of Christian 
Science medicine.  Christian Science leaders later recognized that “healing the sick [was] 
a consequence of Christian Science practice and not its prime object.”395  Still, Christian 
Scientists continued to ply their trade and charge patients for their services into the 1980s. 
Ultimately, medical licensing boards and physicians from the three major sects 
worked together to challenge the expansion of Osteopathy and Christian Science.  
Whatever differences these sects may have had with each other, they realized that they 
shared common interests and goals.  After working together for thirty years to enact 
licensing, they were not interested in allowing new medical sects to benefit from the 
fruits of their labor.  Medical licensing boards prosecuted Osteopaths and Christian 
Scientists in accordance with the wishes of the three major sects.  By the turn of the 
century, medical licensing continued to unite the three sects.  This unification would 
quicken in the twentieth century.  
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CHAPTER XIV
THE FINAL PIECES
At the same time legislatures and courts were debating Osteopathy and Christian 
Science, the direction of medical licensing was being altered by three distinct events and 
trends.  First, the AMA reversed its long-standing policy and agreed to admit 
Homeopaths and Eclectics to its ranks.  Second, the last few holdout states finally enacted 
medical licensing laws.  One of these, Indiana, was an excellent example of a state that 
delayed enacting licensing, but aggressively enforced it once it was approved.  Finally, as 
mentioned in the previous chapters, states passed laws that recognized the new drugless 
medical sects.  In 1907, the California legislature passed a new medical practice act that 
explicitly addressed the legitimacy of these new medical specialists.  Often, these laws 
carved out special privileges for Osteopaths, but several other drugless medical 
specialists were granted practice rights only if they could pass a fairly traditional medical 
licensing exam.     
In 1870, the AMA had purged the remaining Homeopaths from the Massachusetts 
state medical society, the last state organization that permitted them in its ranks.  The 
AMA along with state and local Regular medical societies around the country kept 
Irregulars out of its organizations for the next thirty years.  In 1901, the AMA embarked 
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on a series long overdue reforms and began to reshape itself into a more representative 
and responsive institution.  This reorganization was inspired partially by the reformation 
of the British Medical Association.396  As part of this reorganization, the AMA began to 
explore reversing its long-standing policy barring the admission of Irregulars.             
While the AMA was the largest of the national medical societies by the 1900s it 
was no longer growing and it failed to play a major role in enacting medical licensing 
across the United States.  The AMA’s influence was fairly limited.  Additionally, Regular 
physicians around the country ignored the AMA’s consultation clause.  Thirty years of 
conflict with Irregulars had accomplished little for the national organization.  The AMA 
was in danger of becoming increasingly irrelevant.
Leaders in the AMA also were concerned that the organization was insufficiently 
democratic.  At annual meetings, members of the AMA voted on issues that affected the 
organization.  Everyone who attended the annual meeting had an equal voice in these 
votes.  Therefore, the decisions made at these meetings did not represent the will of a 
majority of the AMA’s members, but instead reflected the views of the physicians located 
nearest to the AMA conference site.  Typically, most of the attendees at the annual AMA 
conventions were doctors from that region.  The AMA realized that the votes at the 
convention needed to represent a broader scope of the organization’s members.  Instead 
of allowing its policies to be dominated by different groups of regional voters each year, 
it sought to create a system that could more representative of Regulars across the 
country.397 
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The AMA’s exploration of expanding its membership was well-timed because the 
three major medical sects already were starting to merge into a more unified professional 
group.  The AMA had an opportunity to take advantage of the gradual elimination of the 
three medical sects and secure its place as the national association for all physicians.  As 
the three major sects adopted the principles of scientific medicine, sectarian disputes 
were fading away.  Most of these disputes centered around medical beliefs and practices, 
but scientific medicine eroded the legitimacy of each group’s beliefs.  Scientific medicine 
created an understanding of medicine that crossed sectarian borders and united 
physicians.398 
As early as 1893, two Homeopathic medical schools, the Hahnemann Medical 
College of San Francisco and the Homeopathic division of the University of Michigan 
School, repudiated Homeopathic medicine and sought to merge with their Regular 
medical colleges.  As Regular and Homeopathic medicinal practices became increasingly 
similar, the Homeopaths at these schools argued that it made little sense to continue with 
the division.399   
Numerous other medical licensing and state boards of health also had been 
working together in violation of the AMA’s consultation clause by including Irregulars.  
Because most of the board members of these organizations were appointed by governors, 
board members were often the most politically savvy and influential physicians in their 
states.  These board members were typically the most prominent physicians from their 
respective sects in their states.  The connections established in these organizations 
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between these physicians eroded long-standing hostility between the leaders of these 
sects and permitted sectarian physicians to realize that they were fairly similar.       
These alliances permitted some Allopaths to ignore the AMA’s consultation clause 
and accept Homeopaths as “legitimate practitioners.”400  The Medical Society of the State 
of New York broke apart in 1882 after it admitted two former Homeopaths into its ranks.  
After a civil war broke out in the state society, the AMA refused to seat the members of 
the medical society.  Dissenters split from the Medical Society and formed the New York 
State Medical Association.  Over the next thirty year both organizations muddled 
along.401  This dispute shattered the largest and most important Regular medical society 
in the country, but it encouraged other Regular medical societies to do the same.  In 1893, 
a former Homeopath was admitted to the New York Academy of Medicine.  The academy 
was Regular society that had previously been a strong supporter of the AMA’s code of 
ethics.  In 1892, the Mississippi Valley Medical Association (another prominent Regular 
association) also invited Eclectics and Homeopaths to apply for admission.402
Since the breakup of the Medical Society of the State of New York, the AMA 
desperately wanted to unify the state’s Regulars and end this lingering division.  The 
AMA needed to broker a settlement between the two New York Regular medical 
societies, but that would be impossible unless it changed its code of ethics.  Instead of 
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excluding Homeopaths and Eclectics, the AMA seriously investigated inviting them into 
the AMA.403 
Even though Regular, Eclectic, and Homeopathic medicinal practices also were 
increasingly merging together from a therapeutic perspective, the AMA’s longtime 
policies had kept the sects organizationally distinct.  Despite the AMA’s best efforts, its 
code of ethics did not harm Homeopathy or Eclecticism.  Homeopathy and Eclecticism 
thrived even though they were excluded from the AMA and Regular state and local 
medical societies.  Instead of weakening these competing sects, the Regular profession’s 
hostility united and preserved them.  By the turn of the century, the AMA was willing to 
explore more pragmatic options.404
Not only did the AMA fail to destroy the Homeopathy or Eclecticism, the AMA 
itself was struggling.  Instead of being a truly national Regular medical society, it 
behaved more akin to large midwestern regional association.  The AMA failed to expand 
into the South or the West, and its membership represented only eight percent of the 
country’s 100,000 Regulars.405  It was neither a truly national organization nor a 
particularly effective one.  To ensure its survival, the AMA needed to expand its 
membership and broaden its geographical reach.  Admitting Homeopaths and Eclectics to 
the AMA had the potential to achieve both of those goals. 
By 1903, the American Medical Association completed its reorganization and 
agreed to admit Homeopaths and Eclectics to its ranks.  The AMA freed state and local 
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societies and allowed them to admit Irregulars.  In New York, the newer New York 
Medical Association ignored the AMA’s change and sought to preserve the consultation 
clause and the old code of ethics.  This move backfired, and Regulars fled the 
organization and joined Medical Society of the State of New York, which was quickly 
readmitted to the AMA.  Eventually, the New York Medical Association was taken over 
by the medical society, and the state’s Regulars embraced the AMA’s policy change.406  
The AMA ended the division within its largest state organization, and Regular medical 
societies now could recruit from a large pool of potentially new Irregular members.  This 
shift encouraged the AMA and other Regular societies to aggressively court and “absorb” 
Eclectics and Homeopaths.407
The Eclectics and Homeopaths viewed the AMA’s transformation with suspicion.  
Some Eclectics were justifiably concerned that AMA’s primary goal was to swallow 
20,000 “innocent eclectic and homeopathic lambs.”  The AMA’s shift in policy also 
threatened to entice sectarians from their own organizations and into the larger AMA.  
Membership in the AMA promised legitimacy that had eluded Eclectics and Homeopaths 
in some states for years.408  The shift in policy was effective for the AMA.  Not only did 
Eclectics and Homeopaths join the AMA, Eclecticism and Homeopathy began their long 
gradual descent into obscurity or extinction.
As the AMA was reorganizing itself, the last few states transitioned from 
registration laws to comprehensive medical licensing.  Indiana was one of the last states 
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to license its physicians.  Unlike the earlier states, Indiana’s transition to licensing was 
relatively smooth.  Indiana’s medical societies drew from more than twenty years of 
experiences by other state licensing boards when they crafted their licensing medical 
laws.  These laws had been litigated heavily already throughout the country, and Indiana 
had a unique opportunity to pass a law that could potentially avoid legal pitfalls.  
Additionally, the Indiana Board of Health was not hampered by the ambiguity of the 
earlier licensing laws that stalled aggressive enforcement of licensing against illegal 
practitioners.        
After twelve years of laboring under a medical registration law, Indiana passed a 
medical licensing act in 1897.  Before 1897, county clerks issued certificates to practice 
medical to applicants.  Applicants went to their county clerk, presented a copy of their 
medical diploma, and submitted the required affidavits.  Dr. William P. Whery, of the 
Indiana State Medical Society, argued that county clerks did not try “to prevent 
fraudulent claims.”409  Not only did the state not make an effort to restrict the practice of 
medicine to qualified practitioners, it did not have any way to supervise medical study or 
practice in the state.  While Illinois, Indiana’s next-door neighbor, mandated changes in 
the medical education and prosecuted illegal practitioners decades before, Indiana 
registered anyone who presented a diploma and affidavit.  
All of this changed when the Indiana legislature created a licensing statute similar 
to the 1887 Illinois medical practice act and created a unified licensing board.  Applicants 
could earn a certificate if they had a diploma from medical school in good standing or 
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they could submit to a medical examination.  Like previous licensing laws, practitioners 
who served in the state for more than ten years would be waived in after they presented 
their original registration license and two affidavits attesting to that fact.  Midwives had 
exactly the same privileges as physicians and they, too, could apply for a license, but they 
were required to pass the obstetrics portion of the medical examination administered by 
the Indiana board. While midwives were licensed by the board, they lacked 
representation on it.  
Just as in Illinois twenty years earlier, passage of the Indiana medical licensing act 
caused a panic among the state’s most marginal medical practitioners.  Physicians who 
possessed questionable credentials attempted to comply with the new requirements by 
obtaining new medical diplomas.  Some physicians obtained diplomas “from alleged 
schools of medicine so utterly disreputable as to require but little if anything more than a 
commercial consideration for graduation.”410  Because of the large volume of applicants 
and the dubious nature of numerous diplomas, the newly formed State Board of Medical 
Registration and Examination lacked sufficient funds and time to meet all of its 
responsibilities.  It fell behind processing the new applicants.411  Like most state licensing 
boards of the time, the Indiana board did not receive any money from the state.  It was 
supported financially solely by applicant fees.  At its inception, the Indiana board did not 
have a sufficient of amount of money to process the crush of application in a timely 
manner.    
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Still, the Indiana board attempted to expedite the verification process of early 
applicants and approved licenses for physicians with questionable qualifications.  One 
such physician, Dr. John A. Burroughs, initially slipped through the approval process, but 
the Indiana board later reevaluated his eligibility. Burroughs began practicing medicine in 
Indiana in 1896, and he claimed to be a graduate of both the American Eclectic Medical 
College of Cincinnati and the American Medical College of Indianapolis.  Burroughs 
received a license under the previous registration law in 1896, and he applied under the 
new licensing act in 1897.  The Indiana board initially issued Burroughs a new license in 
March 1897 based on provision in the 1897 medical practice act that permitted current 
license holders new licenses.  This issuance appears to have been perfunctory, because by 
October 1897, the Indiana board sought to revoke his license.  The Indiana board alleged 
that he misrepresented “the character of the colleges” on which the original license was 
based, circulated false and obscene literature, and provided false guarantees of cures.412
Burroughs took the Indiana board to court, but he was unable to challenge 
successfully the validity of the Indiana board’s power or the constitutionality of the 
statute.  While the court was concerned that the licensing law was perhaps unwise, 
because “such laws repress independent investigation, and so retard the progress of 
medical knowledge,” it found that was a question better left to the purview of the 
legislature.413  Additionally, the Indiana legislature clearly learned from previous 
licensing laws’ mistakes because the new act gave physicians a right to appeal any 
revocation to the Indiana courts.  Courts previously struck down medical boards’ 
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enforcement abilities because they failed to provide for an appropriate appellate process.  
While courts were still skeptical of the utility of licensing laws, the Indiana act withstood 
court scrutiny.  
Like Burroughs, Eliza Coffin also challenged a decision by the Indiana board for 
refusing to grant her a license to practice medicine.  Coffin practiced in Indiana before 
the 1897 law took effect, but she was not a graduate of a medical school.  The Indiana 
board denied her a license because she was “guilty of gross immorality.”  After the 
Indiana board denied Coffin a license, a proxy of the prosecuting attorney for Starke 
County came to an agreement with Coffin and decided to terminate the prosecution of the 
Indiana board’s appeal.  Under the settlement, Coffin was awarded a license, and the 
board’s objections to her licensing were ignored.  After the prosecuting attorney for 
Starke County was replaced, the new attorney challenged the bargain made by his proxy 
and argued that the prosecuting attorney could not simply dismiss the Indiana board’s 
complaint and license Coffin.  
The Indiana Supreme Court agreed and contended that prosecuting attorneys in 
Indiana had the duty to advocate the position of the board until the appeal’s conclusion.  
In the Coffin case, the medical board’s case was handled by an attorney who was filling 
in for the prosecuting attorney.   This case highlighted a problem faced by medical boards 
throughout the country.  They typically had direct control only over the administrative 
hearings that they held.  Once a physician appealed the Indiana board’s decision to the 
local trial court, medical boards relied on either prosecuting or contract attorneys to 
advocate for their positions.  Medical boards essentially were required to outsource their 
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prosecution efforts.  In the Coffin case, the failure of their attorney to prosecute Coffin 
undermined the ability of the Indiana board to enforce medical licensing, but the court 
ultimately supported the board’s authority under the law.  Still, if the next prosecuting 
attorney had not reexamined this case, the Board would have been forced to license 
Coffin.414  
By 1901, the Indiana board contracted a private legal firm, Gavin & Davis 
(Gavin), to represent the Indiana board and to prosecute individuals under the medical 
practice act.  Gavin appeared to have been working in concert with prosecuting attorneys 
around the state.  In some cases Gavin served as the prosecuting attorney, but in others, 
the county prosecuting attorney was in charge.  Regardless of who handled the 
prosecution, Gavin began to issue yearly reports to the Indiana board in 1901.  While 
Gavin identified the defendants, the reports often failed to provide details of its cases.  In 
its first report to the Indiana Board, Gavin stated it prosecuted twenty-seven separate 
physicians.  Gavin’s report showed that eleven of the cases prosecuted by it were 
ultimately successful; it had either secured a conviction or affirmed the decision of a trial 
to revoke a medical license.  Each of the convictions resulted only in twenty-five-dollar 
fines.  Five of the cases were concluded when the defendants either fled or left the state.  
On four occasions, juries acquitted defendant physicians.  The Indiana board or circuit 
courts dismissed another three cases, and five cases were still pending.415
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In 1902, Gavin failed to provide a complete breakdown of all of the cases it 
prosecuted, but it discussed a number of key cases decided during the year.  In State v. 
Parks, George Parks, a magnetic healer, was convicted of practicing without a license.  
Parks appealed his conviction, but the court sided with the Indiana board.  It upheld the 
medical practice act and found that magnetic healing was not a separate school of 
medicine.  Parks argued that the provision of the 1901 law granting Osteopaths a limited 
right to practice medicine was discriminatory, because it did not provided for other sects, 
such as magnetic healers.  The court disagreed and determined the legislature was well 
within its authority to provide limited practice rights only to Osteopaths.  Therefore, it 
was unnecessary for the Indiana board to license magnetic practitioners.  If magnetic 
healers wanted to practice medicine, they would need to be a graduate of a medical 
school in good standing and pass the examination administered to physicians.416
The Parks decision had an immediate effect in Indiana because another magnetic 
healer in Montgomery County left the state two days after the decision was rendered.  
This magnetic healer already had been indicted for numerous violations of the medical 
practice act and tried once for violating the act.  In his first trial, the jury became 
deadlocked and failed to decide the case.  After the Parks case, any ambiguity regarding 
the status of magnetic healing would have disappeared.  Therefore, a conviction, while 
not assured, became much more likely.  Instead of fighting the case, the healer fled for 
greener pastures.417
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In 1904, Gavin reported that it had initiated approximately twenty prosecutions.  
Of those prosecutions, a third resulted in convictions, a third in acquittals or dismissals, 
and the other third still were pending.418  While Gavin was prosecuting twenty cases a 
year, the Indiana board did not have the resources to investigate questionable 
practitioners throughout the state.  Therefore, the Seventh Annual Report of the Indiana 
Board asked people to conduct investigations on their own and report any evidence of a 
criminal practice to the board.  In order to facilitate this, the annual report included a 
checklist and affidavits for potential informants to use to substantiate their claims.  The 
checklist included the following suggestions:
“1. Ascertain from County Clerk or Secretary of the Medical Board whether 
accused has license to practice medicine.
2.  Get statements, signed and in writing if possible showing-
 a. Who made first arrangement with the accused.
 b. The name of the patient and the character of the   
 diseases treated.
 c. What examination and diagnosis was made.
 d. What treatment was prescribed or given.
 e. How long the treatment continued.
 f. What was the result.
 g. What was the compensation paid and by whom paid.
j.   A copy of any advertisement:
m.  Examine records for birth or death returns.”419
Whether this checklist was distributed only through the Indiana board’s annual reports is 
unknown, but it was clearly encouraging physicians and private citizens to investigate 
and report any suspicious activities by other physicians.   
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The Indiana board’s efforts to enlist informants bore fruit in 1905 when it revoked 
Dr. John Milton Rhodes’ license for offering to perform an abortion.  Rhodes graduated 
from the Marion-Sims College of Medicine of St. Louis in 1899.  He received his license 
from the Indiana board that year and began practicing medicine in Indianapolis.  Rhodes 
believed that Boykin falsely testified after she approached him for an abortion.  She 
claimed that he offered to abort her pregnancy for “$10, $15, or $25 according to the 
character of the operation.”  Rhodes alleged that the Indiana board hired Boykin to solicit 
abortions from various physicians.  He also claimed that the Indiana board used Boykin 
and another unnamed man because it “desired to make some examples in order to stop 
abortions.”420  Rhodes was concerned that the Indiana board would not make Boykin 
available for him to question at the revocation hearing.  When Rhodes learned that he had 
been summoned to appear before the Indiana board, he short-circuited the process by 
filing a permanent injunction and temporary restraining order against the Indiana board to 
prevent it from revoking his license.  A circuit court judge agreed and granted Rhodes’s 
injunction and temporary restraining order.  The Indiana board appealed his decision.421 
The five members of the Indiana board stated on appeal that they had not hired 
Boykin and did not plan to make an example of him.  Instead, the Indiana board stated 
that not only would Rhodes be permitted to question Boykin, but he could also produce 
his own witnesses to refute her testimony.  The Indiana board claimed that it would 
evaluate the evidence fairly and impartially determine whether the preponderance of the 
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evidence supported revocation.422  The only fact that the Indiana board and Rhodes 
agreed on was that Boykin was no longer in Indiana and she could not be compelled to 
testify at his hearing.  
The Supreme Court of Indiana found that Rhodes could not prevent the Indiana 
board’s hearing from going forward.  If Rhodes wanted to challenge the allegations, he 
could do so at their hearing.  Additionally, the medical practice act permitted Rhodes to 
appeal any decision made by the Indiana Board to the court system.  It reversed the 
decision of the trial court and annulled the temporary injunction.  Despite the Supreme 
Court’s decision, the Indiana board did not revoke Rhodes’ medical license.  As late as 
1911, Rhodes was still a legally practicing physician in Indianapolis.423   
Indiana essentially went through the same process as other states that adopted the 
medical licensing statutes, but in Indiana it was a much smoother transition.  The Indiana 
courts did not challenge the authority of the Indiana board to regulate physicians and 
midwives because they were persuaded to follow earlier decisions that had sustained 
licensing.  The Indiana board was able to move quicker than other states to expand its 
enforcement efforts.  Indiana’s law licensing had been designed to withstand the type of 
legal challenges that had been successful in the past and avoid the setbacks that had 
plagued other licensing laws.    
Only six states and territories (Michigan, Idaho, Oklahoma, Vermont, Kansas, and 
Alaska) created examining boards after Indiana.  By 1903, Alaska was the only state or 
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territory that had not created a type of medical examining board.  Additionally, by 1901, a 
large majority of states required new applicants to be graduates of approved medical 
schools.  Fourteen states did not require applicants to be graduates of medical school and 
another seventeen states did not exclude graduates from underperforming medical 
schools, but many of these applicants were required to pass licensing exams.424  Medical 
licensing laws were becoming standardized enough that several states began developing 
reciprocity agreements with each other.  As standards became more consistent across 
state lines, physicians again were given the opportunity to move freely from state to state 
without having to take an examination for each move.
As medical boards successfully consolidated the medical profession, they 
strengthened the requirements for medical schools.  As state medical boards increasingly 
emphasized clinical and laboratory education, commercial medical schools became less 
able to pay for these educational necessities.  By 1906, there were one hundred and sixty 
medical schools in the United States, and a study by the AMA concluded that many of 
those schools were worthless. The worst schools lacked laboratory equipment that was 
essential for teaching medical science.  Not only did the study demonstrate that many of 
the schools were woefully underperforming, but it highlighted that medical students 
could no longer afford to pay what it cost to teach them.  Medical schools had to “secure 
state aid and private endowment” to ensure a quality education.425  Physicians believed 
that one of the best ways to improve the quality of education at the country’s medical 
244
424 Harmowy: 113.
425 Transactions of the Indiana State Medical Association Fifty-Eighth Annual Session (1907):  
452-453, http://books.google.com/ebooks.
schools was to require all physicians to take an exam to practice medicine.  In California, 
the state legislature not only decided to require applicants to attend legally chartered 
medical schools, but required all physicians to pass a comprehensive medical exam 
regardless of their medical sect after 1907.  
As part of the 1907 licensing law, the California legislature also addressed how to 
license the growing number of drugless specialists.  Osteopaths were the most prominent 
drugless practitioners, but other specialists such as magnetic healers, naturopaths, 
neuropaths, electric healers, and Chinese medical doctors continued their practices into 
the twentieth century.  These physicians and medical specialists in the state of California 
battled with each other for control over licensing in the state.  In February 1907, the 
California State Journal of Medicine (the official of the journal California State Medical 
Association) reported that there were numerous medical licensing bills were being 
peddled to the state legislature.  The journal complained that a number of these bills 
related to the “licensing of osteopaths, naturopaths, neuropaths, etc.”  The journal was 
concerned that layman would not realize “the true nature of bill like the naturopathy bill 
which would license any form of quackery known.”426
The Los Angeles Times reported that a lobby was forming to break up the 
“Doctors’ Trust.”  According the Times, several different “pathies,” including osteopathy, 
naturopathy, hydropathy, and chromopathy were lobbying for legislative recognition 
under the law.427  Members of the Regular medical society and its members from the 
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State Board of Medical Examiners favored preserving the 1901 Medical Practice.428  One 
bill proposed by a Regular member of the state legislature would have required 
Osteopaths to pass the same exam as Regulars, Homeopaths, and Eclectics, while bill 
sought to preservethe pre-existing separate Osteopathic board.429 
Ultimately, the legislature passed a law that kept the unified board of medical 
examiners and added two Osteopathic members to the new eleven-person board.  The law 
also authorized awarding three different types of licenses.  The first license authorized a 
physician to “practise medicine and surgery.”  The second permitted Osteopaths to 
practice medicine, and the third certificate was designed to be a catchall for any other 
medical specialists who wanted to practice in the state.        
To be eligible for any of the three certificates, applicants had to graduate from a 
legally chartered medical school and pass an examination administered by the board.  To 
practice “medicine and surgery,” the applicant had to be a graduate of a school that 
followed the requirements of the Association of American Medical Colleges.  The 
Association of American Medical Colleges was an organization sponsored by the AMA 
that was seeking to reform medical education in the United States.  Applicants for an 
Osteopathic certificate had to present a diploma from a legal chartered school of 
Osteopathy.  Any other applicant had to present a diploma from a “legally chartered 
college of the system or mode of treatment which the applicant claims or intends to 
follow.”  
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The legislature also required that all applicants were required to pass an exam 
administered in English on anatomy, histology, gynecology, pathology bacteriology, 
chemistry and toxicology, physiology, obstetrics, general diagnosis, and hygiene.  
Applicants would be tested on ten questions in each of these areas and they would be 
graded on scale of one to ten.  In order to pass the exam, applicants had to average at 
least seventy-five percent over the entire exam and no less than sixty percent on any one 
subject.  While California legislature gave all medical specialists an opportunity to 
practice medicine in California, applicants essentially needed a traditional medical 
education in order to pass the state’s exam.  It would be difficult for any medical 
specialist to pass this exam unless they previously attended a comprehensive medical 
school for Regulars, Homeopaths, Eclectics, or Osteopaths.430
The legislature also designed the law to permit the board to enforce a code of 
ethics and gave the board the power to revoke licenses.  The board was required by the 
legislature to deny a license to any applicant who was proven guilty of unprofessional 
conduct in the past. The statute defined unprofessional conduct as taking part in an 
abortion, “willfully betraying a professional secret,” advertising in a way that was 
intended to deceive the public, running advertisements that claimed to regulate “the 
monthly periods of women,” any conviction for “moral turpitude,” “habitual 
247
430 “Medicine - Practice of Medical Examiners”, (Stats. and Amdts. 1907, p. 252, ch. 212), The 
Statutes of California and Amendments to the Codes Adopted at the Special Session, 1906 and the 
Regular Session, 1907, Annotated,  (Bender-Chaquette Company, San Francisco, 1907), 734-738, 
http://books.google.com/ebooks.
intemperance,” or practicing under a false name.431  The California law clarified the 
rights and responsibilities of the board and established what type of unprofessional 
conduct was impermissible.  Previous laws in other states were much less explicit about 
type of conduct that was considered unprofessional and what actions a board could take 
against unethical physicians.   
While the law explicitly disclaimed discrimination against any specific medical 
sect, the law raised the bar for all medical practitioners.  The California law forced 
Osteopathic medical schools to broaden their curriculum beyond physical manipulation 
and into traditional medical subjects.  Additionally, nauropaths, neuropaths, hydropaths, 
Christian Scientists, and other specialists would pass the examinations only if they were 
already well-versed in the medicine.  These smaller medical specialities did not have the 
resources or comprehensive medical schools like the three major sects or Osteopathy.  
Even though Mary Baker Eddy and the Church of Christ, Science opened the 
Massachusetts Metaphysical College in 1882, she closed it in 1889 and converted into a 
mail-driven degree program.432  This new law effectively would bar most other medical 
specialists, including Christian Scientists, from legally practicing medicine in state.       
  In addition to targeting the more formalized “pathies,” the legislature also sought 
to marginalize traditional Chinese “physicians and herb givers.”  Chinese medicine was 
not considered to be a particular school of medicine under the law.  Even if a Chinese 
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doctor was graduate of a Chinese medical school, it was unlikely that the state board of 
medical examiners would have considered it to be legally chartered.  In Los Angeles 
alone, their were dozens of Chinese doctors outside of Chinatown and many more who 
practiced within the Chinese enclave.  The Los Angeles Times speculated that Chinese 
doctors would be limited to practicing in Chinatown under the law.433  
By the summer of 1907, the Los Angeles Times’ prediction proved correct.  The 
new state board of medical examiners began to crack down on Chinese herb doctors in 
the state.  In June, the board arrested managers of three of the largest herb pharmacies in 
Los Angeles.  The board promised to reveal that not only were these pharmacies 
exploiting their patients by charging them large sums for bottles of alfalfa juice, but that 
Chinese herb doctors actually were backed by “white men.” The board argued that these 
“white directors” were making huge sums of money from “white women” who 
frequented these pharmacies.  The board also claimed that they were targeting only 
Chinese pharmacies run by “quacks” and not more legitimate operations.434  The 1907 
law gave the board an opportunity to target Chinese practitioners, and it acted 
immediately.  Whether the board’s action were predominately motivated by paternalism, 
racism, or concern for the welfare of California consumers, or all of the above is difficult 
to ascertain.  Regardless of the motivations, Chinese physicians were increasingly 
marginalized by the new law.
Aside from targeting Chinese doctors, the new board also expelled one of their 
longtime members and their former chairman of the board.  Dr. Dudley Tait was a 
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prominent Regular physician and a longtime member of the board.  He was also the most 
polarizing figure during his long tenure on the previous unified board.  Various medical 
sects, including Eclectics, accused Tait of discriminating against Irregular practitioners.  
Some Eclectics lobbied for the 1907 law because they hoped that it would allow them 
finally to get Tait off the board.   Although his term expired in 1907 and he was not 
appointed to the board by the governor, Tait was hired by the board to serve as its 
secretary.  The board hired Tait even though it was no longer controlled by Regulars.  
Regulars had only five members of the eleven-person board.  Soon after his hiring, the 
Homeopathic, Eclectic, and Osteopathic members of the board grew weary of his 
presence and decided to end Tait’s affiliation with the board after he was accused of 
wielding undue influence over the Regular members.  The Los Angeles Times reported 
that Tait “was inclined to overstep bounds over reason” to prevent certain types of 
physicians from practicing in the state.  The dismissal of Tait was in response to 
numerous negative responses to the board since it was revamped.  Some of the newer 
board members were disturbed enough by his conduct that they raised the ratings of 
several medical schools that they believed were singled out by Tait.435  Instead of 
exacerbating tensions between sectarians, the new board finally decided to ease tensions 
by terminating its most controversial physician.   
Despite the dismissal of Tait, the new medical board struggled to find its footing.  
By the time the 1908 legislative session rolled around that “rollicking vaudeville 
entertainment know as ‘Medical Bills’ [was] booked for another run before the 
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Legislature of California.”  Some Regulars and Eclectics actually wanted to reinstate 
separate boards, but Osteopaths were satisfied by the new law even though the 1907 law 
eliminated their separate board.  Despite these calls for reform, some physicians argued 
that the laws only had been in effect for twenty months and needed more time shake 
out.436  The law was not revised until 1913, but the continued discussions about the form 
of medial licensing demonstrated that even after thirty years, physicians failed to create a 
consensus regarding medical licensing.  By 1910, states still were constantly passing new 
laws and revising old ones.      
This problem represented a broader dilemma for advocates of medical licensing 
throughout this entire time period.  No matter what type of licensing law was passed by a 
state legislature, there were physicians or medical specialists who were dissatisfied with 
whatever compromise the legislature reached.  This problem was present after the first 
licensing laws were passed and continued as multiple medical sects competed against 
each other in the medical marketplace.  The nonstop debate of the form of licensing was a 
constant feature of this period and would continue well into the twentieth century.       
While the debate over the form of licensing continued, people no longer 
questioned whether licensing was necessary.  Thirty years of licensing had overcome 
earlier misgivings and convinced physicians that it was essential.  What had started as a 
binary dispute between Regulars and Irregulars had grown more complex as new medical 
specialists challenged Regular, Eclectic, and Homeopathic dominance over licensing, but 
Regulars and Irregulars were unquestionably united in their support of licensing.  
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Additionally, what had started as an effort to force physicians to register with their county 
clerks had morphed into system that required almost all applicants, regardless of sect, to 
be graduates of medical schools and to pass a medical examination to receive a license.  
Licensing created new governmental or quasi-governmental institutions that enforced 
new rules and were given the power to revoke licenses.  Future debates would no longer 
question the ability of states to license physicians, but the scope of physicians’ control 




In 1914, Frederick R. Green in an AMA publication on the history of licensing 
stated that the previous forty years of “public health legislation has been chaotic, 
uncorrelated, subject to accident rather than to design and in a large measure the result of 
compromise, following more or less spasmodic and intermittent effort.”  He bemoaned 
that public health legislation was driven less by science and public health concerns, than 
by “political or personal influence, rather than through convincing the public or 
legislation of their merit.”  Because these bills were by their very nature political, they 
were often poorly constructed laws which ultimately were “emasculated by 
compromises.”  Once these bills were passed, they often either mismanaged or they were 
given too little attention.437  Green’s assessment was mostly correct.  These laws often 
were problematic and did not necessary achieve the goals sought by medical societies, 
but despite these problems, elite physicians still succeeded in spreading these laws 
throughout the country.  
Medical licensing was not demanded by the public to solve a problem.  Physicians 
almost exclusively promoted and lobbied for medical licensing.  While many people were 
concerned about the practice of medicine in the United States, physicians convinced state 
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legislatures that licensing laws were necessary and could improve American medicinal 
practice.  Physicians did everything they could think of to make medical licensing 
palatable for state legislatures.  There is little evidence that large numbers of physicians 
bribed legislators, as they did in Oregon, to pass licensing laws, but physicians did 
everything in their power to make these laws appealing to state legislatures.  In most 
states, that meant tying licensing to popular public health laws. 
The emergence of medical licensing was a story of messy, incremental changes in 
numerous states over a forty-year period.   No single event convinced either the general 
public or state legislatures that medical licensing was essential.  While the Bowlsby death 
may have pushed physicians to lobby for licensing in New York in 1871, most states did 
not have any such galvanizing event.  Instead, Regular and Irregular medical societies 
succeeded in passing medical licensing because they successfully tied pubic health 
reforms and never relented in their pursuit of licensing.  Previously licensing was 
perceived by the public and state legislatures as a dispute between competing medical 
sects for market dominance, but physicians successfully turned it into a discussion about 
public health.  Organized, educated Regular and Irregular physicians gradually convinced 
state legislatures that medical licensing was a key component to public health.  If medical 
societies had not tied public health and medical licensing together so well, it may have 
taken much more time to enact state licensing. 
Medical societies’ approach to passing medical legislation made sense. States 
aggressively passed numerous medical regulatory laws throughout the nineteenth century. 
Not only did states pass these laws, they consistently were deemed constitutional under 
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the state’s police power.  By explicitly tying medical licensing to other types of public 
health reforms, licensing advocates ensured that these laws would be found 
constitutional.438  Physicians not only passed the laws, but built a strong argument for 
licensing at the same time that would withstand judicial scrutiny. 
Courts, despite their skepticism, universally ruled that licensing law were 
constitutional under the state police powers.  Even while approving these laws, however, 
many of the state court decisions expressed concerns about medical licensing.  Often, 
courts appeared disturbed that licensing laws interfered with the intimate decision made 
by patients when they entrusted physicians with their lives.  Medical licensing laws also 
upended free-market principles in favor of government regulation.  Courts often were 
hostile to this significant shift.  Courts also tried to influence the direction of licensing 
laws by restricting powers used by the boards to sanction physicians or revoke licenses.  
They also struck down laws because they were overly broad or poorly drafted.  Still, the 
basic principle that states had the right to license never truly was established by the 
courts.
Aside from convincing the courts that licensing laws were legal, organized, 
educated Regulars and Irregulars worked together to enact these law despite legitimate 
reasons to distrust and dislike one another.  Eclectics and Homeopaths understood that the 
original primary motivation behind licensing for Regulars was a desire to eliminate their 
Irregular competitors. Despite this recognizing the Regulars bad intentions, organized, 
educated Homeopaths and Eclectics aided Regulars in their fight for licensing.  Without 
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Irregular help, Regulars would have found it far more difficult, and in some states 
impossible, to enact any significant medical licensing laws.  While the previous historical 
literature focused on the battle between Regular and Irregular physicians, this binary 
dynamic needs to be reevaluated. Organized, educated Regular and Irregular physicians 
formed tacit alliances to pass these laws and then pushed their unorganized, uneducated 
colleagues out of the profession.  
These alliances between elite Regulars and Irregulars strained unity within the 
three medical sects.  The medical sects experienced divisive debates about licensing.  
Licensing divided the Eclectics into warring camps.  Younger, educated and organized 
Eclectics ended up collaborating with Regulars to pass laws and ensure their smooth 
operation.  In states like Oregon, older, uneducated Regular physicians were the 
opponents and prevented licensing laws from being enacted for years.  Divisions between 
older physicians and younger physicians who possessed medical degrees were 
pronounced.  The fight for licensing convinced many Regulars and Irregulars that their 
interests were more aligned with each other than with physicians in their own sectarian 
medical societies.      
While William Rothstein’s statement that “conflict between regular physicians 
and homeopaths and eclectics continued to be a dominant feature of the organized 
profession in the later years of the century” is certainly true, that conflict appears less 
important to the development of American medical licensing than the eventual 
collaboration among organized Allopaths, Eclectics and Homeopaths.439  If anything, 
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medical licensing allowed Regulars and Irregulars to discover their common interests and 
collaborate with each other.  Regulars and Irregulars worked together on numerous state 
health boards.  Eclectics, Homeopaths, and Regular worked together to pass more 
restrictive and comprehensive medical licensing bills throughout this period.  Regulars 
and Irregulars labored together to drive out unorganized sects and fraudulent 
practitioners.  The collaboration between Regulars and Irregulars along with fundamental 
changes in the understanding of medicine slowly melted away differences among the 
three major medical sects.    
By passing medical licensing, organized, educated physicians created an 
environment where Regulars, Homeopaths, and Eclectics established a more unified and 
less sectarian medical system.  Changes in medical science aided this unification, but 
licensing laid the foundation for this transition.  By 1903, even the AMA permitted 
Eclectics and Homeopaths to join its ranks.  In many states, Regulars, Eclectics, and 
Homeopaths worked together to exclude Osteopaths, Christian Scientists, and other 
medical specialties from practicing medicine. 
Despite the opposition of the three major sects, Osteopaths also succeeded in 
carving out licensing for their medical specialty by mimicking the efforts of traditional 
sects.  By quickly building institutions such as medical schools, local, state and national 
societies and journals, Osteopaths acquired a sheen a credibility that other medical 
specialists lacked.  Additionally, Osteopathic medical schools quickly incorporated 
scientific and traditional medicine into their curriculum, despite internal disagreement.  
This allowed their graduates to acquire licenses in states such as California that required 
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them to pass comprehensive medical exams.  Osteopaths also aggressively pushed for 
licensing across the country even though many courts ruled that they did not need them.
Osteopaths also benefitted from the earlier exceptions carved out by Homeopaths 
and Eclectics when licensing laws first were established.  Osteopaths quickly made 
alliances with prominent politicians and successfully pushed for separate licensing boards 
as did their Irregular colleagues years before. These separate boards help preserve some 
of the distinctiveness of Osteopaths longer, as the three major sects slowly merged 
together.  
Medical licensing also laid groundwork for future medical education reforms.  
Even though licensing laws were perceived to be ineffective, medical licensing boards, 
especially Illinois’s board, radically altered medical education between 1870 and 1900.  
By the end of this period, medical schools admitted students who were more prepared for 
medical school than anytime before.  They also required medical schools to add several 
years onto their degree programs and forced them to invest in clinical training for their 
students to comply with the requirements of the state board.  These laws also reduced and 
eventually eliminated physicians who were not graduates of medical schools.  Finally, as 
most licensing boards shifted to requiring all applicants to take exams, licensing boards 
dictated which subjects were taught in medical schools.  Illinois‘ board was able to force 
medical schools to change their curriculum because Chicago had more medical students 
than any of city and physicians from around the country wanted to practice in the rapidly 
growing metropolis.       
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While historian James Burrows in Organized Medicine in the Progressive Era 
described reform efforts after 1900, he did not sufficiently acknowledge that these 
reforms would not have been possible without the creation of state medical boards in the 
nineteenth century.440  Without these state medical boards and the powers that courts 
already had granted to them, it would have been difficult to enforce more selective 
standards.  Efforts to revamp medical licensing were only achievable after the 
implementation of medical licensing.  These laws served as a beachhead for the more 
restrictive laws that would be proposed in the twentieth century.   
Licensing laws also demonstrated how regulation could alter the operation of free 
markets.  Licensing created state and quasi-governmental organizations that exerted 
authority over the country’s physicians.  By 1910, it was no longer possible for anyone to 
put out a sign and call themselves a doctor.  Most physicians had to graduate from a 
three-year medical school and pass a licensing examine that tested multiple subjects.  
Medical licensing represented a significant expansion of state power.  
State governments intentionally interfered with the medical marketplace and 
forced patients to pick physicians who were vetted by either the state or quasi-
governmental organizations.  Since these laws were upheld universally, they did represent 
a significant expansion of a state power.  Most of these laws created new hybrid, public/
private organizations, which administered and enforced these regulations.  The state 
licensing or examining boards often were independent government agencies, which were 
managed and funded almost exclusively by physicians.  The state essentially ceded 
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control of medicine to quasi-public organizations and gave them the power to license and 
prosecute physicians for their misdeeds.  Oddly enough, these quasi-public organizations 
were given a fair amount of latitude to regulate and enforce medical laws as they saw fit.  
State governments exerted little control over these independent organizations.  
These laws also demonstrated that the expansion of state governmental power 
after 1870 was significant.  William Novak previously had explained that the American 
state during the nineteenth century was not as weak was once believed.  Novak showed 
that there was a great deal of regulation at the local level.  Communities consistently used 
nuisance laws as a beachhead for the expansion of state power.  Novak discussed the 
expansion of health-policing laws during the Gilded Age.  He saw the rapid expansion of 
laws that depended on the state’s police power.  States actively passed laws regulating 
sanitation and quarantine.  He simply missed that medical licensing laws were passed in 
conjunction with these other health laws.  Arguably the medical licensing laws were more 
significant because licensing had a much more tenuous connection to police powers than 
sanitation or quarantine laws.441  
Medical licensing laws resembled other regulations that were promulgated during 
this era.  Susan Pearson recently investigated the expansion of laws protecting animals 
and children during the Gilded Age.  It is startlingly how similar these laws were to 
medical licensing.  Both of these laws relied upon on an expansive reading of state police 
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powers by legislatures and the courts.  In both situations states often relied on quasi-
governmental organizations to administer and enforce these laws.442
 Doctors were not only some of the earliest proponents for expanding the 
regulatory state, but also some of the most effective.  While physicians often failed to 
immediately achieve their stated goals, licensing laws, along with these other regulatory 
reforms, allowed physicians to take control of American health care.  Their success in 
regulating medicine demonstrated a newfound willingness of legislatures and courts to 
intervene in personal contracts.  The spread of medical regulation is remarkable because 
all physicians, regardless of sect or medical therapy, were only beginning to use science 
to understand medicine.  Physicians successfully persuaded state legislatures to upend the 
conventional wisdom that free markets were the best way to determine which physicians 
were the most effective and to rely instead on a regulated market.  
Past discussion about licensing focused more on why physicians pursued 
licensing.  The answer is surprisingly simple.  Organized, educated physicians, (Regular, 
Eclectic, Homeopath, or Osteopathic) had several extremely powerful reasons to enact 
licensing and very few good reasons to oppose it.  Clearly, most physicians believed that 
they would make more money if the most marginal physicians or medical practitioners 
were excluded from the medical marketplace.  The patients of those quacks, charlatans, 
or marginal practitioner would be forced to use legitimate practitioners.  Licensing 
offered physicians an opportunity to make a better living then they had in the past.      
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Licensing also offered the potential to turn medicine into a respectable profession.  
The medical marketplace in 1870 was chaotic.  Nostrum pushers, patent medicine 
physicians, and quacks of all stripes were common in this era.  It is abundantly clear from 
perusing any nineteenth century newspaper that the medical marketplace was overrun by 
frauds.  Physicians often were repulsed by the ridiculous claims of these charlatans and 
quacks.  Doctors constantly made outrageous claims regarding their medical prowess and 
curative powers every day in these advertisements.  During this era, educated physicians 
increasingly understood that they knew less about illness and disease than they previously 
believed.  Legitimate physicians were understandably upset that the public fell prey to 
healers who clearly were scamming their patients.  Physicians understandably did not 
want patients to be seduced by false promises, but pay for the services of legitimate 
physicians.  Licensing gave organized, educated physicians a way to eliminate these 
competitors and license only respectable physicians.    
State-sponsored licensing also gave not just individual physicians credibility, but 
entire sects.  Once states’ recognized Homeopathy and Eclecticism, they thrived because 
they could demonstrate to the public that their medical practices were deemed legitimate.  
Additionally, as scientific medicine advanced during this era, physicians began to acquire 
credibility that doctors, due their sectarian differences, previously lacked.  Licensing also 
helped advance scientific medicine in the United States by requiring medical schools to 
teach it.      
  Ultimately, medical licensing was wildly successful for physicians.  Licensing 
allowed physicians to dominate health care in the United States into the twenty-first 
262
century.  Whether an individual suffers from a sprained ankle or lymphoma, he or she 
most likely will end up in front of licensed physician.  Licensing effectively restricted the 
number of medical specialists who could treat patients in the United States.  Licensing 
also standardized medical education for all physicians.  Instead of attending different and 
distinct graduate school programs in surgery, psychiatry, or internal medicine, any one 
who wants to be a physician is required to go to medical school.  People still question 
whether physicians were too successful in expanding their role over medicine during the 
Gilded Age.  
Aside from historian Ronald Harmowy, who argued that licensing dramatically 
increased the costs of health care for Americans, other people have began to question 
aspects of American medical licensing.  As recently as October 14, 2013, the National 
Journal Online published an article titled “Lifting Doctor-Licensing Restrictions Could 
Drive Competition, Lower Costs.”  The author of the article described efforts to lift 
restrictions on foreign-born physicians, expand the ability of nurses to prescribe 
medicine, and embrace telemedicine.  When the California legislature sought to expand 
nurses’ scope of practice, the California Medical Association served its traditional role 
and effectively quashed the legislation.  The American Medical Association aggressively 
has opposed any efforts that they believed encroached on the privileges of physicians.  
Additionally, state medical groups have opposed efforts to expand the distances that 
physicians can practice telemedicine to limit competition between physicians.443 
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Physicians still are fighting in the state legislatures to preserve their authority and 
privileges.  Licensing helped physicians define the practice of medicine in an 
exceptionally broad and beneficial way for them.  It is unlikely that they willingly would 
allow any other medical specialists to intrude on their turf.  The contours of their power 
were ultimately defined during the first forty years of medical licensing.         
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